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INTRODUCTION 
1. The Problem of this Thesis is to determine Whether 
the conception of God held by Dr. Albert Cornelius Knudson, 
Dean Emeritus of the Boston University School of Theology, is 
self-consistent, consistent with all the known facts of' exper• 
ience, consistent with all other propositions held to be true~: 
explanatory and interpretative of all the relations and facts 
of experience, and fruitful to the individual who holds such 
1 
a view •. 
2. The S:oope of this Thesis is limited to the philosoph! 
a:al and theological views of God as held by Dr. Knudson and 
to the ra levant views of othera·wh.ich he discusses~ . Since 
Dr. Knudson is a philosopher as we 11 as a theologian and 
. because theology and philosophy are so closely related and 
interpenetrating at this point, it is almost impossible to 
differentiate _:between his philosophical and theological views 
of God. Practically speaking, these views may be considered_ 
to coincide and he might be called appropriately a philo~ 
sophiaal theologian. But in this thesis the emphasis is 
placed on the philosophical rather than the theological in· 
dealing with the problem specified~ above; such problems as the 
trinity being considered mainly from a philosophiaal approach • . 
1. Adapted from E. s. Brightman's definit1.on of coherence as 
found in his A Philosophy of Religion, P• 128. Cf. also 
to his Nature and Values, 106•107. , 
1 
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There is a definite attempt to give all relevant arguments and 
data the proper amount of weight and consideration, and so to 
judge them on the basis of the ultimate criterion: the philo• 
sophical coherence of all experience. 
3. The Method Used in ~his Thesis is essentially that 
of: : (1) depioting Knudson's views of God; and (2) criticizing 
or commenting on these views. In carrying out the first stage 
of the method, there has been an attempt to portray the views 
of Knudson as accurately as possible and in the terms that 
it is believed Knudson would use~ In many oases this has 
resulted in paraphrasing or summarizing Knudson's statements 
as presented in his many works. It has also resulted in the 
following of the same general sequence of topics that Knudson 
used in the writing about his view of God in The Doctrine of 
~ and to a lesser extent in The Doctrine of Redemption, . 
the two books that deal most directly with his conception 
of God. But of oourse the investigation is not limited to 
these two books; all of his writings that are related to this 
general theme are investigated in the attempt to get his 
complete view. And where there is some difficulty in under-
standing where Dr. Knudson stands on important issues,, Dr. 
Knudson has graciously allowed the writer to ask his questions 
directly to him. Professor Brightman has also granted the 
same privilege for the sections which are relevant to his view. ! 
Hence there has been adequate opportunity to analyze the oonce~ 
,, tion under consideration • . 
I 
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In the second stage of the method;, there has been an 
attempt to make . all comments and criticisms in as direct &'l 
manner as possible. Hence if one particular aspect of 
Knudson's theory seemed to merit criticism, the criticism has 
followed immediately the presentation of that particular 
II ~ 
aspeo:t. If a comment is applicable to a whole ch~pter, , the 
needed comment has been expressed at the end of the chapter • . 
This principle also applies to the chapter devoted especially I 
to the criticisms, evaluations and comments of others beside,: 11 
the writer, being plaoed just after all the aspects of Knudsoxfs l 
conception have been presented. 
It is hoped that this method will not be confusing~. 
Whenever Dr. Knudson's views are being presented, they are 
presented as nearly as possible as he would present them. , 
The presentation of Knudson' a conception is always distinct 
from comments or questions about this conception, even 
though both elements may be pre sent in the same paragraph • . 
3 
CHAF.rER I 
THE ABSOLUTENESS OF GOD 
In developing a conception of God, it is i mportant to 
point out the distinctive characteristic of Deity as well as 
those characteristi cs which God shares with man and the rest of 
his creation. Knudson finds this unique and differentiating 
characteristic i n the attribute of absoluteness. Man shares 
with God the characteristics of personality and goodness, but · 
only God is absolute.l J:lut since most terms may be used in 
more than one sense, it is necessary to determine the various 
r 
uses of the term which Knudson rejects as well as those which 
' he accepts. 
1. The Meaning of Absoluteness 
It should be noted from the very beginning t hat the word 
it absolute n is not a biblical or religious term, but rather a 
philosophical one. The term itself is fairly new, but it is 
inherent in all the monistic metaphysical systems, old or new. 
It grew out of the quest for the real and the abiding in the 
changing world of phenomena. It was felt that there must be 
something more permanent and unif'ied in the world than the 
changing things of appearance. Hence all metaphysicians have 
1. DOG, 242. As a rule, source references are indicated by 
abbreviations which are explained in the Bibliography at 
the end of the thesis. These abbreviations are normally 
preceded by each author's name, except in Knudson's case. 
Abbreviations not preceded by an author's name are gener-
ally references to Knudson's works. 
4 
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sought for a first principle or substance that would account 
for the changing phenomena of the universe. Conse Quently 
metaphysicians have come to speak of the phenomenal world as 
relative (relative to our sensibility, and relative also in 
I 
/( 
,, 
the sense that the world's individual phenomena are determ.ined I 
by their relation to each other), while the "real" world is I 
considered absolute (in the sense that it is self-ex istent and I 
in some way the source of the world of phenomena).l 
In deriving his meaning for the term absolute, Knudson 
completely disregards the dualistic and pluralistic concep-
tions of ultimate reality by stating that they lack logical 
thoroughness and therefore are irrelevant to his own concep-
tion. But he does distinguish three different views with 
reference to the absolute in an effort to show both what he 
means and what he does not mean by the term: (1) The agnostic 
view affirms the absolute, but declares that he or it is be-
yond knowledge. (2) The pantheistic view claims that the 
Absolute is the highest universal, the sum of all being and the 
all-comprehensive. (3) The Abs olute is the world ground or an 
infinite energy producing and sustaining the world. This view 
may be either materialistic or spiritualistic.2 
In direct correspondence with these three views, Knudson 
lists three different interpretations of the word absolute: 
(1) It can mean the unrelated.3 In this special sense the 
Absolute could not be the cause o~ or in any way related to, 
1. DOG, 242-244. 
2 • DOG, 2~-4 . 
3. See also Anonymous, Art.(l948), 53-54. 
5 
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the universe. It is therefore unknowable, unaffirmable, and 
useless from the standpoint of human thought. (2) It can mean 
the unlimited. This pantheistic1 view is applicable only to a 
Being that embraces all of the universe, a Being that Knudson 
thinks cannot be identified with personality nor any definite 
mode of existence.2 About the latter he states: 
This meaning may be presupposed by the other two; but 
here it is made central, and the other two are ex-
cluded. The Absolute is not the ttunrelatedn in the 
sense of being the All; it is the independent and self-
existent cause or ground of a dependent world. The 
world is not a part of the Absolute, but a consequence 
of the activity, an effect, and as such distinguishable 
from its cause. It may even as effect have a measure 
of independence due to the self-limitation of the 
Absolute .3 
This third view is the causal or theistic view of the relation 
of the world to the Absolute. 
In asserting that the Absolute is unrelated and unknow-
able, the agnostic is defeating his own purpose; the only 
reason for affirming an Absolute is to account for the world 
of experience. If there is no relation between the Absolute 
and the world of experience, the concept of the Absolute does 
not explain that for which it was conceived and is therefore a 
useless concept. Thus Knudson holds that the agnostic view is 
inconsistent and self-destructive.4 
1. See Long, Art.(l942), 223 for further information on the 
pantheistic view. 
2. DOG, 245. 
3. DOG, 245-246, 301. 
4. DOG, 245-246, 301. 
6 
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The fallacy in the pantheistic view is the assumption 
that the universal is the greatest reality. Knudson would 
say rather that the real is the individual, the concrete. The 
universal is induced from the particular, rather than the par-
ticular being deduced from the universal. The reality of the 
individual self is something other and more than merely a 
divine thought. r he individual has an existence for himself 
which is not to be identified with the presence and activity 
of the Absolute in him. He is in a sense, and to a certain 
degre~ external to God.l 
Thus it may be concluded that Knudson uses the term 
Absolute in the third sense--that of the independent or self-
existent. His assertion of this fact is as follows: 
But the word 11absolute, 11 as we have seen, does not 
mean that which is out of all relations and hence 
unknowable, nor does it necessarily mean that which 
is inclusive of all existence; it may mean the in-
dependent or self-existent ground of the world and 
in this sense it is practically synonymous with the 
idea of creatorship. 0 Ab~oluteness . • • • • and crea-
torship • • • • mean that the entire world is depen-
dent upon God for its existence and that there are 
no limits to his power except those which he himself 
has imposed.2 
1. POP, 34-37; DOG, 301-304. 
2. DOG, 248, 304-305. lf more complete infornmtion about the 
various meanings of the term Absolute is desired, see 
Baillie, Art.{l908). This source gives a very complete 
background of the general meaning of Absolute and an ex-
cellent discussion of its philosophical meanings, impli-
cations, and relations to other philosophical terms. Wolf, 
Art.(l947), and Wenley, Art.(l902), are also good references 
on the subject. 
.. -- -- - ---- . ·- -- - --=-=--=-=·-===-'-'~==-=-c..-=-=-=·=-==~- ~-- =··-=-=-~·=···=-=-=·--=--=-=-=·-==·--=-=-=·--==~-=--=--=-=·=---~-----'---'"---f;c._ 
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Keeping in mind this definition of the term absolute, is it 
consistent to say that God is abs olute? 
2. The Idea of a Finite God 
In determining the foregoing question, it is first essen-
tial to note the ways in which the term "finite" has been 
applied to God. One prevalent view (emphasized by the follow-
ers of Henri Bergson) is that of a growing or changing God. 
This view is a reaction a gainst the "static", "perfect", and 
"block" part of the absolutistic view of God and the universe. 
Knudson states that William James applies the idea of growth 
to the universe as a whole which he regards as an aggregate 
rather than as a system. Thus James recognizes no Absolute 
upon which the universe is dependent; the whole of reality is 
growing by itself. Knudson feels that this idea is unintel-
ligible inasmuch as the universe would have no environment 
upon which to draw for its growth. Thus Knudson rejects this 
particular view of a finite God.l 
A second prevalent view is that God is struggling and 
achieving morally as human beings are. Thus God would have a 
religious experience similar to man 's and would need a God as 
much as men do. Some even hold that man's religious experi-
ences are elevated by the sharing of these moral struggles 
with God. Knudson feels that this is a mistaken idea and 
comments as follows: 
It is not t he llinitation of the divine power and the 
divine need of human aid that constitutes the true 
religious stimulus to moral endeavor. 'l'he greatest 
1. DOG, 254-256. 
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moral dynamic of life is that which comes from the 
conviction that right is omnipotent and that its 
ultimate victory is assured. He who does not know 
this is a stranger to any deep religious experience. 
It is not sympathy with God, but faith in him that 
saves.l 
1hus Knudson feels that this second view of a finite God would 
do violence to our nprofoundest religious sentimentsn. He 
feels that moral self-sufficiency is inherent in the very idea 
of God. 2 
One advantage claimed for the theory of a finite God is 
that it solves the problem of suffe r ing . If God is both omnip-
otent and good, how can these two attributes be harmonized in 
the light of the imperfection and suffering of t he present 
world order? Knudson says that s ince God is generally con-
sidered to be good, some people have decided that God's power 
must be limited to solve this antimony. Then the evil of the 
world can be ascribed to other beings and forces which God did 
not create and over which he does not have complete control. 
But Knudson feels that this would be undermining to relig ious 
faith: 
If God did not create the world and does not actually 
govern it, what basis have we for trusting him? God 
may be perfectly good, but 'if' he :i s_ i tnpotynt:, · h:is g ood -
ness will mean little to us. It is the union of ~cod­
ness with power that is the sole ground of faith.3 
Rather than deny the omnipotence of God, religion would seek 
relief from the problems by asserting the limitation of human 
1. DOG, 257. 
2. DOG, 256-257. This general topic is developed and com-
mented on in Chapters III and IV. 
3. DOG, 258. -
9 
knowledge. J:t'or religion, human ignorance is a much easier 
assumption than divine impotence. Hence Knudson feels that the 
doctrine of a finite - God is unsatisfactory.l It leaves man 
with a truncated and disintegrating faith.2 
Knudson is correct in saying that the evil of t he world 
should not be attributed to other beings or forces whi ch are 
independent of the control of God. That would be polytheism 
which Knudson rightly denies as a coherent explanation of the 
universe.3 .But perhaps there are other ways of solving this 
antinomy which do not undermine our religious faith in God. 
This problem is given its most ade quate treatment in Chapter IV 
Occasionally the view is taken that God must be finite to 
enter into finite human experience. It is asserted that an 
absolute God would lie beyond the reach of experience. Knudson 
feels that this view rests on a false conception of what ex-
perience is. Experience for Knudson is not a purely receptive 
process; it is rather 
the result of a creative activity on the part of the 
mind , that no object enters the mind either physically 
or metaphysically, that the minds builds up its own 
objects on the condition of external stimuli and in 
accordance with principles i mmanent within itself, and 
that among these principles there may qe a religious 
a priori by virtue of which the mind is sensitivelto 
the supernatural or infinite and lays hold of it.~-. 
1. DOG, 257-259 . 
2. DOG, 259. 
3. This point will be more ade quately treated in the section 
dealing with the unity of God. 
4. DOG, 260. 
10 
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.!!'rom this definition of experience it is evident that Knudson 
feels that God could enter into finite experience without 
being finite himself, since his experience would be the result 
of his mind's activity. More will be said about this idea 
later on in t h is thesis.l 
Knudson does decide, however, that we must think of God 
as under some limitations. He distinguishes two kinds of 
limitations--"those that are i mposed from without and those 
that are self-imposed or that inhere in the divine nature. It ' 
is only the latter that may be affirmed of God."2 He f eels 
that a self-limited God may be regarded as absolute but that 
God can not be limited by any force outside of himself. But 
''to deny to God the power of self-limitation would itself be a 
1 imi t to God, and that in an unworthy way. n 3 
E. s. Brightman holds that God is not only self-limited 
but that there are limitations inherent within his own nature. 
But even though Brightman does limit God more than is custom-
ary, Knudson would ascribe the term absolute to this concept of 
God since this view still holds to the divine creatorship in 
., , 
the current theistic sense of t he term.4 
1. DOG, 259-261. 
2. DOG, 262. 
3. DOG, 262-263; Art.(l932), 237. His view of God's limita-
tions will be further discussed in the section on the 
omnipotence of God. 
4. DOG, 263. Professor Brightman clearly confirms t h is state-
ment in POR, 337. Knudson's view of ~rightman's theory will 
be discussed more fully in the chapter on the problem of 
suffering. 
11 
Knudson goes even further to prove that God is Absolute; 
he holds that unity is a fundamental demand of the mind that 
can not be met by a mere "togetherness or systematic totality" 
of the phenomenal order about us, a demand which postulates 
a unitary Being as its ground and source .1 ;'This monistic 
tendency of the human mind is deep and ineradicable.n2 Even 
this argument is not as strong for Knudson as the one derived 
from the religious nature itselr.3 He feels that all human 
beings have i mmediate experiences or intuitions of the divine. 
These intuitions have a nonmoral origin, and make their rise 
in our consciousness in an unlcnown way . L.,. But "they are ul t i-
mate , as ultimate as the categories of thought."5 "Complete 
unapproachabillty", "overpowerlngness", the "feeling of trust 
and the longing for redemption" are all religious aspects of 
our natures which demand an absolute God in Knudson's sense of 
the word.6 "The history of religion teaches this fact so 
plainly that no serious student can fail to be deeply impressed 
by it."? Knudson stresses this religious argument very strong-
ly for he feels that "nothing short of such an absolute Being 
can satisfy t he religious needs of men •••• The absoluteness 
1. DOG, 2L~9-250. 
2. DOG, 250. 
3. Cf. PTRT, 91-92; Art.(l922). 
4. DOG, 250-251. 
5. DOG, 252. 
6. DOG, 253. 
7. DOG, 253. 
12 
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of God is inherent in the very structure of a spiritual faith."~~ 
Thus he concludes that both the religious quest after redemp- I 
tion and the intellectual quest after truth lead to the affir-
mation of an Absolute. 2 And since Knudson would hold that these 
arguments are only a matter of a high degree of probability I 
and not absolute proofs, one may readily a gree with him, pro-
vided Knudson's definition of the term absolute is kept in 
mind and more is not read into it than he states. 
3. The Omnipotence of God 
Of the attributes omnipotence, omnipresence, and eternity, 
omni potence is the most fundamental. For Knudson O!Il.ni potence 
is virtually synonymous with metaphys ical absoluteness; all 
the attributes are dependent in s ome manner on the omnipotence 
of God. Thus omni pr esence means that the divine power is not 
limited by space, eternity means that it is not linli ted by 
time; even omniscience and moral perfection would be empty 
attributes of the divine unless there is a corresponding and 
sustaining power. "It is power that g ives reality to the 
Divine Being and to all beings. ,a 
Knudson says that the concept of omnipotence had a prac-
tical origin rather t han a theoretical one. For t he Hebrews 
it was a personal trust rather than logic which inspired it. 
They believed that Jehovah was equal to all their needs; and 
1. DOG, 253. 
2. DOG, 253. Of. Baldwin, Art.(l902). 
3. DOG, 264. 
13 
as t heir needs expanded, t heir conception of his power exte nded 
until it embraced heaven and earth, time and eternity. Hence 
Knudson claims that it is primarily faith that inspires our 
belief in the omnipotence of God.l "Faith can become an actual 
triumph over t he world only insofar as it includes t he idea of 
t he divine omnipotence. n2 But since the origins of t h is con-
cept are practical, there is little effort in t he Scripture to 
define it or to work out its speculative implications. Most 
of this work has been done by philosophers and theologians in 
an effort to develop a coherent view of t he universe.3 
Etymologists would have a pers on believe that divine 
omnipotence means that God can do everything, even the irra-
tional and self-contradictory. Knudson a grees with Thomas 
Aquinas that "God can do all things that are possible" but not 
t he irrational, the self-contradictory, or the i mposs ible. The 
latter go beyond reason and fait h and contradict them both.4 
But since God is so powerful by almost any definition, it is 
easier to discuss his ttlimitations n than what he is able to do. 
The word "limitation" has unfortunately two different 
meanings which are often not distinguished. It denotes 
imperfection or diminution of reality, and it also 
denotes definiteness and concreteness of being. Now, 
it is in the latter sense only that we affirm limita-
tion of the divine will and the divine nature. Ration-
ality and goodness, for instance, imply a certain defi-
niteness, and in this sense limitation;· of · · the -~Divine 
1. DOG, 265-266 . 
2. DOG, 266. 
3. DOG, 267. 
4. DOG, 268-269 . 
14 
Being, but they are not limitations in the sense that 
they i mply i mperfection or a lessened degree of reality1 They are, rather, expressions of t he divine perfection. 
Thus, when Knudson s peaks of the omnipotence of God, he means 
that God's power expresses itself perfectly and completely in 
and through his nature. In giving direction to the divine will 
the divine nature may be said to limit it. Limitation i n this 
s ense is the very essence of being for Knudson.2 
But what are the constituents of God's nature and how does 
it condition his will? Knudson begins to a nswer this question 
by stating that truth and right are grounded in the divine 
nature and can not be made or unmade by the divine will. They 
have no objective existence outside of God but are rather in-
herent laws of the Divine Being. They are deeper than t he 
divine will but are made real only through the activity of the 
divine will. Hence t he two are interde pe ndent at this point.3 
Concerning the relation of t he divine will to creation, 
Knudson states that two views are possible. First, t he pre-
vailing tendency in Christian thought has been to refer crea-
tion to the free will of God; if God had chosen so to do, he 
might have entirely abst ai.ned from creative activity. The 
second view is that creation is a n eternal outgrowth of t he 
divine nature. God, to be God, must create ; it is not a matter 
1. DOG, 269. 
2. DOG, 269-270; Art.tl932), 237. 
3. DOG, 270. 
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of choice for him. In this view there must be in the nat ure 
of God a constituent which determines or directs his will and . 
hence is a limitation on his will.l 
Concerning the relation of the divine will to the divine 
ability, Knudson states that Schleiermacher and Biederman hold 
that< nGod wills to do and does whatever he~ do".2 Thus in 
this view, the divine will and the divine ability are t he same. 
There is no possible beyond the actual and no transce ndent 
reserves of divine power. Nature reflects the whole of God. 
Knudson feels however that this view is inconsistent with the 
divine omnipotence. 
God, if truly oranipotent, cannot have exhausted him-
self in the present temporal order. The very idea 
of omriipoteneiL 'irhplies that of the supernatural, as 
does also the idea of Deity itself in its spontaneous 
and vital form.3 
A view which is almost the reverse of this last view is 
that of ~ . S. Brightman. I nstead of the divine will and abilit~ 
the possible and the actual being fused into one, Brightman ul 
holds that there is a conflict between the divine will and the 
divine nature, that there is a tension between the possible and 
the actual. God, who is good and rational, is continually 
willing the highest values, only to have t heir realization 
frustrated by a part of his own nature. 
1. DOG, 270-271. Cf. Wieman, APR, 137. 
up again in section vii, Chapter li, 
2. DOG, 271. 
3. DOG, 271-272. 
Since this part is an 
These views are taken 
"The Freedom of God". 
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eternal aspect of the divine nature, Knudson feels that it 
permanently thwarts the full realization of the divine will 
and purpose.l 
Knudson expends considerable effort in trying to refute 
this position of Dr. Brightman. Discussion of these criti-
cisms is postponed to t ne chapter on the problem of suffering . 
It is sufficient at this point to state that Knudson re ,iects 
this position of Brightman for what he considers to be ade-
quate reasons. He retains t he view that God's nature is in 
complete harmony with his will and that he is omnipotent as a 
result. He feels that the attributes of omnipresence, omni-
science, eternity and moral perfection are all dependent upon 
omnipotence for their existence. He nce if his conception of 
the omnipotence of God is inadequate (as it is shown to be in 
Chapter IV), his conception of these other attributes may also 
need to be altered in accordanc.e with a more adequate concep-
tion of God's power. 
4. The Omnipresence of God 
By omnipresence Knudson means that space constitutes no 
barrier or limitation to the divine power. God's activity 
extends to all parts of the universe and is as controlling in 
one part as in another.2 Knudson rejects the idea of a "bound-
less bulk", a divine substance filling all space. This view 
1. DOG, 272-274. Cf. Evans, Rev.(l930). 
2. DOG, 275. 
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would be inconsistent with the divine unity--whatever occupies 
space can be divided. Also a space-filling substance would be 
"present in any particular place only part for part; it would 
not be ow~ipresent. To be omnipresent means to be 'all there,' 
to be present at every point with one's entire being ."l Knud-
son states that this is Lmpossible to an impersonal or spatial 
being ; "only in and through an infinite self-consciousness 
could omnipresence in this sense of the term be realized." 2 
However infinite self-consciousness does not constitute 
omnipresence by itself. 
Presence in the world from the metaphysical point of 
view means something more than consciousness of it. 
It means immediate action in it. Inm1ediate action 
extended to all things would, then, be omnipresence; 
and this is the sense in which the term should be 
understood.3 
Thus it may be seen that Knudson agrees with Thomas Aquinas 
when the latter states that "God is in all things • • • as an 
agent is present to that upon which it works.Tt4 Hence God is 
present inasmuch as he is the agent or agency which sustains 
every activity of t he universe; his will is to be identified 
with the "ultimate cosmic energy".5 
This general viewpoint appears to be true whether or not 
God's power is limited by his own nature. As long as God sus-
tains every activity of the universe, he is ormipresent. This 
means that God is present in the avalanches in the Alp Moun-
1. DOG, 276-277. 
2. DOG, 277. 
3. DOG, 277. 
4. Summa Theologica, Ft. I, Qu. 8, Art.l as cited in DOG, 277. 
5. DOG, 277-278. 
18 
tains which have destroyed so mapy lives this winter as well 
as in the snow that serves for a winter covering for the wheat 
crop. This also means that God is t he ultimate source of t he 
many diseases of nature as well as being the one who healeth 
all our diseases. Thus the supposition that God is omnipresent 
leads a person to wonder if he is good or evil or perhaps an 
impersonal force that is not interested in the values of man-
kind. This problem is further discussed in Chapters III and 
IV. 
5. The Eterna l i ty of God 
Similarly to the attribute of omnipresence, Knudson lists 
the attribute of eternity as a specification under that of 
omnipotence. nAs omnipotence [Sic? affirms that the divine 
power is not limited by space, so eternity affirms that it is 
not limited by t ;i_me :~: ul As God is not confined to one locality, 
so also he is not a temporal being in the sense of being active 
only in a specified period of time. God must in some manner 
, span all time, just as his activity must in some way extend to 
all the points of space. But how this is to be conceived 
creates a problem; many are the difficulties surrounding the 
concept of eternity.2 
Eternity is comrnonly understood in one of three ways. It 
may ,··denote ( 1) endless duration, or ( 2) timelessness, or ( 3) a 
1. DOG, 278. 
2. DOG, 278-280. 
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combination of both. lJ:1he first view is perhaps the most com-
mon. According to this concept eternity differs from time ~~ 
only in extent of duration. I n considering this possibility , II 
time may be thought of in t wo different ways. none may regard I 
it as an all-containing form filled out with t he divine dura- I 
tion or as a law of the divine nature .'n In the former sense I 
time would have an existence which is e xternal to God and 
which conditions his existence. l n fact it would dest r oy his 
inner unity , for a being in real time could be divided just 
like a being in real space. If on the other hand, time is 
taken as a law of the div i ne nature, God must be a chang ing 
and developing being without absoluteness. 2 
An absolute, self-existent Being may initiate change, 
but he cannot be subject to the law of change . If he 
were, he would be a conditioned being , and as such 
would re quire for his explanation a higher being upon 
which he would be dependent.3 . 
Thus Knudson f eels t hat mere endles s duration is a n inade quate 
concept of eternity as applied to God. 
Plato and Aristotle brought the idea of timelessness to 
the fore ground by opposing eternity to time. God is changeles 
and timeless ~hile the world is changing and temporal. But 
how such a changeless Deity could initiate the world of change 
is an unsolved problem.4 
1. DOG, 280. 
2. DOG, 280-281. 
3. DOG, 281. 
4. DOG, 281. 
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Eternity in the sense of timelessness becomes an unman-
ageable conception the moment an effort is made to 
translate it from a logical abstraction into concrete 
reality. The living God cannot in his consciousness 
be the complete antithesis of time; he must somehow 
stand in a direct and appropriative relation to it.l 
Thus the eternality of God must either be inclusive of time or 
at least consistent with the consciousness of time; strict 
timelessness can not be attributed to a Creator-God. But time 
involves growt h , development and decay and, in this respect, 
can not be attributed to God. Also the relative elements in 
our temporal judgrnents can not be ascribed to God since they 
are due to our lirn.itations. 11 But that he is aware of our tern-
poral experiences and that he by his creative energy sustains 
the temporal order is most emphatically affirmed in Christian 
teaching. n2 From this it would seem necessary to infer that 
there must be some form of succession in his consciousness and 
activity. As soon as one ascribes creative activity to God he 
bec omes temporal and his eternity becomes "tinged with time.n 
Thus Knudson feels that the eternal consciousness must embrace 
time in some sense while also transcending it.3 
in 
1
1 
s everal different ways. What is commonly knovvn in human experi 
This aspect of time-transcendence may be conceived 
ence as the "specious present" could conceivable be expanded 
into an "eternal now" for divine experience. But Knudson feels 
that this idea is inadequate: 
l. DOG, 281-282. 
2. DOG, 282. 
3. DOG, 282-283; DOR, 4-3-44. Also cf. Bowne, THE, 225. 
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By the eternity of God we mean not only that he grasps 
in the sweep of his consciousness the entire temporal 
order, but that he sees the informing principle of the 
whole, that he keeps before his mind's eye the eternal 
goal of creation. It is in this unifying plan and pur- J· 
pose of the universe that the truly eternal element in 
the divine consciousness is to be found.! I 
When the temporal facts do appear in this plan or purpose, t he1 
only appear as symbols or vehicles of a larger meaning and 1 
value. Thus Knudson points out one possible way (derived from 
Ritschl) to conceive of God's time-transcendence.2 
Another way is to stress the fact that intelligence has a 
supertemporal QUality and that personality is identical with 
itself in spite of all the multiplicity and change involved in 
its own consciousness and activity. Knowledge of t i me would 
be ilnpossible if t here we re not something in the i ntellect 
which is t i meless. Likewise t hrough the use of memory the 
personality rises above the flux of time and becomes to some 
extent supertemporal. Knudson affirms the s ame capacities f or 
the divine consciousness while de nying any "eternal divine 
stuff".3 "God constitutes himself forever t he same, and herein 
lies his eternity."4 As the divine intelligence, he is forever 
renewing the consciousness of his own identity. Hence Knudson 
justly concludes that God is timeless and temporal all at once. ! 
I 
1. DOG, 283. 
2. DOG, 283. 
3. DOG, 283-284. 
4. DOG, 28Lh 
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In concluding his discussion about the omnipotence, omni-
presence and eternity of God, Knudson warns that these attrib-
e utes transcend all human power of understanding. As such, God 
is "a Being to be worshiped and adored rather t han fully under-
stood."l Whether or not this viewpoint or that set forth in 
the chapter is adequate will be detennined in the light of 
later chapters. 
1. DOG, 284. For a general discussion of these attributes cf. 
Davison, Art.(l908), 265-269 and Ormond, Art.(l908). 
23 
J-
CHAPTER II 
THE PERSONA LITY OF GOD 
Knudson states t ha t the wor d "p e rson 11 vvas applied to 
t h e t h re e members of the g odhead for many years but not to 
God as a unitary Being . Persona lity was said to be in God 
rath er t h an of God . 1 
This use of t he term 11 person 11 or "persona l ity" is due 
to several reasons . 11 First , e a.r ly Christian though t under 
t h e influence of P l a tonic real ism tended to subor dinate 
t he individual to t h e universal . 112 The being oressence 
of anything wa s unitary and ultima te, wh ile the thing 
itself was individuated and limited . A second aspect of 
Greek t hou gh t t hat re sulted i n t h e same end was the philo-
sophical re a ction against po l ytheism. An impersona l 
divinity supp lanted the persona l divinities of the Greeks, 
and personality was regar ded as a sec onda ry element in 
Deity, while Deity itself wa s not considered persona l . 
A t h i rd factor was p ersona lity 1 s apparent bearing on t h e 
divinity of Ch ri s t and t h e Holy Spirit. To protect the 
divinity o f t he Son and the Spi~it t h ey trea ted the t h ree 
as eterna l persons within a l a r g er di vine whole which was 
essenti a lly impersonal . It was not until t h e l a tter part 
1 . DOG, 286 - 287 . 
2. DOG, 287 . 
(' -
of the ei ghteenth century t ha t they referred to God a s a 
person and laid stress on his persona lity. 1 
The reasons for t h is c h ang e ma y be briefly s t a ted as 
follows: (l) The new scientific t h eories were laying 
stress on the unity of the v:orld and the consequent unity 
of its underlying cause. (2) The period of a materialistic 
monism l ed Christian thinkers to emphasize the personality 
of t he world-g round. (3) The revival of pantheistic modes 
of though t brought a s a re a c tion a new emphas is u pon the 
personality of God . And (4) New insi ght into the meta-
physics of personality g ave theistic persona lism a new 
vogue. 2 Persona lity is not only the key to ultimate 
re a lity; it is i denti cal with it. 
1. The Meaning of Pers onality 
The on ly di rect contact with pers ona lity a va ilable is 
in the human form and associ <:J. ted with a body . So it is not 
unusual t hat many people should conclud e tha t corporeality 
is essenti a l to person a lity. Th a t is why the gods of most 
e arly relig ions were supposed to have bodies or something 
simila r--they must h a ve a body if they had a person c?,li ty . 
"But 1Ni th the rise of ethical monotheism in Israel Deity 
l. DOG, 287-290 . Cf . ? OP, 78 ~87 . 
2 . DOG, 290-291. 
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was detached from ma teri a l form of every kin6; and t hi s 
conclu sion , reach ed t h rough reli g ious insight, wa s l o. ter 
ratified by s ·oeculat ive t hou ght ." 1 Thus t he persona lity o f 
Deity b ec ame sepa r a ted f rom corpor ea l ity , B.nd P l c;. to and 
later Christian thought showed t he p os s i bility of t h e same 
for huma n persona.lities . 2 
Person a lity as app l ied to God must b e unders tood to 
mean more or less 'iiha t one understands it to me a n wh en 
7. 
applied t o human be ing s . ~ Bu t while God's person a l ity must 
be constr ued in psycholog ica l terms just as man's must, yet 
it is not neces sbr y t o limit his persona lity in t h e same 
resp ects a s man ' s . If i t were, God mu s t be eith er finit e 
and growing or else not pers ona l . Knudson r efuses to 
a ccep t e i ther view a s neces s a r y .4 He ho l ds t ha t t he 
e ssential psyc hical e lements in persona lity (knowing , 
willing and feelin~ ) do not involve ne ces sari l y a finite 
and growine b eing . Neithe r s elf-consci ousne ss , self-
knowledge, se lf - c on t rol , nor se l f - di r e ction· (the e ssential 
psych ica l e lements in othe r terms) i mp ly a dep endent li mi -
t a ti on of t h e p ersonality . 5 
1 . DOG, 292 . 
2 . DOG , 29 2-293 . Also cf . POP , 338-362; BICT, 52 - 53 . 
3 . DOG , 295 - 2 96 ; _:·reT, 53 . 
4. Knuds~n ' s objections to t. r-, e fir s t vie l'l were g iven in t he 
p r ecedinG section; his ob j e c t i ons to t h e l a tter view wil l 
be g iven a little later i n this pTesent secti on . 
5 . DOG , 296; BI C'l' , 53- 55 . 
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We are ourselves de pendent beings and i n us 
these powers necessari l y manifest t hemselves 
in an imperfect a nd limited ~ay , bu t t~ ete is 
no reason why they should not b e p ossessed by 
an abso lute BeinE~ and in ~im man:i.fe s t them-
s elves in a p erfect form . -
It is true t hat men ac qu.ire self - knon ledge and self - cont rol 
t h roue:h ye o. rs oi tr <.:L ining and d evelopment, but it is not 
necessary to t h ink of God a s a ch i evi ng them in the same 
ma nner . Indeed they a re p robably ete rna l possessions for 
him . 2 
In further determini ng the me aning of personality it 
is essential to note the idea of a se l fhood and the rela-
tion o r selves to each other . S ome (such as D. F . Straus s 
and Pring le-Pattison) lay stress u pon the exclusiveness 
a nd isola tion of the self . Knud son s ay s tha t t h ese men 
have only seen a p ortion of t he true p icture: uPersonality 
is a l s o social . It imp lies reci proc a l intercourse vri th 
other p ersons . A comp letely is olated p erson woul d not be 
a p erson i n t h e full s ense of the tei'm . 11 3 Thus God must 
be able to have rela tionships with other se lves ; he must 
be able to have fellowship ·with man and man v1 i th him . 
Hence pers onality i mp lies ethi c a l communion , mutual trust 
l . DOG , 296 - 2 97. 
2. DOG , 296~2 97; BICT, 53-55 . 
3. DOG, 297- 298 . Cf . BICT, 55- 56 . 
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8,nd mu tual g oodwi 11 -,'Ti th oth ers. Even though God and man 
do not have the same feelinz s as e qu a ls do tow a rd s each 
other, yet in pri nc i p l e they a r e the s a me: t hey have a n 
eth ica l bas is. ~nd since the proper ethica l a ttitude is 
t hat of mutua l regards based on a mutual reco gnition of 
worth, it may b e inferred that worth or di gnity i s a con-
st i tuent element in personality . In oth er words, persona l -
ity must b e viewed a s an end in itse lf .1 
In endeavorincr. to su,mmari ze Knudson ' s view of the 
meaning· o f 1Jersona li ty , it is found t ha t h is own summary 
is e xce llent. Hence it is quot ed v erbatim: 
Summing up, we may say t h& t pe rsonality does not 
necessari l y i mply either corporea lity or dependent 
limi ta ti on . In its essence it is selfh ood, se lf-
knowledg e and self- control; or , more concretely, 
a pe rson i s one who t h inks a n d feels a nd wills . 
Such a bein?~ by h i s very n9. t ure s eeks communion 
with others . He does so becaus e only in th i s 
way can his O 'iHl true self and h is own intrinsic 
vvo r th, and t h e like self anc1 worth of others , 
come to full exp ression and re a lization . 2 
2 . Personality and t h e Absolute 
It has already been p ointed out that Knudson asserts 
that de pendent limita tion i s not a neces sary impl ic a tion 
of personality. But since the c ontrary view hes been he ld 
so often , it seems advisab le to de a l with this problem 
more specifica lly . 
1. DOG, 298 - 299; POP , 82- 83 ; BICT , 55- 56 . 
2 . DOG, 299 . A simila r view and more complete trea tment 
~~p~he d ivine persona lity is to be found in Bright man , 
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S om e h~ve a r gu ed t hb t p er sona lity a lmo s t inevitab ly 
sug g e s ts hu man limita tions, 1 a nd tha t to a pp ly it to the 
.· bso lute i s merely ant h ropomorph ic. Th e Absolute a s 
s p irit includ es a ll the value s of :oer s ona lity without 
being personal itself; it is 11 su p erp ersonaln . If the s e 
p e op l e me a n to s t a te that the Abs olute h a s a h i g;h er level 
of consciousness a nd will t han hu mans, Knudson vvould 
re adi l y agree; h um a n persona lity c a n only be a symbol of 
the d ivine persona lity a t best. The divine p er s ona lity 
transcends human p e r sonality and t h e latter ca n not fully 
understand the forme r . "But i f i t is a life of free 
intellig ence it doe s not ma tter wheth er we h a ve a ny f urther 
un dersta nding of it or not, nor d oes it ma tter wheth er we 
call i t 1 ·J e rsona l or n o t ." 2 Th K d 1 d 
_ _ u s ~nu son cone u es t ha t as 
long a s a ny free intelli g ence i s a ttributed to the Absolute, 
the differen ces between the person a li s t and the " super-
p ersona list" are only ve r bal . 3 
But if the 11 superp ersons,li s ts 11 me a n to imply that 
the Abs o lute is either pure will vv i t h out intellig ence 
( Sch op enhauer), unconscious intelli g ence (hartmann ), or 
blind force (held by ma ny), t h en truly absoluteness is 
inconsistent with personal i ty . 
--·-- -
1 . POP , 425-426 . 
2 . DOG, 300. 
3. DOG, 29Y- 300. 
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Pers ona lity does not s t and opp o sed to a h i gher typ e 
of divine intellig ence, but to nonintellig ence . To 
deny persona lity to . t h e Absolute or,world-~round 
means tha t it i s not intelli gent ana free . 
Consequently t h e real question i s as to wh ether abso l ute-
ness is opposed to or consistent with consci ou s a nd free 
intellig ence. 2 
In dealin~s wi t h this o_u esti on, Knudson considers t he 
various s enses in which t he word 11 absolute 11 i s us e d3 
and t h en comes to the conclus ion that only in t h e c ausa l 
sense is t h ere no conflict or inconsi s tency betwee n the 
Absolute a nd the i d e a o f persona lity . 
From the c ausal p oint of vie v'! th e Absolute is t h e 
inde p endent g round or c ause o f the unive r se . It 
is de p endent upon noth ing out s i de of itse lf; but 
it is no t comp l etely unrela ted and unl imited . It 
s t ands in relation to t h e world and is to some 
extent l imited by it . But the limitation i s one 
t hat is s elf-imp o sed . The Absolu te i s not itself the 
All nor is it t he Unknowab le. Its c ausal rela-
tion to the wo rld makes it to some de gree know-
ab le, and its creative a ctivity makes it p ossible 
for us to d-i stinguish betwe en it a nd its work. 
Everything i s dependent u pon i t for e x i s tence; 
and it i s t h i s t ha t constitute s it s abso luteness. 
But abso l u teness thus unde rst ood does not exclud e 
self-limitation . Indeed, no t to have t h is p ower 
would itself be a limita ti on . And the s ame - is to 
be said of t he p ower to know and the p ower of 
self - c ontrol. These p owe r s , which a re t h e essen-
tial constituents of persona lity, a re a l s o e ssen-
t i a l to the Absolute, i f he b e regarded a s Absolute 
1. DOG, 301 . 
2 . DOG, 300- 301 . 
3. DOG , 301-304, 244-248. Cf. t h e fir s t s ection of the 
first c hapter. 
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Wh ile human beings h~ve these p owers only in a limited 
sense, t he Abso lute h a s t hem in a comp lete s ense . Thus 
it i s to be concluded tha t t he Absolute i s t he only one 
truly ~9ersonal. "Instead o f say ing t ha t person&.li ty is 
inconsi s tent with absoluteness, we mu s t say , r a t h er, t ha t 
p erfect personality is possible only in the Absolute ." 2 
Even t hou g rJ. Knudson does h old t hat t h e pe r s ona lity 
of God is consis t e nt with h i s absoluteness , he believes 
that the re a l basis for insisting on the personality of 
God is to be found in its p ositive reli g i ous a nd ph ilo -
sophic a l v a lues. Hence it i s necess a ry to study t h ese 
next . 
3· Reli g ious and Philo s oph ica l Values 
Knudson li st s t wo fundamental reli g ious v a lues and 
two ph ilos oph ica l ones . Th e r e li g ious values a re fellow-
shi p with God a nd trust in h i s go odnes s ; both values imp ly 
hi s p ersonality . "No fellowshi p i s p os s ible without free -
d om c:md intellig ence . " 3 Impersona l b ein r.r. s may intera ct, 
but true fellowship and communi on a re p oss ible only on a 
persona l p l ane . These c an on ly exis t as b eing s know each 
1 . DOG , 304-305 . Th i s passag e has been quote d mostly 
because it reve als so much of Knudson ' s concep t of God 
in a comparatively shor t space . 
2 • DOG, 305 . Also cf . Bowne, TI-l.C: , 167- 168 · BIC'T' 53-54 3 . DOG, 306 . ' _, • 
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other and t ake a n emotional a nd volitional i::l. tti tude tovmrd 
e a ch oth er. Intelli gence, or t he p ower to know, is essen-
ti a l t6 fello wship , but a n outgoing o f feelin g and will 
a r e a l s o re quired . Thu s life, as a:o~) li ed to God, means 
someth ing more t ha n intelli g ence; 11 it me a ns tha t in God 
there i s a h eart and will, re sp ons ive to hum a n need, an 
a ttitude of mind t ha t both evok e s an d ansv~ers p r a yer . 11 1 
Knuds on feels tha t t h i s a s pect of p ersona lity i s perhap s 
its most chara cteri s tic . 11 It is t h e moral and emotiona l 
nature t h&• t forms the basis of that living fellowship with 
Go d which constl t ute s t h e essence of true relig ion." 2 
Th e pe rsonality o f God i s als o t h e pres~pposition of 
his g oodness. For g oodness in t he ethica l sense of the 
term d ep ends on freedom and inte l lig ence a nd is imp ossi b le 
without t he m. 11 Thing s and subpe rson a l being s may b e u s e-
ful, but t h e y a re not mora lly g ood . Goodne ss is an a ttri-
bute of pe rsona lity an d apart fr om it is a me re ab-
stra cti on ."3 Cons e quently a ll t he r e li g ious v a lue s b a s ed 
on div i n e ri gh teou s ne ss a nd love a re de penden t on a 
persona li s tic inte r p r e t a tion of t he uni verse . All t h e 
i mplic a ti ons of p rovi d en ce a n d p r ayer would h ave no me aning 
\, . tl t 1 ,, d L~ ·n 1. ou a persona u- o • 
1 . DOG , 306 . 
2. DOGr , 306 -307. 
3 · DOG , 307. 
4 . DOG , 307-308 . Cf. Art. (1Sl 2 3 ); BI CT, 57-58 . 
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Another relis ious value connected to t he conception 
of a personcl l God is t he r e l a ti onship t hat i t has to our 
concepti on of man . In stati ng t hc. t God is persona l one 
a sserts , not tha t God i s like man , bu t t hat man i s li ke 
God . I n d ecla ring th~ t man was ma de in the i mage of God 
not only the digni ty of man bu t a lso the love of God i s 
a f firmed . It was t h e g re a t love of God which lead h i m to 
communi c a te his o1m life and h i s own likeness to his 
creatures . Hence Knudson cone ludes t hat Go d ' s personality 
is "not only c. metaphys ica l pre supposi tion of his love, 
it is itself a n a ffirmat ion of our kinship to him and his 
, 
lovi ng relation to us . 11 J. 
The phi lo sophic a l v a lue s in the concep t of a p er' sona l 
God have been slow i n coming into reco gnition . Only in 
the modern era has p ersona lity been app lied to the entire 
Godhead. Of t h e considera tions t h2. t added me t aphys ica l 
si gnificance to the idea, t wo have speci a l i n flu ence . One 
is the fact tha t person a lity i s g iven in exp eiience a nd is 
hence of a concrete cha r ac ter. Both Au gus t i n e and Desc a rtes 
made i t clea r t hat t h e se lf is kno~n as no th ing e ls e is . 
"If t here is a superempiri c a l lJrincip l e or r e a lity in t h e 
ob jective wor l d , it mu s t be construe d in persona l terms 
or handed ove r to comp l ete nes cience, f or it is in s elf -
experien ce, and t here only , t ha t we have insig h t i nto t h e 
1. DOG , 308 . Of . Art . (1940 ); POP, 55 . 
I 
I 
I 
II 
I 
I 
I 
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true i nw a rdness of thin~s ." 1 Thus it i s ev i dent t hat it 
i s only throug h personali ty th~t one c an e mpiri call y know 
anything about u ltimate rea lity . 2 
The other cons iderat ion i s thc:. t person e li ty contains 
i n itself a solu tion of t he fundamental p roblems of meta-
phys ic s such as no imp ersona l pri n ci p l e d oes or can. It 
is only throu gh t h e f r ee i n telli g ence of p ersona lity that 
c ategories of exp erienc e can be understood and interpreted . 
so if knowledge of t h e si gni f ic ance of t he c a teg ories of 
uni ty , i d entity and c ausality a re denied , one must g o to 
his own experience o f free in te lli ~ence for the answe r. 
If t hat person wishes to kno w how unity c a n be har moniz ed 
wi t h p lura lity , and identity with chan g e, b.e c an best g o 
to t h e same source . 
!Je know ourselv es one and yet we d o many thine; s . 
We a re cons t a nt l y c£1ang i ng and yet we constitute 
ourselves one and the s a me with our pas t se lves . 
How this is p o s s ible, we d o no t k now . But t h e 
f a ct i s sun-clear , it i s inherent in persona lity 
itself . Here, t h en, in our fre e in t ellis ence , and 
t h ere alone, we h ELVe t h e s olu ti on of t he age -old 
p roblems o f met a p hysi cs.3 
In spite of t h e fact t ha t pe rsonality is the key t o the 
me t aphys ica l prob l ems , it is not s i mp l e but comp lex. Wh en 
a pplie d to the Supreme Person i t imp li es t he a ttributes of 
l. DOG, 309 . F'or an excellent s t atement of t h i s p o s i t ion 
s ee Wilson, ~rt. (1929) . 
2. DOG , 308-310; Art. (1932), 235 - 236 . 
3 . DOG, 310-311. 
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unity , ider1tity (i mmutability), self -consci ousness 
(omniscience) an d self -control ( freedom) . This being the 
case, Knudson considers these four attributes in connection 
with t h e p e r sona lity of God ju s t a s he considered omnip o-
tence, omnipresence , and eternity under the absoluteness 
of God . 1 
4. The Unity of God 
"The Unity of God h a s a doub le meaning . It means 
t ha t he is indivisible and tha t he is only . Both of these 
ideas were developed in the Old Testament and became 
permanent elements in prophetic and Christian theism . 11 2 
Ne verthele ss , it h a s not been eas y to develop this concept 
of the d i vine unity . A homoge neous substance or force 
p erva dins all s p ace and extending throu gh a ll time would b e 
infinitely d ivi s ible an d c ould not b e a unity be c aus e only 
a being t h a t transcends space and time ca n be a true un i t . 
S i nce this holds fo r b oth the finite and the inf inite, t h e 
div i ne unity c anno t be such a substan ce or force.3 
" If unity is to as cri b e to t h e world-g round , it must 
be li fted to a superspat i a l and sup ertemporal level • • • • 
But how it is to b e d one , h a s not been a l ways c lear. 11 4 
One common me thod is to identify t h e vvorld - g round with t h e 
1. DOG , 310 -311 . 
2. DOG , 311 . See HTOT, 68, 9 2 for further deve lopment of 
this i d ea . 
3 · DOG, 311- 313 . Also cf . POP , 19 0- 202 . 
4 . DOG , 313 . 
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hi ghest universal vl ith b <:i re be ing , and t hen define its 
n a ture as pure simp licity . It i r:3 neither mind nor ma tter 
and transcends all the p lura lity E; nd d ifferences of finite 
existenc e . Outside o f s a yin t, t ha t it is one and simp le, 
a pe rson can s ay little else a bout it. 1 
N othin ~ csn be deduced from it. It can explain 
noth ing . In log ic there i s no way of passing 
from t h e simple to the c omp lex or f rom bare unity 
to p lura lity; a nd if God be t h ought of as a uni-
t a r y b eing in this sense of t h e term, he could 
not a ccount for the world a s we know it.2 
Thus Knud son conc ludes t h a t it i s only on t h e p l a ne 
of free intellig ence t ha t true uni ty can b e realize d . 
F or an intellig ent agent, unity exi s ts in t he consc iousness 
itself, in the ability of the age n t to ori g ina te a ctivity , 
to p osit p lural ity , and to mainta in his own unity and 
identity over aga inst t h e chang i n g many. 11 How this is 
p ossi b le we do not kno-vv , but it is a f a ct of our own ex-
perience; and wha t ho l ds true of us in a limited de gree we 
are wa rranted in a scribing to God in an unlimited d egree. 11 3 
Regard less of wheth er t h is is absolute truth or not, Knudson 
feels t h2. t t h is is t h e on ly intelli g i b le and s elf-consistent 
form unde r ·wh ich the di vine unity c an be conceived. 11 God 
knows h imself a s one over a g ainst t he cha ne; ing ·world which 
1. DOG , 315. 
2. DOG , 313-314. 
3. DOC+ , 314. 
I 
he posits and maintains through his own free creative 
1 
activity. 11 
Knudson's conclusions are consistent with his premises, 
but his argument would be more effective if he started from 
his given experience of himself and the world and then 
asked what this experience indicated as to the nature of 
God. Perhaps if the latter methodology ware used Knudson 
would not be so hasty in concluding that God is the only 
world-ground. Perhaps there would be more of a tendency 
to conclude wlth Edwin Lewis that the Creator has an 
2 
Adversary. Or there might be a tendency to place more of 
a dualism within the nature of God himself. Knudson's views 
would be more coherent with reason and reality if they 
were less abstract and baaed more on the nature of man's 
experieno:_e. 
5. The Immutability of God 
"As unity denies divisibility, eo immutability denies 
chang~. "3 But change may either be metap:P,ysic:al or ethical,, 
and it may be due either to internal or external causes. 
Since one generally has in mind external causes when he 
thinks of change, a person is only asserting God's independ• 
ence and eternity when he ascribes immutability to God. 
1. DOG, 314; POP, 82-85. 
2. Lewis, CA. 
3. DOG, 314. 
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He is not dependent on any externa.l beings or ch ang ed by 
such . But neither do internal cause s change h i m. He looks 
inward and affirms an identity of bein~ within himself . 
11
"Tei t h er internal n or external c auses a lter the inner 
e ssence of his beinr; . 111 
In the Bi ble t h e eth ic a l unch angeabi lity of God is 
chiefly affirmed, thoug h his metaphysical imnrutability is 
everywhere assumed i n the twofold sens e jus t indic~ted . 
But here the interest i s more in the way his me t aphys ical 
i mmutability is to be conceived . In t his t here is t h e same 
g eneral problem as t h ere was with the unity of God . Just 
a s it is imp ossible t o pass from simp licity to comple xity 
or from unity to p lurality, so it is a lso impossib le to 
pass from i dentity to chan ge or from immutability to motion . 
If God were a changeless substance, there would be no vvay 
of e:~ccountint; for chang e in the uni verse . He nce for a 
truly real and i mmutable princ i ple a person must g o beyond 
t he concep·t of an unc i";;mging substc:mce to the personal 
p lane. It is found he re in the un ique power of self-
consciousness by Yvhich t h e minci differentiates itself from 
its states and activities and y e t identifies itself as one 
a nd t he same. " I t is in t h is me.rvelous c apa city of se lf-
identity, charac teri s tic of r~:r~ee · t 11 · 1n e 1 gence, t ha t we have 
-------
l. DOG , 314-315 . 
. . t . "1". Il l t he key, and only key , to t he di v1ne 1mmu <wl · 1 r-y . 
Knudson not only feels t ha t such self - identity is comp a tible 
with chang e , but t h.a t it is only t hrough chc:mging s. cti vi ty 
t ha t it can be reali zed. Thu s the only intellig ible way 
that immutability can be com~:;:J le tely dissociated from 
immobility has been found , and God be comes t he unc~_ anging 
s ou r ce of cl1. ange . 2 
6 . The Omnisci ence of God 
It has already been s h own t ha t t he power to know is 
not incomp~ tible wi th absoluteness and t hat the l a ck of 
this p owe r would be a l imi ta t ion . But it h as not been 
determined whether omnisci ence i m) lies or does not imp ly 
a knowledg e of everythin[; without any except i on . Thus t h e 
main ques tion of this section i nvo lves the amount of knov:-
ledge t ho. t c an be a ttributed to God . 
So f a r as faith its e l f i s concerned, all t at i t 
re quire s is t _c-, t God knovv all t he. t he needs to 
know as lWoral Gov ernor of t he un ive r se . He needs 
to kn ow the he urts of a l l h i s free creatures t hat 
h e may judg e t h em ari gh t . He ne eds to know a ll the 
f orces of the universe , a ll h i s cre~ted being s good 
and evil, so t h a t 1 e may e;ui 6e them tow o. r d the 
reali zation of his ultima te g oa l and so tha t he 
~ay di rect t h e a ffairs of t h e wo r ld in such a way 
t.l.J.at men IiK.y p l E. ce i mp l i cit confidence in him . 
He needs to know a ll tha t i s i nvo lved in t he t ask 
of' c c,ring fo r his cre a tures and in t hat of redeeming 
those who pl a ce t heir trust in h i m. Noth ing can , 
- - -·----
1. DOG, 316. 
2 . DOG , 315 - 317 . 
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u-1ere f'ore ; ·r-)e h i dden from h i m wL ich pertains to 
t h e we l f a re of h i s child ren . l 
Thus it i s a p r a ctic a l omniscience that f aith aff irms, but 
the re i s s till t h e s ame dif f icultie s in con c e ivi n g it a s 
t hos e i nvo lved in a n abso lu t e omniscience . These diffi-
culties have mainly to do with t wo po ints: t he d i v ine 
knowledg e of man ' s finite experiences a nd t he di~ine fore -
kno~ledse of free a cts . 2 
Although God c annot be ascribed with the s ame physical 
pa ins and sufferin6S a s men h a ve , yet one ' s f a ith would 
seem to require th :.:~.t God h e.ve c.~ direct know l edge of t h ose 
of men . One c an unders tand t hese exp eriences in o ther 
p eop le because he ha s simila r pains himself . But since 
God i s an i nf'in i te and -ou r e ly spiritual Beine; , he c annot 
e x:pe r ience them as men do . Even the V8,ri ous sense -
experiences wou ld s eem to b e beyond the experience of God, 
since senses are not a ttributed t o h i m. Cons e quently 
Knudson S C:1.ys t hat God mu s t h a ve l nowle dge o :f finite ex-
n erience by mode s of kno v·rinc: t h::tt man c annot comprehend . 3 
To say the.t our experiences a re a lso h is and the.t 
he c onse quently knov1s then1 , wou l d b e to f a ll into 
a pantheistic confusion of t he di vine with the 
hume.n t he t would b efudd le r .:o.tt er t han cla rifv 
thou~ht . On t he other h a n d , to deny to God ~ 
knowledg e of our finite exp eriences • • • ~ould m&ke 
l . DOG , 317 . 
2 . DOG , 317-318 . 
3 . DOG, 318- 319 . 
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God of v e r y li t tle r elir;iou s v a. lue . FE:.i t h re qu i r e s a 
Di v i n e Be in ::: who i s t ou ched vri tb_ a f ee lin0~ of our 
i n f irmi t ie si and t ha t we do n ot und e rst a n d how he 
c om es to know tb.es e i n fi rm i t i es i s no r e a son for 
r e j e cti n g t he bel i e f t h a t h e has suc h knowl edg e . l 
Th e di vine fore k n owl edg e of f r e e a cts i s n ot s o 
v ita lly rela t e d t o ma n ' s f a ith as t he divine kno~l e dge of 
man ' s f ini t e e xp e r i ences . To d eny to Go d t h e f or mer, 
woul d not ne ce s s a r i l y b e incon s i s tent with h is omniscience . 
Fo r if fo rek n ow l e d g e of fre e a ct s i s e, self - contradictory 
concention , t h en i t could not b e a ttributed to Go d . _ s 
God can do only t h e do a b le, s o b e c a n kno w only the 
k n owab le . Bu t it ca n not b e pro ved t ha t t h i s i s a s elf -
contradictory con ceiJ tion . It is true t hc:t t man does not 
know how t h i s i s p ossi ble; but to assert tha t it is a bso -
lutely imp o ss i b le i s an unwa rran ted a ssump tion . 2 "God 
may h a ve a way v; e do not u ndersta nd o f foreknov!ing free 
acts jus t a s we beli eve h e h a s a Yray of knowing our inner 
expe ri e nces a lthou r;h he h a s not e xperienced t hem ." 3 
Some Ca lvini s tic writers h &v e sou~ht to solve t h e 
p rob lem of forekno wledg e by asse~tins t ha t an a ct may be 
rendered certain by a divine decree and yet may be volun-
t a r i ly wr ou ght by a free agency . But how this is p os sible 
vvi thout neces s ita ting the a ct i s more of a mystery t h an 
tha t involved in the fo r ekno wledg e of free a cts . Thus 
l. DOG, 319 . 
2 . DOG, 319- 320 . 
3. DOG , 320 . 
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Knudson conc l udes that · 11 objective certe:i. inty c annot , so 
far as 'le c an see, be comb ined vvith true fre edom ." 1 
One of the reasons for affirmin g t he d ivine foreknow-
ledge vvas dr awn from the predi ctive ele~nent in Scripture . 
But due to Biblica l criticism , t h is a r gu ment has been 
undermined . Few predi ctions in the Bible can be said to 
reouire divine fo reknovTle dg e for t heir exp l a n a tion . 
Anothe r a r gument i s tbe g r ea ter security it ·g ive s tb.e 
believer . God c ould not b e t aken by surprise i f he fore -
l~nows everything . Henc e he should be trus ted even more 
securely. But due to man 1 s narrow 11 a r g in of fre edom and 
God 1 s infinite resources of wisdom a nd p ower, it would 
seem imp ossible to sur prise God to the extent t he. t man ' s 
confidence in h i m should be appreciab ly lessened . 2 
Another considera tion-- that all reality , ( pas t, 
p resent , and futu r e) is open to the divine gaze , that 
time is relative to the knowing mind and offers n o barrier 
to the divine knov1ledg e (but i s it se lf dependent for its 
existence up on the divine consciousness and will) -- seems 
more unified a nd more a cce p table to faith than one that 
withdraws a considerable part of the future from t h e range 
of the divine vi s ion . But in spite of t h is conclusion , 
l . DOG , 320-321. 
2 . DOG, 321 . 
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Knudson states t h a t men cannot know ho w such a knowledg e 
of the contingent future is p ossible . 1 
All t ha t we c an say is tha t God may h a ve an 
intuitive g r asp of t h e future t ha t transcends our 
human ways of knowing . Future , ps.st , and present 
may for him cons titute a k ind of "eterna l now 11 ; 
but, i f he t hus knows the fv. ture, he must never-
t heless know it a s future and not as present . 2 
This concep tion of God's omniscience would seem to be 
reasonab le . 
7. The Freedom of God 
In addition to unity , s elf-i dentity, a nd t h e p owe r to 
know, p ersona lity i s chara cterized by freedom or self-
determin a ti on . Freedom means s p ontaneous action from 
vvi thin . 
It me ans the p ower of contra ry choice, it means 
conscious and purposive a ction . It me ans t ha t 
God stands in no neces s ary r e l a tion to the 
p resent wor l d, th~ t its cre ~tion wa s a volunta ry 
act , tha t he miF~h t h ave cre a ted s ome other kind 
of a world in its stead .3 
Thus it is evident t ha t the dividinr;_: line between t hei sm 
a nd pant h eism i s a t t h e po int of freedom . Pantheists hold 
t ha t t h e world e ither is a part of God or a necessary 
consequent of his n a ture . But t he i s ts hold t ha t God is a 
free Bei nr.:; a nd might h a ve wil l ed not to create a world su ch 
as t h is. Thus it see ms evi d ent tha t freedom is involved 
1 . DOG , 321-322 . 
2 . DOG , 322. 
3 . DOG, 322-323 . 
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in t h e very ide a of t h e divine p e rsonality. 1 
But when one a ttemp ts to conceive the relE.tion of t h e 
divine will to t h e ciivine omniscience, h e runs into a 
dif f iculty . How c a n a n omniscient, p erfect, all-g ood 
Bein s c hoose a ny oth er course of a ction than the on e which 
would yield t h e g reatest g ood? Then is God rea lly free? 
In me eting this difficulty Knudson notes that omniscience 
d o es not result from a passive role but from an achievement 
of a free agent. Conse quently omniscience and freedom c a n 
b e s a id to involve e a ch oth er r a ther t han otherwise. The 
value of a ny pa rti culB. r thing c 2. nnot be e stimt::L ted a part 
from the co-opera tion of our entire n a ture. The intellect 
does not dete r mine t h e 'Nill a ny more t h an the will t h e 
intellect. Burthermore, divine foreknovvledg e d oes not 
h old t h e d ivine will to ri g idity. Even though t h e content 
of t h e omniscient mind rema ins a bout the same, it still 
distinguishes between the future and the present and t ak es 
account of the ch ang ing world orde r . Thus Knudson finds 
no anti t h esis between freedom and omniscience . " ~'he two 
imp l y e a ch oth er and a re essenti a l a ttrlbutes of the one 
a bsolute Person ." 2 
On t h e whole Knudson's concep tion of t h e Personality 
1. DOG, 323; DOR, 24-25 . Also cf . PCE, 82; POP, 45, 50, 224. 
2 . DOG, 323-324. 
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of God does seem to be coherent and reasonable . It does 
seem at times that the universe i s impersona l and not 
interested in persona l values. But when the philosopher 
or theolog i a n tries to understand the universe as an im-
p ersonal entity , ma ny antinomies a rise that seem incapable 
of solution . But wh en these problems are seen in a 
persona li stic fra me work , they seem much more c a pable of 
solution . The a ssumption of a personal God may not be 
the perfect ansvver to a ll re l ated p roblems, but this 
assump tion does seem to solve more of them than any other 
known . 
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CHAPTER III 
THE GOODNESS OF GOD 
In the preceding chapters the philosophical presupposi-
tions of the nature of God have been studied primarily . In 
this chapter the supposition that God is good shall be consid-
ered. This is not only a major philosophical supposition but 
also a maj or supposition of most religions and certainly of 
Christianity. It is very important that God be considered 
supremely powerful, unchanging, and wise, but it is even more 
important religiously that he be good. 
In its essence religion is trust in the goodness of 
God. If God were a nonmoral Being, eith er intelli-
gent or nonintelligent, he would not be a proper 
object of religious faith. It is only insofar as he 
is morally good, and so worthy of being trusted, thyt 
he is truly God in the religious sense of the term. 
In fact, this is the quality that has always distinguished 
gods from demons. Demons might be powerful or wise; but, in-
asmuch as they are not considered righteous or dependable 
ethically , they are never the subject of adoration or praise.2 
Hence it is extremely important to learn whether God is moral, 
immoral, or nonmoral. To accomplish this end attention is 
first directed to one of the highest revelations of the ethi-
cal character of God that is to be found- +. Lhe Bible. 
1. Biblical Teaching 
In the Old Testament there is to be found a definite 
1 . DOG, 325. 
2. DOG, 325-326. 
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progression in the Jewish concept of God's ethical character. 
In the Decalogue it is to be observed that God was respected 
as a God of right and law. But while there is a moral element 
in this early conception of Jehovah, this element did not be-
come absolutely dominant and controlling until about the 
eighth century B.C. It vras in this period that the prophets 
denounced unrighteousness and inhumanity in his name and in-
sisted on moral obedience as the only way of winning divine 
favor. They also proclaimed the imminent day of the Lord, a 
day when iniquity would be overvvhelmed and the kingdom of 
righteousness \'rould be set up . Hence they disclosed Jehovah 
to the people , not only as moral judge, but also as the abso-
lute moral idea1. 1 
But Jehovah was also thought of as King or Sovereign, and 
this both added to and detracted from the highest moralization 
of his character. It meant the deification of law and the 
common conscience, and thus it marked a distinct advance be-
yond the earl ier nature-religions . But it also denoted a one-
sided moralization of Deity, and hence it fell short of the 
Christian conception of divine goodness . 2 
God is called "Father" a number of times in the Old 
Testament, but here it was generally in a fairly i mpersonal 
manner . 3 And even though the term was commonly used among 
1 . RTOT, 154-189 and his DOG, 326-327. 
2. DOG, 328-329. 
3. RTOT, 182-184 . 
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Jesus' contempo-raries, Jesus used it in a ne1tr and distinctive 
manner. He made the idea of fatherhood the unifying principle 
in his conception of God, giving it "a position of sole and 
sovereign authority", in a manner never before used. He spoke 
of God not simply as "Father", but as "m.y Father". He also 
added to the content of the conception of the divine Father-
hood; for him God was not only a forgiving God, but one whose 
self-sacrificing love is the distinctive characteristic of the 
Christian conception of God. 1 
Before proceeding farther, it would seem advisable to 
define the ethical terms as used by Knudson in reference to 
God. Although he derives his terms primarily from the Bible, 
yet he puts his own particular interpretation on them. It is 
his particular interpretation that is of primary interest at 
this point. 
2. Definitions of Ethical Terms 
Knudson uses the term "goodness" to denote not only 
moral rectitude but also benevolence or kindness. It is used 
to cover the 1trhole moral character of God, and a ll the other 
terms are used to denote particular aspects of the divine 
character.2 
Righteousness, justice, truth, and holiness express dif-
ferent aspects of the goodness of God insofar as it has to do 
vri th the moral law and the moral ideal. Of these the most 
1. DOG", 330-334. 
2, BOG, 334-335. 
definitely religious term is "holiness". Knudson states that 
this term implies stainless purity and the perfect realization 
of the moral ideal. Hence it includes righteousness, justice, 
truth, and even love itself, since all of these belong to the 
moral ideal. 
But it is customary to associate holiness with recti-
tude of will rather than vii th -vrarmth of affection and 
hence to think of it as characteristic of the divine 
love rather than inclusive .of it. That it embraces 
the other three attribute is1 evident, though each has its own special meaning. 
"Right·eousness 11 connotes the thought that God is "the 
ultimate source and ground of moral distinctions and that in 
him we have the perfect sta.ndard of right." "Justice" involves 
this also, but it directs special attention to God's activity 
in rewarding men according to their deserts. The attribute 
of "truth" differs from the preceding ones in that it takes 
special cognizance of God as Reveal·er. Thus he is not only 
righteous, just and holy, he is also truthful in the revela-
tion he has made of himself. Regardless of whether God has 
spoken through nature or through man, his word is trustworthy.2 
Of the ethical attributes expressive of the aspect of 
the divine benevolence or kindness, love is supreme. "Love" 
involves the warmth of personal interest as well as a sacri-
ficial spirit. It entails the good will, the love of benevo-
lence; in God, it seeks the welfare, the redemption of all men. 
1. DOG, 336. 
2. DOG, 336-337. 
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It takes pleasure in men and seeks fellowship with them. 
Hence love is definitely implied in the idea of the divine 
Fatherhood.1 
As such, 11 mercy" and 11 grace 11 are but manifestations of 
the divine love insofar as it is directed toward the redemption 
of the sinful; "faithfu~ness" is its manifestation -vrhen di-
rected to1vard those who are obedient and submissive to the 
divine will. Grace and mercy are generally used interchangea-
bly, although the latter is a broader term and is a gift to 
sinful men who are wretched from the misery of sin; grace is 
granted them insofar as they are culpable or guilty . Faith-
fulness signifies that God's love toward man is constant and 
that it continually uses new forms to bring about the redemp-
tion of ma~~ind. All three of these are specific expressions 
of the divine love. 2 
Of all the above terms, Knudson choo ses the terms "right-
eousness" and 11 love" as being most expressive of the two main 
aspects of the divine character . Hence the question arises as 
to the relation of these two to each other. 
3. Righteousness and Love 
Both of these attributes include each other inasmuch as 
each of them approach perfection . They overlap, interpene-
trate, and can never be completely separated one from the other. 
Yet they have different associations and connotations. 
1. DOG, 337-338. 
2. DOG, 338-339. 
50 
51 
- ::.::~:.~--::.:."":'".:.=--=--:::.:=.:.==.==..._=-===-=-=-=-=-o=-=-=-'-'-·==-=-==-=-=-===c'-=-fi-=--:::.=----:_-=---=. 
"Righteousness is primarily concerned with moral excellence as 
an ideal, vrhile love is primarily concerned vfi th the happiness 
of other sentient beings."1 The former involves the common 
virtues in the larger social groups, while the latter is es-
pecially realized in the morality of self-sacrifice in the 
family. The first is attentive to the act; the second to the 
underlying motive. "A greater inwardness, depth, and self-ef-
facement thus belong to love than to righteousness." 2 
This contrast is also to be seen in the Old Testament 
and New Testament conceptions of God. cr,enerally speaking, the 
God of the Old Testament was one of righteousness. As stated 
before, the prophets ascribed to him moral rectitude in a 
more absolute way than had been done before. He vms mainly 
interested in social justice and the welfare of humanity. 
Later, though, the moral stress tended to degenerate into a 
cold, formal, and legalistic attitude and Pharisaism. 
To right this evil Jesus appeared on the scene with a 
nev; vision of God, with a God who had not been imposed 
upon by human respectability, a God of the Fourth 
Estate, a God who was eager to save the lost and ready 
to sacrifice himself in order to achieve their salvation, 
a God of redemptive love.5 
This new emphasis did not overthrow the prophetic idea; divine 
righteousness was the presupposition of the Christian con-
ception of the divine love. "Love does not annul the divine 
justice, it fulfills it." The two go hand in hand. 4 
1. DOG, 340. 
2. DOG, 340. 
3. DOG, 341. 
4. DOG, 341-342. 
But this Biblical inteYpretation was to be questioned in 
the development of Christian Theology. Some argued that 
righteousness implies distributive justice, and that the lat-
ter does not allow for any departure from the strict law of 
reward and punishment as determined by one's deserts. Thus 
there can be no forgiveness of sins without the demands of 
justice being first met. So the question became; Does God 
reward and punish men in strict accordance '''i th their deserts 
or does his love overrule them in some fashion? 1 
A common answer to this question is that punishment is 
for the good of the offender and for the p revention of evil. 
Knudson shov/S that there is some truth to this answer inasmuch 
as God is not indifferent to moral distinctions and does not 
treat the just and unjust a lik e. But that his righteousness 
requires him to reward or punish in strict accordance with 
the deserts of the person involved would seem to be an expres-
sion of the divine wrath rather than the divine love. This 
would make him an unfeelin,g judge and make his relation to 
men merely an ethico-legal one. Furthermore, it would be 
against the main argument of Jesus who represents God as a 
Father whose love gladly receives the prodigal son and showers 
gifts upon him that are undeserved. This is because forgiving 
love is not contrary to the principles of remuneration and 
retribution, it rather transcends them. It bestows blessings 
l. DOG, 342-343. 
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on men in sp ite of their demerits, although not in complete 
disregard for their moral qualities. Hence no atonement in 
the ordinary sense of the term is necessary before God's for-
giving grace can become operative. The v.rrath of God becomes 
an emotional expression of holiness occasioned by sin. He 
approves right conduct, but he is indignant at wrong doing . 
But, as Knudson propounds, there is nothing in the divine 
wrath that is vengeful; it comes closer to being grief and 
compassion and differs with them in that it expresses the 
sacredness of the moral law and the divine hostility to sin . 1 
The love of righteousness implies hatred to sin. 
Between the wrath of God and his love there is, 
consequently, no antithesis. Both serve the same holy 
purpose, and if love be the proper designation of 
this purpose, then wra~h is an instrument of love o r 
an altered form of it. 
To this it is objected by some that wrath is not love, 
nor is justice love. Hence the t v.ro cannot be fused together. 
There is vrithin the nature of God a dual ism that can be over-
come only by act of atonement. This is almost inevitable, 
Knudson admits, so long as happine ss and holiness , love of men 
and love of righteousness are sharply distinguished . But this 
antinomy is unnecessary if v.re moralize our idea of happ iness 
and personalize our idea of holiness. Wnen brought together 
in the concrete conception of the kingdom of God, the antinomy 
vanishes. 
1. DOG, .3l.J-3.:..347. 
2. DOG, 347 . 
53 
~~'-!!~--------'=-----'---'-=·· .=...-_;.-~---· --. --- .~-_;.-'-'· -"'---"=--=--=-=--=· -=--=-=--=-=-_;.-=-""'· -,-~-=--"-· -=-=---=-'-'--==--=-=-·=-=-=--=-==-~--"-=-=·-=-=-~-'--=--=-=--=-'----'-=-='-11--'=-'-----"'--~· -. - - . 
L' t/ ) f 
54 
----=--=--==~-F-·=·======-=-===-=· ~-=-==-~=~=--==·==··=--=--=-=-====-=--~=-----~-~=======--=-=--===-==-=-=-==-,==*=-·=--~-=-==--=== 
Instead of two divine ends we now have one. The moral 
ideal and human well-being are fused together, and in 
God we no longer have justice and love at variance with 
each other, but one holy1 and loving ~Jill seel-ring the 
moral redemption of men. 
In continuing the above discussion, Knudson notes that it 
has been frequently said that God loves the sinner and hates 
the sin . This is another possible solution to the antinomy 
between the love and ~rrath of God. But Knudson reveals that 
this is only a partial truth. Love and hate can only be prop-
erly directed tO\,rard persons and it is only in an accommodated 
sense that they can be applied impersonally. In fact, sin 
apart from personality is a mere abstraction. Only free in-
telligence can give moral quality to an act. Hence condemna-
tion of the act involves condemnation of the actor also. But, 
on the other hand, since the sinner does not generally identify 
himself 1vi th his sin, since the sin is not a complete expres-
sion of his personality, something of go od remains l'fi thin him 
which makes · him worth redeeming and vmrth loving. Thus he is 
capable of being the subject of redemptive divine love. But 
sin is evil by its very nature, purely evil. It must be de-
stroyed before the sinner may be saved. In fact, to hate sin 
means to love the one trying to free himself from the bondage 
of sin. 2 "Hatred of sin and love of the sinner thus imp l y 
each other; they are but t~rro sides of the divine redemptive 
purpose, a purpose directed to·Hard personal beings and 
1. DOG, 348. 
2. DOG, 349-350. 
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meaningless apart from them. ul 
But 'V'rha t does it mean to say that because sin is evil it 
must be destroyed before the siru~er may be saved? Has not it 
been noted that Knudson holds that sin apart from personality 
is an abstraction? Hence how can sin be d e stroyed without the 
destruction of the personality involved?. Can sin ever be de-
stroyed? Does not Knudson use the term 11 sin 11 at this point 
as though it were an entitative substance and at other times 
as a choice of the intelligent vvill which is less than another 
possible choice of better probable consequences (DOR, 244-249)? 
vvould he not be more consistent to say that God should help 
the individual sinner to abolish "sinfulness" or the tendencies 
to sin from his life? A person must always be free to sin or 
he is not really righteous in abstaining from acts of sinning . 
But although Knudson may be somewhat inconsi stent at this 
point, his essential contention is quite true. Since God is 
interested in creating and maintaining values, he is naturally 
opposed to the destruction of value by any person choosing 
the least of two possible values . Hence God is in this sense 
a hater of sin but a lover of the sinner, persons being of 
intrinsic value . 
4. Love and Personality 
Some have raised the question as to whether l ove or person-
ality is the more essential and significant element in the 
1. DOG, 350. 
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Christian conception of God. Knudson answers that this situa-
tion is similar to the relation between love and righteousness; 
they both imply each other. From the metaphysical point of 
view p ersonality is the more es s ential, but it needs love in 
order to complete itself. Without a loving vrill p ersonality 
would lack direction and an ultimate and worthy goal . But 
from the p ractical vie;,·rpoint , love is the more important since 
it forms the basis of religious faith. But it would be a mere 
abstraction apart from personality. 1 "Personality is incom-
plete vri thout love, and love vvi thout personality is nonexi s-
tent."2 
Nor can it be said that "personal love" is more expres-
-
sive of the divine nature than is a "loving personality 11 • In 
the fonner expression divine love is emphasized; the latter, 
the divine personality. Essentially they both mean the same 
thing. Yet there is an imp ortant difference. If personality 
is p laced in an adjectival relation to love, there is a p ossi-
bility that their organic ,and structural relation may be ob-
scured. But if personality is made the p rimary object of con-
sideration, p rovision is made for love to communicate itself 
as well as to be objectified in benevolence. God must first 
of all be a p erson s o that his love can be expressed as good 
will and as the communication of his life and spirit to men.3 
1. DOG, 350-352 . 
2 . DOG, 352. 
3. DOG, 352. 
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It should also be p ointed out that personality and love 
both fix attention on the volitional, as distinguished from 
the intellectual, side of the divine nature. Will is the fun-
damental thing in both personality and love. 
For Christianity God is intelligence, wisdom, reason, 
but he is also, and more fundamentally, will, pur p ose, 
benevolence. This viewpoint it is that we have in mind 
when we ascribe central importance to either the 
personality or the love of God. Both attributes have 
a common volitional rootage and bot£ in their spiritual 
form tend to merge into each other. 
Thus far in this chapter fu~udson's biblical view of the 
goodness of God and its treatment in the history of theology 
has been dealt with primarily, Now his vievr in respect to its 
philosophical basis shall be studied. 
5. Philosophical Basis 
Knudson lists three special reasons for affirming the 
goodness of God: the analogical, the empirical and the apri-
oristic. By the "analogical" he means the argument based on 
the analogy between the human spirit (insofar as the latter 
implies a union of the intellectual and the ethical) and the 
divine spirit. He feels that this argument has almost irre-
sistible cogency since there is always moral responsibility 
where there is free intelligence. "If, then, God is omniscient 
and free, there is every reason to believe that he is also a 
moral Being."2 God might conceivably be evil in nature, just 
as there are evil human beings. But he might be ascribed 
1. DOG, 353. 
2. DOG, 354. 
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irrationality on the sa..me basis. 11 If we are \varranted in 
thinking of him as rational, we are equally warranted in think-
ing of him as good. The same logic holds in both instances."l 
But this analogical argument is not completely convincing. 
Even though the validity of drawing an analogy between the 
human and the divine be granted at this point, yet there is no 
right to infer from God's omniscience and freedom that he is 
good. As Knudson himself points out, God might be omniscient 
and free and still be conceivably evil. Neither does the ar-
gument for the rationa,li ty of God seem to have too much bearing 
or relevance to the argument for his goodness, unless perhaps 
Knudson has in mind the self-negating nature of either a com-
pletely evil or irrational system. This added assertion would 
truly strengthen the argument . Also, the analogical argument 
could be further strengthened by noting that a person who is 
omniscient would be aware of the fact that all his values are 
maintained only as he always chooses the best of all possible 
choices, which is ultimately what morality or goodnes s means . 
Even on this basis one could not be sure that God does actu-
ally do this. On Knudson's view that God is omnipotent, om-
niscient, and immanent in the vmrld, it vrould seem questionable 
-,.rhy God does not destroy evil in the world if he does a lways 
choose t he best of all possible choices. Hence other argu-
ments are added to supplement the analogical one. 
1. DOG, 355. 
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Knudson says that the empirical argument is based on the 
moral nature of man, on the moral s t ructure of human society, 
and on the moral p rinciPles which operate in human history. 
This moral nature needs a moral author for its explanation 
vlhich, _as its cause, must at l east be equal to the human spirit 
which it produces. "He that formed the capacity for right-
eousness, shall he not himself be righteous? To ask the ques-
tion is to answer it."1 Still attempts have been made to 
derive the moral from the nonmoral. Some say that man' s ethi-
cal nature developed from natural impulses and requires no 
other explanation of its origin. But here there is a confusion 
between temporal antecedent and metaphysical causation, and 
thus a failure to note the unique character of the moral life. 
There is a chasm between the "natural" and the 11 moral" which 
no logic can bridge. Knudson thus implies that if an adequate 
cause of man's moral nature is to be f ound, it must be found 
in a world-ground that is itself mora1 . 2 This argument seems 
to be adequate, rational, and emp irical. 
Some try t o argue in a similar way that human society 
also has a moral character, and, as such, it too points to a 
moral author. Here it is customary to lay stress, not on its 
transcendent source, but on history's revelation of an imma-
nent divine po1trer. Society is so constructed that it makes 
the 1t1ay of the transgressor hard, not only for the individual, 
1. DOG, 355. 
2. DOG, 355-356. 
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but for the social group. 11 A righteous nation is exalted, but 
doom a"'i'rai ts the wicked. 11 But it is not manifestly clear that 
righteousness reigns in h~ooan society and human history. Many 
are the examples where the opposite is true. Hence,"all that 
a study of the objective facts of life can do is to show that 
these facts do not negate faith in the goodnes s of God." 1 
Knudson asserts that this is as far as the social and histori-
cal arBument can go. 2 
I 
Consequently it is a very unsatisfactory 
argument for the goodness of God. 
Knudson avers that the strongest arvm1ent for the goodness 
of God is to be found in its aprioristic form. This argument 
contends that man's moral consciousness stands in its O"'i'Tn right, 
that it is absolute in this sense, and that it carries with it 
a demand that reality shall be in accordance with it. Regard-
less of the many ways that this argument may be stated, they 
all begin with the assumption of the absoluteness of the moral 
lmv. We cannot escape from the sense of "ought" or "duty", 
which implies that the nature of things demands that we do thus 
and so. "To affirm the absoluteness of the moral lav-r means, 
then, to affirm its objective validity or, in other "\vords, the 
moral character of the universe. 11 3 And it is only a matter of 
putting this same thought into other terms when we insist on 
the objectivity of values, on a religious priori, or on the 
1. DOG, 357. 
2. DOG, 356-357. 
3. DOG, 359. 
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fundamental and inevitable character of our faith in the reali-
ty of the ideal . All of them must have an objective reference 
and are meaningless without it. Hence the ultimate objective 
reference of the universe must be moral in its nature. 1 
This last argument also seems to be cogent and valid. 
Thus if one assumes the general trustworthiness of Scripture 
and the validity of the inferences from the moral nature of 
man and from what "ought" to be, he may feel confident in 
affirming that God is good. But still there are some diffi-
culties v-rhen one tries to understand the relation of God's 
goodness and his absoluteness. These shall be studied next. 
6. Goodness and Absoluteness 
The metaphysical absoluteness of God was studied in Chap-
ter I and Knudson concluded that it receives its most funda-
mental expression in the attribute of omnipotence. As the 
human spirit comes into contact with resisting forces, it has 
the thought of one ultimate and irresistible pov-rer which is the 
source of all things and upon which everything depends. This 
is one argument for the existence of a dynamic, metaphysical 
absolute. But the human spirit nGt only contacts resisting 
forces, it seeks peace and satisfaction. But it cann.ot find 
this satisfaction in itself, nor in the objects round about it; 
it rises to the thought of an ultimate and highest good, a 
good in which the restless soul finds rest and out of \1hich no 
1. DOG, 357-360. 
61 
-- ----.:::.=...:.;.:. -
new and unsatisfied desire arises . Hence there is an ethical 
Absolute vrhich exists alongside of the metaphysical Absolute; 
these lead Knudson to believe that there is in God a union of 
the highest good v.rith the highest power. 1 
But it should be noted before proceeding further that 
these arguments of Knudson and others before him are forms of 
the ontological argument which have little validity . Even 
though one may have the thought of an ultimate and highest 
good or of a metaphysical Absolute, this in no way proves that 
either or both of these have objective realities beside the 
thoughts themselves. That I have a thought proves only that 
I have the thought and perhaps approve of . it, but not that 
there is an objective reality corresponding to the thought . 
This should be kept in mind as we proceed fal"'ther . It vmuld 
seem much better to fall back on the other arguments 1vhich 
have been noted to be valid for the power and goodness of God; 
otheri-vise the antinomies to be proposed would seem to have 
little basis. 
This union of the metaphysical and ethical Absolute ·s in 
God has been the cause of several scruples in the history of 
philosophy and theology. The first one to be discussed is the 
assumed inconsistency between morality and absoluteness . 
Some circles hold that morality is relative to man and 
I that it cannot be properly affirmed of the Absolute . This is 
1, DOG, 
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because morality is said to imp ly the coexistence of good and 
evil, and that the Absolute is the unity or identity beyond 
all differences, so that no moral distinctions exist for him. 
He is hence regarded as 11 sup ermoral. 11 But this latter term is 
subject to the same ambiguity as the term "sup erp ersonal", as 
has already been discussed in the section on "Personality and 
the Absolute" in Chapter II . If supermoral is taken to mean 
that God's morality is of a higher type than that of human 
beings, there is practically complete acceptance of this vie~ov­
point by scholars. But if it means that God transcends the 
moral completely, the term implies an "agnostic" or 11logical 11 
conception of the Absolute which Knudson has rightly rejected 
as invalid. The true view of the Absolute as the uncondi-
tioned ground or cause of the world does not in any way con-
1 flict with the idea of goodness. 
Yet some p eople refer both evil and good to God and argue 
that he must therefore share in neither of them and be beyond 
both. Knudson appropriately declares that this is a confusion 
of moral and natural evil; the latter may be attributed to God, 
but not the former. God may not be able to p revent natural 
evil; but he could sin, since sin is a matter of choice by an 
intelligent agent . Hence he also can abstain from sinning (or 
do good) since that is a matter of continually choosing the 
better of all possible choices. And it is generally accepted 
1. DOG, 366-367. 
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that God continually chooses the best of all poss ible choices 
open to him and is therefore perfectly good. 11 To ascribe 
moral neutrality to him is as obnoxious to our religious as it 
is to our ethical nature."l 
But even though this may be true of God in his relation 
to the world, some say that the situation is different as he is 
thought of as a self-existent and independent Being. Here the 
second difficulty presents itself, the apparent contradiction 
between the implication of love and a fundamental monism. How 
can God , who has no ontological other, love? One possible 
answer is that creation i s an eternal and necessary consequence 
of the divine nature and thus there have always been beings 
whom God could love. But Knudson justly criticizes this view 
in stating that it would probably lead to pantheism. Another 
proposal is that human beings do not attribute love to God in 
their sense of the word but rather content themselves with 
affirming his free personal self-determination wi thout trying 
to ascertain any more specifically the actual content of his 
moral consciousness. Here Knudson is again right in: .asserting 
that this proposal does not seem very satisfactory. Hence the 
third proposition has been offered that there are personal dis-
tinctions \-r i thin God in the form of the Trinity which make 
possible love-life within God himself. This doctrine will be 
1. DOG, 368. Cf. his DOR, 222-270, where he gives an excellent 
discussion on the nature and conditions of sin. His view 
on this point is about as coherent a s can be found. 
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discussed more completely in another chapter where it shall be 
seen that there are also several difficulties in this theory, 
although Knudson st~tes that it has quite a bit of speculative 
value for the problem under consideration. His own view seems 
to be (although not stated explicitly) that creation is eter-
nal, yet free and actuated by love. Then love would be ~n 
eternal attribute of God and there would always be objects for 
Him to love. 
But however that may be, the important thing religiously 
is not the love that may exist within the Godhead itself, 
nor the divine love toward prehuman or angelic being s, 
but the love of God toward men. ltnd this \'I'B may affirm, 
regardless of the other possible expressions of his 
good will . There is nothing in his absoluteness,, 
correctly conceived, that is inconsistent with his 
righteous and loving attitude toward the vmrld .l 
This conclusion seems to be adequate and consistent with all 
that is known about God. Man may not know much about God, but 
he feels there is adequate evidence to indicate that God loves 
him . 
The third scruple that Knudson mentions2 ·, is the supposed 
incompatibility of omnipotence and perfect goodness . This is 
perhaps the most difficult of the three and involves the prob-
lem of natural evil and suffering. And because of the fact 
that this p roblem is so difficult and its resolution is likely 
to affect greatly a person's conception of God, the ·vrri ter has 
devoted the whole next chapter to a consideration of Knudson's 
treatment of the problem . 
1. DOG, 369. 
2. DOG, 361. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE PROBLEM OF SUFFERING 
Lactantius states the problem of suffering or natural 
evil adequately: 
God either wishes to take away evils, and is unable; 
or he is able, and is unwilling; or he is neither 
\'lilling nor able, or he is both vvilling and able. If 
he is willing and is unable, he is feeble, which is . 
not in accordance with the character of God; if he is 
able and un~<rilling, he is envious, v.rhich is equally 
at variance with God; if he is neither willing nor 
able, he is both envious and feeble, and therefore 
not God; if he is both willing and able, which 
alone is suitable to God, from what source then are 
evils? or why does he not remove them?l 
This quotation indicates that the p roblem is complex and that 
it does not yield to an ea sy solution. Hence it seems essen-
tial to trace briefly v.ri th Knudson the history of the problem 
in the hope of receiving more light on it and of understanding 
Knudson's own conclusions more adequately. 
1. History of Problem 
i. Biblical views. -- In the Bible there are to b e noted 
two fairly different views of natural evil; the dominant Old 
Testament view was retributive, the prevailing New Testament 
one was pedagogical or disciplinary. They do not necessarily 
exclude each other; but when one or the other is unduly empha-
sized, they represent very different outlooks toward life. 
The Old Testament outlook was for the most p art restricted to 
1. Lactantius, A Treatise on the Anger of God, Chap. XIII, as 
quoted by Knudson, DOG, 362n. 
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the earthly sphere and the highest good consisted of the par-
ticular blessings that may be enjoyed in the present life. 
Thus the evils of life were temporal and intrinsic; they were 
accounted for as punishments for sin. The New Testament out-
look was to the future and the highest good was eternal life. 
Thus eternal death was the supreme evil and the temporal evils 
of life became instrumental in the spiritual education of man-
kind. In the Old Testament period many evils were explained 
a.s penalties for sin; but the retributive principle was more 
and more embodied, both in its relation to the individual and 
to the nation. But the principle failed to accord "~ifi th the 
facts of history and experience. So in the New Testament 
period evil was not necessarily regarded as punishment for sin. 
Pain came to have a quality opposed to that of punishment. 
Christians exhorted each other to rejoice in tribulations, and 
even death 1-vas considered as gain. To some extent the idea 
was entertained that the inequalities of the present would be 
righted in the next vrorld; but the deeper thought 1-·.ras the idea 
of the end to be achieved. (the kingdom of heaven) and not 
distributive justice. Thus the dominant teaching of the New 
Testament became normative in the field of Christian experi-
ence and the retributive principle continued (in a subordinate 
role) to have considerable influence. But these were primarily 
religious rather than philosophical insights and did not take 
into account all the facts nor deal vri th their profounder 
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metaphysical implications. 1 
It was not until the time of St. Augu stine that the more 
scientific and philosophical aspects of the problem received 
significant treatment. Before his time, the tendency was to 
stress the abuse of freedom as the cause of human "\'roe. But 
the discus s ion of this principle v-ras rather g eneral and not 
thoroughly '\vorked out. 2 
ii. Augustine's Theodicy. -- "Augustine began his theodicy 
with the affirmation that God is absolutely g ood, that he has 
created all things, and that everything he has created is g ood. 
Nothing that is evil, therefore, really exists."3 Evil is 
like a disease; it preys upon nature or the g ood but has no 
being apart from it. It is the diminution of the good and 
leads ultimately to the extinction of all existence. It is 
sin, c:md sin and evil have their orig in in the freedom of the 
human will, not in God. But since this obscures a distinction 
between moral a nd natural evil, Augustine added that evil may 
be of two kinds; either sin or the punishment of sin. Thus 
all evil that is not identical with sin is derivable from it. 
But since much suffering is not traceable to sin, Augustine 
had recourse to the doctrine of orig inal sin. Adam's sin was 
a free act in which a ll of us participated. Hence death and 
evil are our just penal ties. .f3ut while God is not the author 
1. DOR, 169-176; DOG, 362; RTOT, 266-289; BICT, 93-98 . 
2. DOR, 176. 
3. DOR, 177. 
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of sin and evil, he regulates them for the purpose of testing 
and developing mankind. Augustine t hus combines the princi-
ples of the Old and New Testament, finding in the former the 
key to the origin of evil, and in the latter the moral motive 
that regulates them. 1 
In Augustine's theodicy Knudson justly finds several im-
portant truths, such as the central pla"ce accorded human free-
dom, the emphasis on the solidarity of the race, and the ethi-
cal interpretation of suffering. 2 But the theory as a whole 
rested on t vm points which are largely rejected at present: 
(1) the identification of Adam vdth the race, and (2) the 
biblical account of the fall and its consequences. The first 
is to be rejected because there is no way of fusing personal 
being s into a metaphysical unity without destroying their 
being and their moral responsibility; the second because death 
and the other evils are inherent in the physical structure of 
man and the world, and must exist a p art from human guilt. 
Thus natural evil cannot be ascribed to sin, let alone to the 
sin of Adam treated as a racial act.3 
iii. Leibniz's Tneodicy.--After Augustine, interest in 
the problem died down for over a thousand years. Pierre Bayle 
(1647-1706) stirred up new interest by arguing in his 
Dictionnaire historigue et critique that both the infinite 
1. DOR, 176-184; BICT, 98-99. 
2. DOR, 184. 
3. DOR, 184~~; BICT, 99. 
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wisdom and goodness of God are inconsistent with his omnipo-
tence, and that the existence of evil caru~ot be harmonized with 
the idea of an all-wise, almighty, and all-merciful Creator. 
Leibniz answered Bayle by asserting that imperfection is a 
rational necessity in a world of finite beings, that evil is 
simply a form of imperfection, and that God could not have 
created the world without evil. The world is a perfectly 
constructed machine and its creator is an infinitely wise, 
good, and powerful Being. It is the imperfections of the 
monads, of which the world is made, which gives to them their 
individuality. Tne.se are arranged by a pre-established har-
mony and the relation of interdependence that this implies. 
Even pain is a secondary form of imperfection, as well as 
moral evil. Both are derivable from the imperfection of one's 
mental life in general. 1 In this manner Leibniz attempts to 
solve the problem of evil. 
This view is criticized by Knudson in the following man-
ner: (1) Metaphysical imperfection is not evil in the same 
sense -as pain and sin are; they are altogether different. 
Metaphysical finitude does not involve a compromise between 
the poitrer and goodness of God; hence the problem is left un-
touched. (2) The attempt to deduce the evils of life from 
"the eternal truths" of reason and to make them rational 
necessities is unsucces s ful. TI~ere is no law of reason that 
1. DOR, 186-192; DOG, 363-364; BICT, 99-100. 
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requires the existence of many diseases and human ills. The 
only thing that reason clearly requires concerning evil is the 
possibility of sin. (3) This solution is achieved by disre-
garding the distinctive elements in personality. Man is an 
end in himself; a free being. He is distinct from nature and 
is in a personal relation with God. But in the Leibnizian 
theodicy, neither man nor God is free; both are determined. 
Thus the goodness and p ower of God are justified, but only by 
destroying the distinctly Christian conceptions of God and 
1 
man. Although these criticisms by Knudson have some validity, 
they shall be reconsidered to some extent in the section com-
paring Leibniz's and Brightman's views . 
iv. Kant's View.--Knudson states that it was Immanuel 
Kant more than anyone else who brought the sway of Leibnizian 
2 theod i cy to an end. Hence the next step is to study Kant's 
contribution to the p roblem, especially seeking Knudson's view 
and criticism . Knudson sunooarizes Kant's theodicy under the 
following four main points: (1) Man's moral and relig ious 
nature is the proper starting p oint for a sound theod icy. 
There is no independent theoretical knowledg e of God such as 
the older rationalism assumed. Therefore we should not start 
with the idea of a perfect Being and try to harmonize the 
existence of such a Deity vii th the facts of life. This method 
1. DOR, 192-196; DOG, 364-365; BICT, 100-101. 
2. DOR, 196. 
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of procedure renders a final solution impossible. We should 
rather start from the ethical side of our being and ask how it 
requires us to think of the world. (2) "On interrogating the 
moral consciousness we discover that the only absolute value 
it recognizes is that of a free ethical personality. Nothing 
else •.• has intrinsic Horth. rrl Therefore nature is not an 
end in itself, it is merely instrumental to the moral life. 
Consequently, God is not primarily concerned with maintaining 
the natural order, but rather with the moral order. (3) If He 
accept the primacy of the pra ctical reason, the absolute worth 
of the moral personality and the instrumental nature of the 
natural Horld, it ensues that the suffering of life has meaning 
and value only as it contributes to the development of moral 
character. We do not know exactly hoH this is accomplished; 
all that the moral rea son requires is that the world and its 
evils should afford a field for the exercise and development 
of moral character. So long as this is accomplished, we have 
no ground for complaint. Knudson asserts that in principle 
this view solves the problem of evil for us. (4) Along with 
this disciplinary theory of natural evil Kant repudiates eude-
monism as a norm by which the worth of life should be judged. 
Nature does not exist to satisfy one's desire for sensuous 
happiness; only the good vdll and holiness of cha racter consti-
tute the true good of life. The sensuous feelings are mere 
1. DOR, 197. 
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facts of nature and have neither value nor disvalue in the 
higher meaning of these terms. Nature aims at moral, not sen-
suous, perfection. Thus Knudson concludes that Kant sought to 
divert the problem of theodicy into nev-r channels and that he 
succeeded to some extent. Yet people are still asking the 
question as to how, in view of the evils of life, God could be 
both perfectly good and omnipotent. This question has been 
answered by many in the form of an extension of the Leibnizian 
theory. They have limited God not only by reason but by irra-
tional forces or p rinciples either without or within Him. God 
is perfectly good but finite in pov-rer, and hence he is not 
1 
morally responsible for the evils of the world . 
Of those theories limiting God externally, Knudson briefly 
discusses those of Iviarcion, and the Manicheans, and rejects 
them on the same basis that he vmuld reject any dualistic or 
2 
polytheistic theory. Polytheism is one easy way of solving 
the problem at hand, but it is unsatisfactory as a total view. 
Only a monism can stand the critical tests of philo sophical 
and theolo gical investigation . 
2 . Professor Brightman's View 
In turning to a study of the theories that limit God inter 
nally, Knudson says: 
A more subtle and refined form of the Manichean 
theory of nat-ural evil is that 1-vhich conceives of the 
l. DOR, 196-200; DOG, 365; BICT, 104- 107. 
2. DOR, 200-203. 
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power of God as limited not by some external principle 
or substance but by a resisting element i'Tithin his own 
being. Instead of a fundamental metaphysical dualism 
composed_of God and an opposing force we here have a 
dualism of nature and will within God. God is a uni-
tary Being; he has one undivided consciousness, and 
his vfill is the sole source of the world. In these 
respects the theory is monistic. But the divine i'iill 
is limited by the divine nature, and thus there arises 
a ·conflict within the divine consciousness. ~ne divine 
will finds itself hampered, unable to do all it would. 
It is crippled in its activity by certain aspects of 
the divine nature, and hence the world which it creates 
is in a sense a disappointment to God himself. If he 
had not been limited in his power by his own nature, 
he would have made it a retter world. In these respects 
the theory is dualistic. 
This monistic-dualistic theory, as it is named by Knudson, has 
been most completely and coherently developed by Professor 
Edgar S. Brightman. Knudson says that the novel feature of thi 
theory is the dualistic principle which Professor Brightman 
introduces into the framework of an idealistic and monistic 
philosophy . God not only limits himself but he is inherently 
limited by a part of his own nature (The Given) against which 
he continuously and consciously struggles. 2 
In order to better understand Knudson's criticisms of 
Brightman's view and the accompanying comments whi ch are soon 
to follow, it seems advisable to note how Brightman defines 
The Given. Dr. Brightman asserts that 
The Given consists of the eternal, uncreated laws of 
reason and also of equally eternal and uncreated proc-
esses of nonrational consciousness which exhibit all 
the ultimate qualit ies of sense objects (gualia), 
1. DOR, 203-204. 
2. DOR, 204-205. Cf. Brightman's POR, POG, and FOG for his 
complete view. 
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disorderly impulses and desires, such experience as 
pain and suffering, the forms of space and fime, and 
whatever in God is the source of surd evil. 
Here it is evident that there are two parts of The Given, the 
rational form and the nonrational content. The former is com-
parable to the Pattern and the latter to the Receptacle in 
Plato's philosophy; the main difference being that the Pattern 
and the Receptacle are external to God in Plato's concep tion 
and The Given is a part of the very nature of God in Professor 
Brightman 1 s viev-r. 2 
In the following section there is a rather extensive 
study of Knudson's criticisms of Brightman's vievr. This is 
necessary because it vvas mainly this problem of natural evil 
that caused Brightman to reconsider his conception of God 
(which was originally almost identical to Knudson's present 
view) and to adopt his present view of a finite God. But is he 
justified in making this change? Knudson of course answers 
that he is not and gives the criticisms that are about to be 
delineated and evaluated. In a later chapter (in a fashion 
comparable to the followinE one) Brightman's criticisms of 
views similar to Knudson's are studied. 
i. Brightman and Leibniz.--Knudson precedes his majdr 
criticisms of Brightman's vievr with a comparison between the 
Leibnizian view and that of Brightman. He first shmvs that 
views make the divine reason a part of God. Then he declares 
1. Brightman, POR, 337. 
2. Brightman, POR, 337-339. 
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that there are two important differences between them. First: 
God is in his very essence a rational Being . But this 
could not be s a id of The Given. There is nothing in 
the idea of the divine p ersonality that requires such 
a nonrational a nd resisting element as The Given is 
said to be. Rather, v.rould such an element seem alien 
t o the divine nature; rnd certa inly it is purely hyp o-
thetica l in character. 
Brightman vlould p robably answer that this nonrational and re-
sisting element is not only part of the divine nature; it is 
also a part of every other nature. Everything that exists has 
both form and content; form without content is empty, and con-
tent without form is chaotic. P~d so it is with God whose 
given nature is both rational in form and nonra ti onal in con-
tent . Neither asp ect of God can ex ist without the other. Th.a t 
this is Brightman's view would seem to be confirmed by the fol-
lowing p assage:2 
\~en God c r e a tes, he h a s to create as a will limited 
both by rea son a nd by nonrational content. Thus 
when man is created there enter into his being the 
same constituents that obtain eternally in God and 
in all his deeds.3 
Thus the rational form and the nonra tional content are constit-
uents of all reality according to Brightman. 
There seems to be more eviden ce for Brightman's view than 
Knudson's at this point. If, as Knudson says, "reason is a 
constituent element in personality,"4 then there are probably 
1. DOR, 205. 
2. Also confirmed by Art.(l932), 134- 5. 
3. Brightman, POR, 333. 
4. DOR, 205. 
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other constituents of personality vrhich are at least "non-
reason, tt such as will and content. ICnudson even talks about 
the divine will as ratifying the divine reason, which is to 
imply that the vrill is other than reason in some fashion. 
Hence Knudson's concept of God has its nonrational constituents 
as does Brightman's. One is really as consistent as the other 
at this point, except that Knudson ·would deplore calling any 
aspect of his conception of God nonrational, \Nhereas Brightman 
is very frank about it. The thing which Knudson really objects 
to is the "resisting" element in Brightman's view, which itrill 
be more fully discussed as other criticisms are considered. 
The second difference between the views of Leibniz and 
Brightman is stated by Knudson as follows: 
Then, in the next place, the divine reason does not 
resist the divine will. The latter rather ratifies 
the divine reason. It works in and through the divine 
reason and is conscious of no cramping restriction as 
a result of this relationship. But it is of the very 
essence of The Given that it retards and limits the 
divine will so that it is only by struggle that God 
is able to carry on his work, and even then he falls 
short of his heart's desires.l 
Here Knudson seems to try to dodge the fact that the divine 
reason is a limitation on the divine will. In DOG, 269 he 
discusses the question of the meaning of the word limitation 
and decides that rationality is only a limitation in the sense 
that it denotes definiteness and concreteness of being. Then 
he states that this is not a limitation in the sense that it 
1. DOR, 205. 
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implies imperfection or a lessened degree of r eality. But 
Brightman points out that 11 neither absolutist nor finitist sup-
poses that the la\vS of reason were created by an arbitrary fiat 
of will; reason is an eternal and un crea ted attribute of God, 
not dependent on his will. 111 Hence the will must act in ac-
cordance with the principles of rea son and is therefore limited 
to that extent. Just so also is the content aspect of God 
( a ccording to Brightman) not created by the will. Thus God 
must always work with and take into considera tion these given 
f a ctors in any of his activities. But Brightman's view should 
not be overthrown on the bas is that it 11 sounds strange and dis-
cordant11; rather, does it explain all the given data of experi-
ence? 
ii. Criticisms.- -Next Knud s on lists seven specific criti-
cisms of Professor Brightman's theory: 
1. It compromises the divine unity and so f a ils to 
meet the rational demand for a ba sal monism. • •• 
so long a s the divine vlill stands apart f rom any 
portion of the divine na ture and refuses to ratify 
it or is in any way crippled or hampered by it, we 
have a serious curtailment of the divine unity. 
Furthermore, the distinction draWli between the 
divine nature and the divine vlill seems to me an 
illicit abstraction. The divine will apart from 
the divine nature is vacuous, and the divine na ture 
apart from the divine will is nonexistent. 2 
From a p er sonal conversation with Professor Brightman it was 
learned that he cons iders this to be a very weak criticism and 
one of little need for concern on his part. He feels that this 
1. Brightman, POR, 303. 
2. DOR, 206. Cf. DOG, 272-275; BICT, 102-104. 
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criticism indicates a complete misunderstanding of his vievr. 
He stated that he bad always insisted on the unity of God and 
still does. There is really no bifurcation between will and 
nature in God; they are t\vO aspects of one dynamic pro cess. 
Perhaps it could be best stated that the form and content as-
pects of God's experience limit the range of possible choices 
that are open to God in His activities. As such, there would 
seem to be no duality in God's personality anymore than there 
is in any other personality. Personality is a "unitas-multi-
plex11 (Stern): a unity with variety, change and multiplicity.1 
And the struggle exists because God is continually trying to 
re-form or transfer his content2 so that greater and greater 
values can be achieved. And even though the divine will does 
not "ratify" the nonrational content of the divine nature, yet 
"God may be said to 'ratify' his personality as a whole, with-
out approving certain uncreated parts of it; for his nature as 
a whole is the progres s ive control of The Given, not ratifi-
cation of it."3 
2. The theory in question by limiting the divine 
pO\ver compromises also the divine goodness and so 
fails to meet the deepest demands of religious faith. 
For the goodness in which religion puts its trust is 
not simply a goodness of intention but a goodness 
linked \-ri th ·power, an "objective 11 as distinguished 
from a merely 11 subjective 11 goodness.4 
But it is quite questionable a s to how the divine goodness is 
1. Brightman, 
2. Brightman, 
3. Brightman, 
4. DOR, 206. 
FOG-, 187-188. 
FOG, 150. 
Art. ( 1932), 140 • 
Cf. DOG, 273-275. 
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"compromised" by the divine power being limited. As long as a 
person h a s the power to choose the better or the worse of pos-
si ble choices, power is othervri se irrelevant to moral goodness. 
A person might be almost helpless a nd still be perfectly good. 
Peop le trust God primarily because h e is morally good, not be-
cause he is powerful. 1 This is V<rhat Knudson probably means by 
11 subjective goodnes s 11 which he feels is inadequa te for relig-
ious faith. Hence he contra sts it V<rith what he calls "objec-
tive goodness". Brightman has p robably analyzed Knudson's 
concep t correctly vvhen he states that 
By objective goodnes s I take him to mean perfection 
of achievement in accordance with will •••• The 
demand for perfect objective goodness is refuted if 
there is anything whatever that is not as it ought 
to be. To assert tha t now God is objectively per-
fectly good is a serious comp romise of the ideal of 
goodness. There is enough o b j e ctive goodnes s in 
God to control and eternally improve a universe not 
wholly a product of his will. Is not that a s much 
a s the f a c ts allovT? And is it not enough for 
relig ious faith? 11 2 
Tnis statement seems to be a correct interpretation of the data 
of exp erience as vrell as a correct a n a lysis of Knudson's con-
cep t. If God is really achieving in accordance with his will 
and h e is omnipotent, then he mus t have an element of evil in 
his will or there should not be all t h e evil that there is in 
the world today. But of course Knudson would not a gree with 
this conclusion and hence it would seem that he is more incon-
sistent on this aspect of the p roblem than is Professor 
2. Brightman, Art.(l932), 140. 
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3. According to the theory God is the Creator 
of the world. • •• But presumably he had sufficient 
knowledge so that he foreknew the evils that would 
inevitably result from his delayed and hampered 
creative activity. Yet in spite of this he chose to 
create the world. • •• The fact that he created 
the world vli th an adequate knowledge of what he was 
doing would seem to imply that he regarded the una-
voidable evils incident to creation as justified by 
the total outcome both for himself and for his 
creatu.res. And this, after all, does not differ so 
very much from the common theistic teaching, for it 
implies that God is at least indirectly responsible 
for the natural evils of life. 1 
Professor Brightman has stated in a personal conversation that 
this criticism is the one that has bothered him the most of all 
criticisms directed against his theory of God. Yet Dr. Bright- I 
man seems to have given a very adequate answer to this criti-
cism in his POR, 331-334. If God were finite in Brightman's 
sense of the term, truly he vmuld be much more justified in I 
1 creating the i-vorld as it is than if he were infinite as Knudson I 
I holds. Creation of the world with all of its evil might then 
I be his best possible choice; but if he is omnipotent as Knudson ,, 
holds, it is much more difficult to see how it could be his I 
I best choice. And certainly Knudson dulls the sharp edge of the 
I above criticism when he admits at the end of the above quota-
tion that Brightman's view does not differ much from the common 
theistic teaching. Actually, Brightman's view would seem to be 
a much more adequate explanation for the creation of the world 
in which we now live than is the common theistic theory to 
1. DOR, 207-208. 
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which Knudson holds. It justifies both the Creator and the 
creation of the universe as v.re experience it. 
4. The assertion of the absolutely evil and irra-
tional character of much of the suffering of life seems 
to me dogmatic, and inconsistent with1 the spirit both of true science and of true religion. 
This point is well taken. It may be intrinsically evil for an 
essential building to burn dovm; yet if this evil is instru-
mental to the building of a new building v-rhich is more effi..;; · 
cient than the old building, the intrinsic evil may be the 
means to more intrinsic good than otherwise would probably re-
sult if the building had not have burned down. But this is 
not to say that the intrinsic evil would not have been less-
ened if the old building could have been torn down instead of 
burned. Intrinsic evil is still intrinsic evil, as Brightman 
rightly insists2 and must be fought against by God and man, 
even though its instrumental value may be completely out of 
proportion to its intrinsic disvalue (e.g. the seed that dies 
in the ground may be the means of bringing about an ear of 
corn; the los s of one seed is intrinsic evil, since it is com-
pletely destroyed, although it is the means to the p roduction 
of many seeds which are intrinsically valuabte). Both God and 
man should be continuously seeking to reduce both the intrinsic 
and instrumental evil of the world on all occasions. It seems 
to be part of the very law of the universe (and ultimately of 
God of course) that intrinsic evil precede and be the means to j 
1. DOR, 207-208. 
2. Brightman, POR, 334. 
intrinsic good (e.g. the seed must die before grain can be 
produced). Yet this does not mean that we should be complacent ! 
with the present evil (e . g. cancer); we should do all in our 
power to reduce, destroy and prevent it. If the evil seems to 
be necessary (as the seed's dying seems to be), we should do 
all we can to reduce it (e.g. breeding our plants so that we 
get more grain from the same number of seeds) . If the evil 
seems to have very little if any instrumental value (e.g. can-
cer), we should do all that vve can to destroy it and prevent 
its reoccurrence. 
But Knudson is justi.fied still in saying that v-re should 
be slow in asserting that the evils of life a re incompati-ble 
with the rationality and goodness of the universe . There ap-
pears to be no evil that cannot be instrumental to both further 
good and further evil, and no good that cannot be instrumental 
to both further evil and further good. 
also good or evil in its instrumentality. And the ultimate 
determination of the good or evil of the action or event must 
not only involve its intrinsic value, but its instrumental 
value as well. Hence it is possible that all evil may result 
in good which overbalances the evil instrumental to it in such 
a fashion that all evil might be considered good for the total-
ity of persons. 
But even Brightman would probably agree vri th this conclu-
sion since his public statement in the fall of 1949 that surd 
-==-==-~- -=== 
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1 
evil may be instrumental to intrinsic good. He states that 
does not know hovr he could have ever made the statement in his 
I 
'I 
FOR, 246, that 11 if there be any truly surd evil, then it is l1CL 
in any sense an instrumental go od . 11 He feels that it must havei 
been a typographical error; at least he cl a ims it never really 
entered int o his theory as such. Hence both Brightman and 
Knudson now a gree that all the evil of the v-rorld may have in-
strumental value and be the means to intrinsic g ood . But 
Brightman asserts that intrinsic evil and certainlysurd evil 
are imperfect in their instrumental value, since he feels that 
there might conceivably be better ways to develop the same 
values without the pre~ceding and consequent disvalues. 2 He 
also declares that traditional theists such as Knudson must 
hold that the instrumental value of all evil must be p erfectly 
adap ted to bring about intrinsic good , if God i s both perfect-
ly good and omnip otent. 3 
But Knudson has contended in a personal conversation that 
he does not hold to the lat t er vievJ as such. "Every evil of 
There has been some confusion as to what Brightman means 
by surd evil. In addition to the definitions given in FOR, 
he has stated in a conversation that he means by it that 
exp erience which we believe ought to be shunned or pre-
vented after rational criticism of empirical disvalues and 
rational choice of action in accordance "~di th a self-
imposed standard. It is nonra tional in the sense that it 
is not a choice of reason and cannot be deduced from any 
act of reason, jus£ as the color blue cannot. It is in-
trinsically evil and cannot be completely reduced to in-
trinsic good by any operation. However, it may be in-
strumental to some intrinsic good. 
2. Confirmed by Brightman, FOG, 173. 
3. Brightman, POR, 263. 
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the universe works together for go od, but not necessarily for 
absolute good." Knudson says that he does not know whether an 
absolutely perfect world is possible and hence v-re do not know 
what absolutely perfect good would be. Our relig ious faith 
would have us believe that 11 all thing s -vmrk tog ether for good 
to them that love God, to them who are the called according to 
his purpose;"1 which indicates that the universe is under 
divine providence and that we can trust God to work out the 
highest values for the totality of persons. How this is possi-
ble v-re cannot say, but we trust God and leave the problem up 
to him. For the problem of natura l evil goes back to God alone 
and we would rather assert human i gnorance than divine impo-
tence in determining the way God solve s his problem. 
But Knudson is illogical at this point since an omnipotent 
God vmuld be able to make all evils p erfect instruments for 
good and since God would not be truly good if he could do so 
and did not. Knud son somewhat admitted the validity of this 
conclusion in a personal conversation, but he said tha t t h is is 
the point where his faith comes in; rather than discredit God's 
power, he preferred to discredit man's knowledge. But this is 
certainly putting faith in one interpretation of the Bible 
above faith in empirical reason, which is contra ry to his stat 
criterion of truth--that "theology and philosophy • •• both . 
base their case on a rational interpretation of our total 
1 • Romans 8 : 28 • 
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human exp erience, both subjective and objective."l Hence it 
must be concluded that Brightman's view is more rigorous and 
coherent than Knudson's on this problem. 
5. The theory of The Given implies, in my opinion, 
an unduly anthropomorphic conception of God. • •• 
God has a drag in his nature, a resisting element, 
against which he finds it necessary to struggle. But 
a God so limited, l"lhile he may seem more intelligible 
to us, will impress people as too human.2 
I 
I 
This criticism is very weak and Brightman's answer is very ade- I 
quate. 3 Anthropomorphism is not in itself a valid criticism; 1i 
empirical coherence is the final test. All of our thinking I I 
! 
and concepts (especially of God) must be anthropomorphic; all jl 
our experience is human . We cannot avoid being anthropomorphic4; 
6. Another difficulty in connection with The 
Given has to do with the Why or the Whence of its 
existence. We are told that it is eternal, that it 
had no origin. But this does not satisfy us. If The 
Given were an integral factor in personality, or if it 
were an essential part of an ultimate rational whole, 
we might accept its existence without further question • 
• • • But The Given is neither rational nor an essential 
element in personality ••.• And with reference to such 
an element in the divine nature we inevitably a~k why 
it should exist. 
We are told that the divine will controls The 
Given, though it does not create it. But does t he 
control increase in efficiency or does The Given dimin-
ish in resisting power? If nei ther occurs, it would 
seem that God is engaged in a hop eless task and must 
eventually give up in despair. On the other hand, if 
either occurs, we have a changing and a grovring God, 
and one wonders why greater p rogress has not been made 
in view of the endless eternity through which he h a s 
been struggling against The Given. 
~fuether the theory calls for a God who is steadily 
I 
I 
II 
II 
I 
II 
I 
I 
,, 
I! 1. BICT, 44. II 
2 . DOR, 209. I 
3. Brightman, POR, 328-330. J 
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growing in power is not clear. He is said to be perfect, 
but his perfection is said to consist in his "perfecti-
bility." ••• Professor Brightman ••• seems to use 
the term to express a dynamic as distinguished from a 
static conception of the Deity and in this respect is 
in harmony with the current theistic view. But whether 
this ceaseless activity of God • • • is grovving from 
more to more so that it will eventually at least approxi-
mate omnipotence, is a point on which, so far as I 
recall, nothing definite is said. Apparently, the re-
sisting Given has an eternal future, and in that case 
evil also becomes an eternal necessity.l 
This complex criticism involves many different problems in 
one. The first one is thequestion as to whether or not The 
Given is an integral part of personality . Knudson gives an 
emphatic negative answer to this question as can be seen from 
the above quotation and the following passage. 
In human experience there is a "given" element, but 
this given element is due to our dependence upon an 
external environment. It is not essential to person-
ality. If it wer e, there could be no such independent 
and self-existent Person as the theory of the Given 
assumes that God is.2 
But this statement is of doubtful validity. Just because there I 
is in hu.rilan experience a "given" external element which is not 
essential to personality, it does not follow that there is not 
an : internal "given" element which is integral to p ersonality. 
Certainly all the "given" elements of our experience are not 
external environmental factors; most of the elements that 
Brightman lists under "eternal and uncreated processe·s of non-
rational consciousness 113 are equally applicable to human 
l. DOR, 209-212. 
2. DOR, 209n. 
3. Brightman, POR, 337. 
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experience as they may be to the divine. It seems quite 
I certain that Brightman would maintain that these "given" ele-
In fact, in his POR, I 
351-353, he lists the aualia and the forms of time and space as !! 
I 
ments are integral parts of personality. 
a part of the characteristics of even a minimum self. And 
these characteristics are developed to a higher level in what 
he classifies as a person. It is to be noted that he does not 
include in these characteristics such parts of The Given as 1 
I 
"disorderly impulses and desires, 11 anything directly related to 1 
surd evil, or 11 such experiences as pain and suffering . 11 How ~~ 
ever 1n h1 s FOR, 320, he lists "the pleasures and pains , the- !1 
desires and impulses of experience" as beil:1g "inseparable con-
stituents of every pulse beat of actual consciousness and of 
every object to which we refer." But even here he does not 
list the desires and impulses of experience as being "disor-
derly," or list anything connected with surd evil as being a 
vital part of consciousness or of any object. But vlhen Pro-
fe s sor Brightman was questioned about this fact, he replied 
that the word "disorderly" could have been left out as easily 
as included. He had only included it because Plato h ad done so 
in his writings on the receptacle in the Timaeus. And the fact 
that h .e had not listed 11vrhatever in God is the source of 
lh:uman7 surd evil" as being a vital part of consciousness is 
due to his own lack of foresi ght. Actually he would want to do 
so in some form or another. If this vrere not true, it would 
seem that God's personality would have to be viewed as less 
----- -·-=Jt=== 
perfect than those which He created, which does not seem proba-
ble. Hence we conclude that The Given is an integral part of 
personality and that Brightman is quite consistent in arriving 
at this conclusion. 
Knudson more or less dodges the above problem by his defi-
nition of personality: 
We vmuld find in personality four . . • fundamental 
elements: first, individuality, which includes unity 
and identity; second, self-consciousness in the sense 
of power to know as v-rell as to feel; third, will or 
free activity; and fourth, dignity or ";orth .1 
These elements of the personality are excellent so far as they 
go, but they are not sufficiently broad to cover all the essen-
tial aspects. The first three elements could be listed under 
the activities of the person and the fourth is not of signifi-
cance for our present discussion. But in addition to activity, 
Brightman rightly propounds that every real object embodies 
form and content. The latter are the given aspects of person-
ality which are present inseparably in every activity of a 
person. 2 Hence it is evident that Knudson is consistent with 
his definition of personality in renouncing The Given of 
Brightman's theory of God, but that his theory of the person-
ality of God (or of other persons) is inadequate since it does 
not include enough of the empirical elements. And since there 
are given elements in personality, one accounts for their 
1. POP 83. Also cf. DOG, 229, and the section of this thesis 
on ''The Meaning of Personality". 
2. Brightman, POR, 320. 
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existence in the same fashion that one accounts for personality 
itself. Hence, personality being the ultimate in reality and 
existence, God's personality (with its given elements) must be 
assumed to exist eternally. 
In answer to the second problem in the above quotation as 
to whether the content of The Given changes or whether the 
efficiency of the divine control increases, Brightman enun-
ciates that The Given remains eternally the Se~e and that God's 
control of it increases in efficiency.1 Thus, as Knudson 
rightly asserts, God is changing and growing on this view, "and 
one wonders why greater progress has not been made in yiew of 
the endless eternity through -,.rhich he has been struggling 
against The Given". To this Dr. Brightman answers: 
Why, then, has not everything happened already? To 
this there is only the double answer: it is necessary 
that time be unbegun (for there -,.rould be a time before 
any possible beginning); and experience shows that 
everything has not yet happened. • •• However much 
a finite God may progress, he has infinite stages and 
varieties of progress behind him; and at all stages of 
progress, he is the fullness of all actual objective 
being, the creator of all created being, the unity of 
all energy. His inexhaustible perfectibility for the 
future presupposes a past series of inexhaustible 
perfectibilities.2 
This answer is adequate, and it leads to the last part of the 
quoted criticism of Knudson against Brightman's theory con-
cerning "perfectibility'' and an "approximate omnipotence" on 
the part of God. 
1. Brightman, POR, 335-341. 
2. Brightman, POR, 335. 
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The passage from POR that has just been quoted is suffi-
cent to explain the essentials of Brightman's theory of infi-
nite perfectibility . A more specific and complete explanation 
is to be found in POR, 340-341. This theory is certainly op-
posed to the traditional view of perfection but not without an 
adequate rational basis. No one ever experiences absolute 
perfection or completeness. Absolute completeness always con-
notes the idea of something static and unchanging because that 
whi cb. is complete has no need for activity of any type. "Yet 
such .'perfection' is as far above human comprehension as it is 
above concrete imagination; and it is so remote from the facts 
of experience as to be incoherent (although doubtless consis-
tent) with them."1 Thus the concept of inexhaustible perfecti-
bility may be better substituted for that of perfection since 
things are experienced as approaching completeness rather than 
as being complete. Hence God's po-v.rer is continually approach-
ing omnipotence (in Knudson's sense of the word) although 
never arriving at complete unlimited power. In fact, ''there 
is no evidence that power is infinite. All power is under 
limits. " 2 And this is especia l ly in accord with Brightman's 
theory since The Given is eternal; and thus natural evil is 
also an eternal necessity to some extent. But this should not 
be the cause of feelings of pessimism on the part of indi-
viduals since disvalue can only exist so long as value exists. 
1. Brightman, POR, 340. 
2. Brightman, POR, 319. 
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And if God is continually gaining more control of The Given so 
that value or good continually increases and evil or disvalue 
continually decreases, the universe can look forward to a 
healthy amelioration. This aspect of Brightman's theory seems 
to be empirically coherent. 
Thus we come to the l ast of Knudson's written criticisms 
against Brightman's theodicy as listed in DOR: 
7. There is nothing in the nature of The Given that 
gives us the slightest insight into the reason why 
its resistance to the divine l'l'ill should lead to any 
specific evil. • •• It throws no light vn~atsoever 
upon the concrete evils of life. Of any evil that 
seems especially repugnant to our sensibilities we 
may say that God because of his struggle ·vli th The 
Given could1not help it, but why , we have no idea 
-v.;hatsoever. 
This criticism had some validity at the time DOR vlas written, 
since Brightman had not clearly defined what he thought was 
the content aspect of The Given. 2 But he did so in his POR, 
337 and hence v-reakened the force of this criticism. The fact 
that The Given contains impulses and desires, pains and 
pleasures gives a little more insight into the reason that 
there are such specific evils as murders and suicides . But it 
does not help much with such diseases as lepro sy , tuberculosis, 
cancer and syphilis. But neither does any other view kno;,,m . 
1. DOR, 212. 
2. This statement does not mean to imply that Brightman had 
not previously described the general aspects of Tae Given, 
for he did so in FOG, especially on 119, 134, 172-178, and 
185-186 and in POG, 125. The statement has reference 
rather to the fact that it was not until his POR that indi-
cation -vms made as to the specific content of the 
nonrational Given. 
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And therefore there would seem to be no reason why Brightman's 
view should be more criticiz-ed at this point than any other 
view. 
When Knudson 1,vas asked about this, he replied that Bright-
man's reason for changing his view to that of the finite God 
1,vas so that he could account for the evils of life. Knudson 
went on to say that he does not try really to explain specific 
evils, rather that he leaves their explanation in the hands of 
an omniscient God with whom he puts his trust. And the reason 
v.rhy Brightman is to be cri tici:zed is that his theory does not 
accomplish really that for which it was formulated. 
As if almost anticipating this criticism, Brightman 1,vrote 
in FOG, 173-174, the following: 
Those who say, as some of my critics do by implication, 
that any possible expression of divinely omnipotent and 
benevolent power in an ordered world must necessarily 
contain alcohol and syphilis, insanity and arterio-
sclerosis, or their equivalents, know a great deal more 
about ~~at must necessarily be than is vouchsafed to me. 
However necessary the truths of formal logic and mathe-
matics may be, I know nothing about 1,vhat must necessarily 
be in the concrete world; yet I dare claim to know a 
little about what experience is. Now whether we look 
at the subjective exper~ence of man's inner life or at 
the objective experience that we call nature, we see 
purpose and reason struggling with refractory material 
and bringing order out of disorder, beauty out of ugli-
ness, life out of death, mind out of life. • •• Thus 
we see life as the drama of a suffering and striving 
God who never loses courage in his wrestling with The 
Given, but always faces in his struggles conditions 
which he did not create and for which it v-rould be 
unreasonable to hold him responsible. 
Brightman has replied further in discussing this problem, that 
in asking for a theory that would account for particular evils 
in the world, Knudson is a sking for an a priori theory about an 
empirical fact. And if this could be given, there would be an 
a priori necessity for each empirical fact. In other vmrds, if 
there were a theory which was so adequate a s to account for 
such particular evils as cancer and leprosy, one would know so 
much about their causes as to be able also to predict their 
necessary occur rences. Thus it seems vrell to conclude as 
Bowne does (although his statement is taken out of context 
somevrhat) that 
we may trace the deed to the doer, but to trace it into 
the doer involves confusion and nonsense. The producer 
is not the v.rork , but he is revealed through the work; 
and the work is understood through the producer. This 
is a relation which is perfectly intelligible .in 
experience; and beyond it we cannot go. When we seek 
to construe the back-lying intelligenc e we have no 
guide.but experience, 1 and this does not take us far even 1n our own case. 
In other words, the nature of the cause of evil can only be 
inferred from the nature of evil itself. It is impossible to 
go beyond this. If all evil v1ere completely reducible to good 
(v,rhich Knudson does not conclude), it is easy to see that its 
cause may 'ivell be completely good. But if it be concluded that 
there is evil that is not completely reducible to good (as 
Knudson really holds although he may not want to admit it), 
then this evil must be accounted for in the nature of its 
cause. And because of the fact that there is no guide but 
experience, the nature of the cause cari only be construed in 
1. Bowne, MET, 428-429. 
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general terms and not to the extent that one can tell why 
specific evils exist as they do. To ask for more is to follow 
what Bowne (following Matthew Arnold) has called the method of 
rigor and vigor, which is a method Dr. Brightman states that 
Dr. Knudson does not accept. 1 
From the preceding discussion about Knudson's criticisms 
of Brightman's theory of God, it should be evident that ·Knud-
son needs to reconsider these criticisms in the light of 
Brightman's vievv as a \vhole. That Knudson has seriously con-
sidered Brightman's view as a possible solution should be evi-
dent from the fact that he acted as a sort of midwife to 
Brightman's view, encouraging and helping the new conception 
to come to birth. At the time DOG was published, Knudson was 
more sympathetic with Brightman's view than he has been at any 
time since then. DOR gives the height of his thinking and 
criticism on the problem and indicates the sincerity of his 
search for an adequate solution. But as to whether or not 
Brightman's view is coherent is not of issue in this thesis. 
The important point is whether or not Knudson is justified to 
overthrow Brightman's view, and it is the conclusion of this 
·section that he is not so justified since his criticisms have 
been shown to be inadequate and not cogent. 
3. Knudson's View 
Now that the discussion of Knudson's view of the biblical 
teaching and other possible solutions to the problem of natural 
1. Cf. Bowne, THE, 15-18. 
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evil or suffering has been completed, the next discussion is 
about the viel'l that Knudson himself holds and vrhich he asserts 
to be perhaps the most widely held view by Christian thinkers 
at the present time. He attempts to bring what are actually 
many views into one by formulating their essential elements 
into three main characteristics. 
111. Following Kant, the tendency is to regard the prob-
lem of natural evil as theoretically insoluble."1 According 
to Knudson's view, the Augustinian, Leibnizian, Manichean, 
semi-Manichean, race-sin, and all other theories have failed 
to meet the necessary requirements for a theoretical solution. 
Yet he feels that the concrete evils of life (such as cancer, 
leprosy, and syphilis) are contingent and that there would be 
no violation of the rules of reason if they were absent. But 
regardless of this fact, he asserts they are existing and that 
there is no completely adequate theoretical explanation for 
their presence. 2 
The basic problem that confronts us, therefore, is to 
decide which is more consonant with reason and the 
Christian faith, to account for the apparently irra-
tional evils of life by referring them to our ignorance 
of their purpose or to account for them by the theory 
of an actual limitation of the divine power. In 
deciding this question most of us would probably 
agree with Lotze that ••• 'we do 3not understand the solution which yet we believe in.' 
But here the critic might \<Tell ask if this conclusion is 
"consonant vli th reason and the Christian faith." The only 
1. DOR, 213. 
2. DOR, 213; BICT, 89, 104; DOG, 366-367. 
3. BICT, 104. 
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reason why a person has faith in any theory is that that theory 
explains the given phenomena better than any other. 1 The only 
reason why Knudson believes in the theory that God is g ood is 
that he feels that t h ere is more evidence for that theory than 
for any opposing theory.2 The same should be true for the 
theory that God is omnipotent. After his p resentation of al-
most all the evidence, he concludes: 
Such general considerations as the foregoing help us 
to meet many of the questions raised concerning natural 
evil, but it does not answer them all. There are dark 
phases of human history and vicissitudes in the lives 
of individuals that leave us baffled.3 
And such being the evidence, why does he believe so tenaciously 
in the omnipotence of God? What f a cts guarantee the omnip o-
tence of God in spite of all this evidence to the contrary? 
There would seem to be none. Then why retain a theory 1-vhi ch 
is not adequately supp orted by exp erience, esp ecially when 
there is so much evidence to the contrary? This does not quite 
seem consonant with rea son. 
According to statements made by Knudson in a conversation, 
the Christian faith would seem to b e based on the King James 
version of Romans 8:28: "And we know that all thing s vmrk to-
g ether for good Lnote that all things do not work to gether for 
best even in this translatioll/ to them that love God, to them 
who are the ca lled according to his p urpose." The most 
1. Cf. BICT, 13-14. 
2. Cf. DOG, 354-357. 
3. DOR, 219. 
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accurate translation of this passage, in light of recently 
found ancient manuscripts, would seem to be that of the Re-
vised Standard Version: 11 We know that in everything God works 
for good with t h ose who love him, who are called according to 
his purpose." Here we find that it is not everything (-v.rhich 
naturally includes the evil of the universe) that works for 
good; it is rather the cooperative efforts of God with those 
that love him that work for good. And both are working for the 
establishment of good; not for the good of certain people . 
TI~is latter translation seems to support the struggling, suf-
fering God of Brightman rather than the omnipotent God of 
Knudson. 
The second characteri stic of Knudson's view is that while 
he claims there has not appeared a complete theoretical solu-
tion to the problem of natural evil, yet he feels that there 
are several considerations vlhich make the problem more intel-
ligible and that relieve many of the difficulties commonly 
associated with it. The first of these considerations is that 
people generally weigh the natural evils of life from a hed-
onistic standpoint. People tend to look at the passive plea-
sures of life as its chief good and, as a result, condemn the 
universe for causing or allovling so much pain and suffering. 
TI~is Knudson rightly asserts to be a mistaken standard by 
which to judge the universe. 11 The true goal of life is ethical; 
it lies in achievement, in the formation of character, and 
from this point of view much of human suffering is seen in a 
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new light."l It is no longer purely evil; it is seen as a 
means to higher ends and purposes. 2 
The second consideration which helps toward a better un-
derstanding of the p roblem is that many p eop le view it with an 
ex clusive anthropocentrism; they feel that the universe was 
made only for the good of man and thus, when everything d oes 
not work out to that end, they criticize both God and the uni-
verse. But it is quite possible that the world has ends vihich 
are other than human, and this f a ctor must be t aken into con-
sideration in any fair evaluation of the seeming purposelessnes 
of much of the suffering and n~tural evil of human lives. For 
there is a lso the cosmic order or system \1hich must be main-
tained if there is to be a ny development of rational and moral 
beings. And much that is involved in the maintenance of this 
s y stem i s perhaps incidental t o the main plan and purpose of 
God; it is a necessary concomitant or by-product of the system 
and not an integral part or direct expression of it. Perhaps 
many of the evils of life belong to this by-product of the 
system which cannot be s a id to be a divine end in the strict 
sense of the word. These could conceivably be averted by a 
special divine intervention. 
But if it v1ere seriously suggested that this \iould 
be done if God was good, we should be inclined to 
ask with Pope, 'Shall g ravitation cease when you go 
by?' Cosmic order has a value that needs to be 
1. DOR, 216. 
2. DOR, 215-216; BICT, 105-106. 
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preserved even though ills may result from it. Evils 
that arise in this way are, of course, ultimately due 
to the divine will, but they are not directly purposed 
and hence need not be regarded as immediat! and com-
plete expressions of the divine character. 
In other vmrds, it is conceivable that God could relieve the 
natural evils by his intervention, but he would be forced to 
change other aspects of the cosmic order or system in order to 
do so. And since there probably is more value inmaintaining 
the order as it is (even though evils result from it) than in 
intervening to eliminate the evils (and thus necessarily al-
tering the system), God continues to maintain the cosmic order 
so that his essential purposes or ends may be carried out. 2 
Concerning the first portion of this second consideration, 
there would seem to be no question as to its validity . lv.lany 
people are too anthropocentric in their views and thus do not 
adequately consider other possible purposes that God may have 
in the universe. But the last portion of the preceding argu-
ment does seem to be open to criticism. wnen Dr. Knudson was 
asked as to what he considered a possible theoretical solution 
to the problem of evil, he gave the above argument concerning 
the necessity for the maintenance of the cosmic system . But 
he only asserted this argt~ent as a tentative solution to the 
problem, not ~s something he asserts as being the solution to 
the problem. This must be kept in mind as criticisms are given 
in reference to this view . 
DOR, 216-217. 
DOR, 215-217. 
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First, the view that many of the evils of life are due to 
"a necessary accompaniment or by-product"1 of this cosmic 
system would seem to fall under his own criticism: 
• • • to ascribe such suffering as we cannot otherwise 
explain to some sort of necessity within or without 
the divine nature throws no light v-rhatsoever on its 
origin. We do not know how this necessity operates 
nor vrhy 1 t should produce the suffering it does. The 
only necessity we understand is rational necessity, 
••• the concrete evils of life are all contingent 
and ••• t~eir absence would violate no necessity 
of thought. 
This criticism seems to be adequate for this theoretical solu-
tion so that either the theory or the criticism must be dis-
carded. Otherwise one might go through the horns of the di-
lemma by asserting that this necessary accompaniment was due 
to rational necessity. If this view were upheld by Knudson 
(i.vhich does not seem likely), almost any other theory (such as 
Brightman's) could be upheld on the same basis. 
The second criticism that might be made is that this vie"Vr 
places the universe in a peculiar metaphysical position in 
relation to God. It makes the universe a mechanical system 
which God is ceaselessly keeping in existence and operation as 
a person might keep an automobile in existence and operation 
by working on it and directing its movements. Of course, 
Knudson would not want to bifurcate God and the universe to 
this extent (although one wonders from other passages3); 
1. DOR, 216. 
2. DOR, 213. 
3. Cf. DOR, 23, 28-29 for examples. Also cf. Bowne, MET, 288-
289. 
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personalities are the only thing that exist for him. 
It is he LGo£7 who does everything. In him the world 
has its sole causal ground. There are no hidden 
entities lying back of the physical atoms. The material 
\¥orld is phenomenal through and t£-rough. • . • Other 
being than this it does not have. 
Or in other words, the phenomenal world is only the continual 
activity or energizings of God and must be considered ulti-
mately a part of God. Hence (in jumping back to Knudson's 
theoretical solution for the problem of evil} this cosmic 
system must ultimately be a part of God, which makes its nee-
essary accompaniment--natural evil--also a part of God. This 
conclusion (which has similarities to Brightman's view) vmuld 
be contrary to Knudson's views, although he can only avoid its 
conclusions by asserting that the world is metaphysically 
other than God. This brings about a dualism which he rejects.2 
His truest view is that the world is a part of God yet distinct 
from him . 
• . • the fe eling arises · that the world is to some 
extent estranged from God. It is not only distinct 
from him, but in part qualitatively different. It is 
evil as well as good. It stands apart from him not 
only as his instrument, but as representative of a 
different sp irit and character from that which we 
attribute to him.) 
That this quotation justifies criticism would seem to be evi-
dent. How the world can be a part of God and yet be distinct 
from him metaphysically_ is beyond comprehension. Either the 
1. POP, 77. 
2. POP, 75; DOR, 32. 
3. DOR, 28-29. 
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world is a part of God metaphysically or it is not. If it is, 
then natural evil must be a part of him in some fashion or 
other. (Even Knudson admits that evils are 11 ultimately due to 
the divine will 111 on the basis of his hypothetical solution.) 
If it is not, then he would be prop ounding a dualism which he 
openly rejects. Hence it is evident the Knudson's hypo-
thetical solution is untenable. 
The next consideration that Knudson suggests is in regard 
to anthropomorphism. This was briefly discussed under Knud-
son's fifth criticism of Brightman, but in a somewhat diff erent 
manner than at this point. Here he suggests that the anthrop o-
morphism has been both cosmic and zoolo gical since people have 
not adequately distinguished between cosmic and human ethics. 
Knudson feels that there is a vital diff erence between the two 
since "nature deals with men in a way that no human being would j 
dare. • •• It is evident, then, that we cannot apply our 
human standards of right and wrong to the Creator. It is only 
in a formal way that we can s a y what is compatible v.rith his 
goodness and what not." 2 At this point the critic mi ght well 
ask -v;hat makes Knudson decide that God is good in the first 
place if human ethics are not in line with cosmic ones. Here 
again Knudson is subject to his own criticism: 
All theists not only admit, but affirm that if 
personality and morality are attributed to the 
1. BICT, 104. 
2. DOR, 217. 
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Absolute, it must be in a form that transcends their 
limited realization in human life. It is the second 
interpretation Lthat God is a type of being tha~ 
transcends the moral altogether and excludes i.:!;/ that 
is the cause of debate and that alone g ives signifi-
c a nce to the insistence on the 'supermoral' and 
'superpersonal' character of the Infinite. In this 
sense, however, the terms imply an 'agnostic' or 
'logical' conception of the Absolute which '11'Tl have 
found ample ground for refecting as invalid. 
The preceding discussion implies that cosmic or divine ethics 
are supermoral, since human standards of right and '11'rrong can 
be app lied to the Creator only in a formal way. Perhaps he 
does not mean that the Creator is supermoral in the sense that 
he tra nscends the moral completely; p erhaps he simply means 
that his morality transcends its limited realization in human 
life. But surely Knudson would say that God's standards of 
right and vrrong are as high or higher than humans. But if 
this be so, how can the Creator be just in committing deeds 
that would be unjust for man, under the same circumstances. 
For if he could feel justified in so doing, his standards 
would seem to be lower r ather than hi gher than human beings. 
Taking either horn of the dilemma, Knudson v10uld seem to be 
inconsistent. 
Another aspect of anthropomorphism that Knudson discusses 
is in relation to a comparison of the suffering of the lower 
animals and that of human beings. He feels that a person is 
too anthropomorphic if he assumes that lower animals suffer as 
much as humans under the same conditions. He does not go so 
1. DOR, 367. 
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far as to state that lower animals are completely unconscious 
of bodily agony that they may be suffering, but 11 ••• the 
truth probably lies in that direction rather than in that of a 
zoological anthropomorphism."1 In any case a person should be 
careful not to exaggerate the suffering of the animal world or 
to pronounce them out of harmony with the divine beneficence 
until more is known about the nature and extent of these suf-
ferings.2 
A critic might well question Knudson at this point as to 
how he knows that any ~~:rthe:v person suffers as he does under 
the same circumstances. Knudson would undoubtedly answer that 
he sees a similar effect in the activity of the other person 
as the same stimulus would bring about in his own body. Hence 
he knows that a person is in similar pain by his activity. 
Nov.r the critic may well ask as to why the same principle of 
comparison cannot be applied between humans and lower animals. 
When a horse gets gastro-enteritis e.cute, he rolls, paws, moans ~ 
and becomes almost insensitive to stimuli that would ordinaril 
excite him. The pig sets up a terrible squeal as he is vac-
cinated. The cow with mastitis becomes very sensitive. Tae 
dog cringes and acts as if his feelings are hurt when his 
master speaks crossly. How are these different from the ac-
tivities of man under the same conditions? Perhaps " ••• we 
Ld£7 need to be on guard against the tendency to exaggerate 
1. DOR, 218. 
2. DOR, 218. 
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the sufferings of the animal world", 1 but Knudson needs to be 
on guard against the tendency to underestimate them also.2 
The evidence seems to be that animals (both human and non-
human) suffer in proportion to their intelligences, memories, 
imaginations, anticipations and sensibilities. To assert that 
nonhuman animals suffer to a negligible extent vrould seem to 
go contrary to the data of observation and experience. And 
since this does seem to be true, one's theory of suffering 
must take it into consideration. But Knudson's theory is woe-
fully weak at this point . The chief benefit of nonhuman suf-
fering or pain would seem to be that it may be a warning of 
impending danger. This brings up the next general considera-
tion that Knudson feels helps to explain suffering. 
That pain is often a warning of impending danger and so 
serves to preserve life is an unquestioned fact. In connec-
tion with this thought, Knudson asserts that the development 
of the capacity for suffering has been a necessary stimulus 
and guide to survival and progress in biological evolution.3 
An example of this might be that a person's body could be con-
sumed by fire without his b ecoming aware of it if there were 
not pain in connection with the burning of flesh. Hence the 
pain from fire does serve a good purpose, that of warning the 
person of the destruction of his flesh and the prevention of 
1. DOR, 218. 
2. Cf. "The Pains of Anirnals 11 , in The Atlantic, August, 1950, 
57-61 for a discussion of the p roblem by C.E.M. Joad and 
C.S. Lewis. 
3. DOR, 218. 
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death. But this argument leads to an infinite regress if 
viewed in its proper light. Death .is certainly an intrinsic 
evil, regardless of its instrumental value. Even though the 
Christian may have hope of life after death, he still avoids 
death as long as possible because it is intrinsically disvalu-
able and one of the chief natural evils. Thus in the example 
of fire just given, fire causes pain (a natural evil) which in 
turn is a means to the prevention of a greater natural evil--
death. Hence the lesser evil is justified since it is the 
means to the prevention of a greater evil. But does this jus-
tify the existence of natural evil itself? Why should everyone 'I 
have to face death? Is death a lesser evil that is the means I 
of the prevention of some greater evil? To what terrible evil 
does this regress ultimately lead us? And how is it justified? 
Perhaps by thus carrying this argument to its logical conclu-
sion, its absurdity becomes evident. It is impossible to jus-
1 
tify natural evil in general by pointing out that a lesser I 
natural evil is justified since it is a means to the prevention 1 
I 
of some greater natural evil. A person still has the problem 
as to why the greater natural evil exists. If this in turn is 
to be justified as the means of preventing some greater evil, 
where does the regress end? 
Another consideration that Knudson notes is that pain is 
a foil to pleasure since it enhances enjoyment by way of con-
trast.1 This is another old and familiar argument which 
1. DOR, 218. 
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contains a partial truth. As a person lies dying from cancer, 
he undoubtedly reflects that his p revious health was a wonder-
ful state in comparison to his present one. Thus disvaluable 
experiences may help one to see t h e worth of valuable ones by 
way of contra st. But are the disvaluable experiences necessary 
to the realization of the worth of the valuable ones? Must a 
person eat a rotten app le before he can appreciate a good one? 
Must a p erson live a life of sinfulness before he can appre-
ciate the Christian life? No, an intrinsically valuable expe-
rience is enjoyable in itself and need not be compared to dis-
valuable ones. If such a comparison were necessary, the value 
or disvalue of an experience would be merely relative and there 
could be no true intrinsic values or disvalues . 1 Life is valu-
able without death; p leasure is enjoyable without pain. The 
latter are not necessary to make the former valuable . 
Knudson feels that the chief significance of suffering 
lies in its contribution to the moral and sp iritual life. He 
believes that it is doubtful if man could rise above the sense 
plane and enter into a truly spiritual life excep t as he is 
subject to suffering . 
It is through pain and struggle that we become detached 
from the world and conscious of our kinship with God. 
Natural evil v-rould seem an indisp ensable means of our 
attaining to the life of the sp irit.2 
Then he goes on to state that the evils of t h is life lose much 
1. For discussion of values, see Brightman, POR, 88-94. 
2. DOR, 219. 
II 
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of their hardness and unintelligibility when this life is link-
ed with the life eternal and the evils are viewed from this 
1 perspective. But the critic may well ask if evil is always or 
even g enerally a contribution to the moral and spiritual life. 
Whereas some people are able to enter a more spiritual life as 
the result of suffering, others curse God as a result of it. 
Is there any real evidence that people as a v.rhole become more 
spiritual as a result of suffering? Is it not in times of suf-
fering that the minister is most needed to reassure people that 
God is good and not evil? Are not people's cries to God in 
times of disaster the . result of fear and the desire for help 
rather than being an entrance into "a truly spiritual life"? 
And how do the evils of this life become less hard or unintel-
ligible when seen from the vantag e point of their linkage with 
the eternal? The evils of life are very real, but what expe-
riential evidence is there that there will be a life after 
death in which all or most of the natural evils will be re-
moved? If natural evil seems to be an indispensable means of 
spiritual attainment in this life, v.rould not it seem to be an 
indispensable means to the same in the next life? Since these 
questions do not seem to have clear-cut answers that favor 
Knudson's view, it may be concluded that evil .'s contribution 
to the moral and spiritual life is rather dubious in character. 
Suffering may be the means to increased spirituality for some, 
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but the means to a loss of faith in God's goodness or power for 
others. 
After thus concluding that the problem of natural evil has 
no adequate theoretical solution and that certain considera-
tions do throw light on the problem, Knudson's third point is 
that the renunciation of a theoretical solution does not pre-
elude a practical solution of it. He feels that a person 
should be more concerned with a practical victory over it than 
with an explanation of it. He rightfully asserts that many 
people have been victorious in life as the result of consid-
ering this life with its evils as the training school of man-
kind. To these people the very imperfection of the vrorld has 
often been considered its perfection since it has been the 
means to a rich development of personality and ethical char-
acter for them. 1 
We are redeemed, not only from suffering, but in and 
through suffering; and suffering. • • ceases to be a 
dark, repugnant, and inexplicable fact and becomes a 
divine agent in the training and emancipation of the 
human spirit.2 
This conclusion undoubtedly contains much truth. People often 
learn to cooperate together in a new way as the result of some 
terrible disaster in which they are forced to work together for 
the well-being of the whole. As a result of such disasters, 
racial and social prejudices are often broken down and the 
kingdom of God on earth is brought more completely into 
1. DOR, 220-221; BICT, 105-107; DOG, 365. 
2. DOR, 221. 
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realization. But sadly enough, not only rain but also natural 
evils fall upon the righteous and the unri ghteous alike; and, 
as pointed out in the p receding paragraph, suffering does not 
seem to be a perfect tool for the schooling of mankind as it 
should be if an omniscient, omnipo t ent, and all- goad God were 
its fashioner and user. It is quite possible that more people 
either lose faith in God or fall from the life of the sp irit 
or both as a result of suffering than the contrary. Most 
people do well to have faith that there is some kind of p ur-
pose in the universe and that there is some intelligence 
guiding and controlling to some extent the cosmic processes . 
That these p eople should be expected to leap from this faith to 
a faith in an omnipotent, omniscient, and all-good God would 
seem to be unwarranted by careful reflection upon the totality 
of cosmic processes as experienced by man. 
Thus this chapter may be concl uded by stating that Knud-
son has reasonably rejected most of the theoretical explana-
tions for suffering discussed i n this chapter . That there are 
many practical and theoretical considerations that help to 
make the suffering in the universe more intelligible is not to 
be doubted. But taken to gether these considerations do not 
offer sufficient basis for faith in an omniscient, omnipotent, 
and all- good God. Perhaps Knudson v.rould do ·Hell to reconsider 
views limiting God's power, such as Professor Brightman's . 
This would seem doubly mandatory since this chapter has shown 
that Knudson's criticisms of Brightman's theory are not cogent . 
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CHAPTER V 
THE PROBLEM OF THE TRINITY 
Knudson asserts that the biblical conception of God may be 
g enerally defined as ethical personalism since the New Testa-
ment conception stresses sacrificial love. This revelation of II 
divine love was made not only in word and deed but particularly I 
in the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ. As a 
result of this revelation, Jesus as well as the traditional 
God of the Hebrews came to be regarded as divine; and from this 
broadened concept of Deity there grew the doctrine of the 
Trinity. 1 
Although there have been numerous ethnic trinities or 
2 triads in the various religions of the world, they have been 
mostly polytheistic and radically different from the Christian 
Trinity, which is fundamentally monotheistic.3 Other attempts 
at both a psycholo gical and s p eculative derivation of the Trint 
tarian doctrine have been made upon the assumption that the 
doctrine stands in organic relation to reason and religious 
experience. 4 Knudson states that this latter assumption is not 
only correct but needs to be emphasized because of the tendency 
I in the past to lay stress on the mysterious nature of the doc-
1 trine. He feels that the Christian concept is based both on 
1. DOG, 370. 
2. For some examples of these cf. DOG, 371. 
3. DOG, 370-373. 
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reason and revelation, and hence admits of rational supp ort 
1 
and exposition. It is with this Christian concept that this 
chapter treats p rimarily, and that with the purpose of judging 
its rational (rather than revelation) basis and its coherence 
with the rest of experience--as seen by Knudson. 
1. Development of the Doctrine 
There were tvro main periods, according to Knudson, in the 
development of the Trinitarian doctrine. The first was ap-
proximately the New Testament period in which there was a rec-
ognition of a unique presence of God in Christ--a presence 
that called forth a worshipful attitude tovvard him. The sec-
ond period extended a century beyond its climax (to the Coun-
cil of Nicaea in 325) in which there was an identification of 
this presence with a mode of being within the divine essence 
itself. In both periods the fundamental concern was with God 
incarnate in Christ, not vli th God the Creator nor God the 
sanctifying Spirit. It was in Christ and his sacrificial 
death that God was most fully revealed as Redeemer, and it was 
in his Messiahship and the sanctifying work of the Holy Spirit 
that God's immanent activity was felt most keenly. Without 
these concrete manifestations of the redemptive and immanent 
activity of God, the Trinity of creation, redemption, and im-
manence might not have been conceived. For it vlas these con-
crete manifestations (not the abstract ideas of different 
1. DOG, 377-378. 
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aspects of divine activity) that laid hold of the minds and 
hearts of Christian believers. 1 
As to how the belief in the divinity of Ch rist arose, 
Knudson points out that this question is one of the most de-
bated in the history of religion. His conclusion is that this 
conviction is no foreign importation but rather the result of 
a direct impression made upon the disciples by Christ himself. 
Knudson accounts for this impression of a divine character on 
the basis of five factors. (1) the feeling (derived from his 
unique personality) that Christ was superhuman; (2) the con-
sciousness in Jesus of being Messiah or of a unique filial 
relation to God; (3) the exalted moral character of Jesus and 
his embodiment of the principle of sacrificial love; (4) the 
belief in the resurrection of Jesus; and (5) the deep-seated 
religious conviction that all history is rooted in God and 
that God imparted himself to mankind in and through Christ. 2 
Each of these facto rs find excellent support in Scriptural 
passages and seem adeq"L1a tely to uphold Knudson 1 s conclusion. 
As a result o f this impression, the Nevf Testament writers 
were concerned to find designations that would do justice to 
the supreme religious and spiritual value they found in Christ. 
Hence they used such terms as "Messiah 11 , "Lord 11 , and "Logos" 
in reference to him. But these terms are ambiguous and do not 
define the exact relation of the person of Christ either to 
1. DOG, 385-387. 
2. DOG, 387-394. 
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God or man. Their use added to the problem for future genera-
l 
tions. 
An invasion of the speculative field is represented by 
the doctrine of Christ's pre-existence as taught by Paul and 
others of the New Testament. The fact that it ~<rent unchal-
lenged by his contemporaries indicates either that it was not 
original with Paul or that it was accepted as a natural infer-
ence from the previous views of Christ. Paul further con-
ceived of Christ as a kind of archangelic being, distinct from 
God, and fully personal. That this conception was not con-
sidered adequate is indicated by the fact that later thought 
demanded a more intimate relation bet~<reen the divine element 
in Christ and God himself, ~<rhich prepared the way for the 
2 
second p eriod. 
The second period identified the divine principle in 
Christ with a mode of being within God himself, according to 
the following five stages of development: (1) the equation 
of Christ with the Logos by the Apologists of the second cen-
tury; (2) the teaching (introduced by Origen) of the eternal 
generation of the Logos-Son from God . the Father; (3) the view 
(expressed by Athanasius at the Council of Nicaea) that the 
divine unity required that the Logos, or Son, be homoousios 
(of the same substance) viith the Father; (4) the rise of the 
Trinitarian doctrine of one essence and three hypostases; and 
1. DOG, 394; DOR, 285. 
2. DOG, 395-397. 
(5) the absolute e quality of the three Persons of the Trinity 
(Augustine's view). This development led to what Knudson 
calls the traditional form of the doctrine. The doctrine has 
been elaborated and refined by Thomas Aquina s and others, but 
it remains essentially the same as held by Augustine--even 
today . 1 
In the development of this traditional view of the Trini-
ty, the Christian Church rejected certain other vievrs. One 
of these I'Tas the humanitarian view which held that the divine 
element in Christ's life exceeded that found in any other 
human being , but that this element was not sufficiently unique 
to warrant his being reverenced as divine. 2 The Ebionites 
conceived of him as a man so completely filled with the Divine 
Spirit that he virtually constituted a class by himself.3 The 
Adoptionist view looked upon Jesus as a man in whom a unique 
pol'rer dwelt, but who was not an incarnation of Deity. Through 
his obedience and divine grace be attained to d ivinity and 
after his resurrection was invested with divine rank. 4 Another 
view was the modalistic which maintained that the persons in 
the Trinity were merely successive and temporary modes of mani-
festation on the part of the one Father-God. 5 A somewhat con-
trasting view is the Arian in which the preincarnate Christ 
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was conceived as a temporal and created being, subordinate to 
God.l Lastly, the Docetic view denied any real humanity to 
Christ, asserting that he merely appeared to eat and drink and 
that he had no material body actually. 2 These views (with 
many variations) were rejected by the Church for adequate 
reasons. The Church in turn accepted the view which made 
Jesus Christ: 
the same perfect in Godhead and also perfect in manhood; 
truly God and truly man, of a rational soul and body, 
coessential with us according to the manhood, ••• to 
be acknmvledged in two natures v.ri thout confusion, 
v.ri thout division, without separation; the distinction 
of natures being by no means taken away by the union, 
but rather, the property of each nature being pr3served, 
and concurring in one person and one hypostasis. 
The Holy Spirit was the other person or hypostasis of the 
Trinity, all three being on an equality and one in essence. 
Knudson feels that this concept has the follovring advan-
tages over all deistic forms of monarchianism4 or unitarianism: 
(1) it gives mankind a living God, both because the three hy-
postases are in constant interaction and interpenetration and 
because God is always actively immanent in the v.rorld; (2) it 
makes provision for the moral absoluteness of God in that each 
of the hypostases have adequate objects of love; (3) it gives 
support to the doctrine of the incarnation; (4) it saves phi-
losophy from the impasse brought about by the assumption of an 
1. DOG, 409-410. 
2. DOR, 294-295. 
3. From the creed adopted by the Council of Chalcedon, as cited 
in DOR, 297, from Schaff, The Creeds of Christendom, II, 62. 
4. Anti-Trinitarian theory that God is one in person as well 
as nature. 
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ultimately simple and distinctionless unity; and 
tects theism against both deism and pantheism. 1 
(5) it pro-
Yet it has 
these objections: (1) the doctrine is tritheistic; (2) the 
distinct personality of the Spirit is unnecessary to account 
for most of the ethical and religious values p rovided by the 
Trinity; (3) the terms used in describing the Trinity have no 
counterpart in reality as kno~m to man; (4) the doctrine was 
constructed against the background of Platonic realism from 
~rhich it has never been shaken (personality is real--essence 
is an abstraction from it); (5) the identification of the 
divine element in Christ v.ri th the Lo gos and the ego of Jesus 
is subject to modern philosophical criticism; and (6) the 
theory of redemption it assumes--a mystical-metaphysical com-
munication of the divine life to men--is not generally held to 
be either adequate or necessary since the Reformation. 2 Due 
to both these objections and these advantages (the latter 
being refuted to some extent in Knudson's treatment of its 
objections), neither the Church as a whole nor Knudson in par-
ticular feels that the traditional Trinitarian doctrine should 
be either completely overthro~m or completely accepted. It 
enshrines great values that should be conserved.3 But p erhaps 
it is possible to restate the theory in such a fashion that 
the above objections can be removed to a major extent v.ri thout 
1. DOG, 410-415; BICT, 85. 
2. DOG, 415-422; BICT, 81-8 4. 
3. DOG, 422; BICT, 85. 
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destroying its values. This is what Knudson attempts to do. 
2. Knudson's View 
In POP (1927) Knudson discusses the doctrine of the 
Trinity with the p rimary interest of showing the possibility 
of giving it a personalistic interpretation. He states that 
the doctrine might be legitimately considered as pantheism ap-
plied to the Godhead (organic unity combined with numerical 
p lurality), a view which fits in vdth the social interpretation 
o f the Trinity. Or one might adopt the psycholo gical inter-
pretation which finds in the unitary consciousness or self-
consciousness with its threefold activity an analogy to the 
Trinity. The social interpretation of the Godhead is truer to 
the original genius of the Trinitarian doctrine, but is less 
in harmony with personalism than the psychological interpreta-
tion, though personalism is not necessarily 'inconsistent with 
either. Personalism excludes pantheism , yet holds strictly to 
the absoluteness of God in the sense that no limitations are 
imposed upon him from without. It also attributes to God an 
inexhaustible richness of life, which upholds the basal relig-
ious truth in the doctrine of the Trinity. 1 
In DOG (1930) Knudson emphasizes several factors which he 
feels should be maintained in reference to the doctrine of the 
Trinity. He upholds as confidently as ever the underlying 
motives which brought about the concept. In reference to this 
1. POP, 333. 
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he states: 
We hold that God is immanent in the world and that he 
was in some real sense incarnate in Christ. We hold 
that he is Redeemer as well as Creator, that he is 
personally present in human hearts as the sanctifying 
Spirit, and that1 in his essential nature he is sacrifical love. 
But he does not feel that it is necessary to hold to three 
centers of self-consciousness and s elf-decision from the above 
affirmations. Nor does he believe that God is a bare unity. 
Rather, he believes that God can be conceived in such a •..ray as 
to retain the essential truth of the traditional Trinitarianism 
without holding to a tritheism. Knudson suggests three dif-
ferent ways as possibilities. The first is to say that the 
Trinity is a symbol of the richness of the idea of God, his 
inner nature being unknovm. ~fnether or not there are hypo-
static distinctions in the Divine Being is unknown, but one 
comes nea rest the truth vrhen thinking of God in symbolic terms 
of Father, Son, and Holy Sp irit, for these terms express the 
inexhaustible richness of the divine nature. 2 
The second way of retaining both the unity of God and the 
religious values of the Trinity is to hold to a modified 
Sabellianism or modalistic theory. As God manifested himself 
in three -vmys, so there is adequate reason to affirm that his 
essential nature is indicated by the three terms of Father, 
Son, and Holy Spirit. But these are not sepru"'ate persons, they 
1. DOG, 422-423. 
2. DOG, 423-424. 
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are three asp ects of the divine nature. 1 Knudson feels that 
this conception represents the main trend in modern trinita-
rianism to 1-rhich even Karl Barth h as thrown his influence as 
over against tritheism. He feels that future thought on the 
subject of Trinitarianism will be along this personal and in-
telligible conception of the divine unity rather than with 
sub-personal and mystifying conceptions of the unity of the 
2 Godhead. 
Tee third way is to &ssert the Christlikeness of God. 
This way has the advantages of: (1) fixing attention on the 
basal factor in the Trinitarian doctrine (that the divine 
sp irit is like Christ's); (2) associating man's knowledge of 
the divine character vri th the historical revelation of it in 
Christ; and (3) directing particular attention to both his 
metaphysical and ethical unity: 
His entire being is holy will, and to speak of him 
as Christlike is equivalent to saying that he is in 
his essential nature love. His love is both self-love, 
a love of goodness, and communicative l ove. In both 
aspects he was incarnate in Christ, a nd .h ence we have 
a Godlike Christ and a Christlike God. ~ 
This third way of looking at the concept of the Trinity is not 
only a valid method, but one having g reat importance. That it 
is the basal factor in the Trinitarian doctrine would seem to 
be evident. Whatever other values the concept of the Trinity 
may emphasize, it mainly emphasizes the Christlikeness of God. 
1 • DOG, 425-4-26. 
2 . BICT, 80-86. 
3. DOG, 428 .. 
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In Art.(l932) F~udson states that it is necessary to 
bring about a revision of the traditional doctrine of the 
Trinity. The Platonic or Neo-Platonic phraseology has become 
obsolete and the doctrine needs a reformulation in modern 
terms. But Knudson feels that the church is not apparently 
prepared for any such reformulation. Hence the old formula 
should be continued in use as a symbol of the richness of the 
Christian idea of God. It expresses the vital truth that God 
is Christlike. But how should the "persons" of the Trinity 
be conceived? Knudson feels that both speculative and natural 
tendencies are to think of them as merged in the larger per-
sonality of God in some manner. 1 
In DOR (1933), Knudson develops his conception of Chris-
tology which is, as stated above, the central problem in the 
doctrine of the Trinity. In this conception, he emphasizes 
three points . The first is that complete humanity must be 
attributed to Jesus, both in the sense that he had a human 
spirit, soul, and body and that his ego or personal center was 
hmnan. By this, Knudson does not mean to exclude the divinity 
of Jesus but rather the traditional theory that the human 
nature of Jesus was impersonal and that the eternal Logos con-
stituted the ego or personal center of his being.2 
The second is that the uniqueness of Jesus is the result, 
not of the union of both the human and divine natures within 
1. Art. (1932), 237-238. 
2. DOR, 319-320. 
.l 
: ; I 
\ 
him, but of his unique dependence upon the divine will and his 
unique enduement "\'rith the Divine Sp irit. He was not only 
dependent upon God as all men are, but basic in his life there 
was also a unique divine creat ive activity that made "his 
metaphysical relation to God Q.ifferent from that of other 
men." This difference is not dcie to his possession of a 
divine nature or substance but to the "special mode of opera-
tion of the immanent divine will upon which he \vas dependent ~1 
In other words, the Divine Spirit vras present in him to an 
unprecedented degree so that there was reciprocal interaction 
between the two as well as being a power upon which his life 
1-vas dependent. 2 
The third point is that the divinity ascribed to Jesus is 
neither based on his personal claims to such nor on his pos-
session of omniscience and omnipotence but rather on his 
unique consciousness of oneness with God and his redemptive 
agency in the founding of the kingdom of God. It is grounded 
in the divine will rather than the divine nature; it manifests 
itself in a heightened human consciousness--in his filial con-
sciousness, in his sinlessness, in his spiritual authority, 
and in his redeeming power.3 
At this point the critic may well ask if the assumption 
that Jesus had a metaphysical relation to God different from 
1. DOR, 321. 
2 . DOR, 319-323. 
3 . DOR, 319, 323-325 . 
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that of other men does not destroy some religious values dear 
to men. One of the chief of these is the belief that each 
person can attain a similar ethical life to that of Jesus by 
living his life in a similar manner to that of Jesus, particu-
larly in relation to God. But if Jesus had a different meta-
physical relation to God than the rest of men, bow is the rest 
of mankind to follow his example if they cannot hope to have 
the same metaphysical relationship to God that Jesus did? 
Knudson answers this criticism by pointing out the sense 
in which Jesus can be thought of as an example, by showing 
what factors are involved in a perfect ethical life, and by 
clarifying to some extent what is involved in Jesus' unique 
metaphysical relation to God. First, Jesus is not an example 
to mankind in the sense that each or any man either can or 
ought to be able to do what he did. He is rather an example 
in the three factors that go to make up a perfect ethical life: 
an obedient will, an ideal moral character, and a blameless 
conduct. Knudson feels that this last factor depends too much 
on the age and the circumstances in which one lives f or it to 
be a fixed part of a universal and authoritative human e xample. 
But since the blameless conduct of Jes.us was the result of 
follovdng certain general principles, his life is an example 
-to mankind of what princi ples to follow and of hO'ttl to fit 
these to each particular situation. In fact, his blameless 
conduct is based to a large extent on the fact that his vrill 
-vms obedient t o what he felt to be his duty. In being perfect 
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in obedience, he is an example to mankind, whatever may be 
thought of his uniqueness. This obedience to felt duty is the 
absolute moral idea which he represented and which is a goal 
obligatory upon all moral beings. Knudson rightly insists 
that only on the unwarranted assumption that Jesus' uniqueness 
excludes his free choice is it possible to maintain that his 
uniqueness makes him unfit to be an example to mankind. In 
so far as Jesus freely chose the right and avoided the wrong, 
his victory over evil is an example to others. 1 
The third point which Knudson would use in anS1.vering the 
criticism given above is that God's incarnation in Jesus (his 
unique metaphysical relationship to God) is to be conceived in 
terms of immanence and inspiration. In the doctrine of the 
incarnation the attention is fixed on the manifestation or 
presence of God at one supreme point of history. In the doc-
trine of immanence the attention is focu sed on the idea of the 
presence of God in the world as . a whole and throughout all 
time. Between the two doctrines there is no antithesis; they 
emphasize different aspects of the workings of God. 
The bare idea of immanence needs to be supplemented 
by the idea of different degrees of immanence, the 
highest degree being in the person of Christ. The 
incarnation in Christ,.on the other hand, needs to 
be supplemented by the idea of an incarnation in man-
kind as a whole and also in nature. The two doctrines 
of incarnation and immanence thus overlap and tend to 
merge in each other.2 
1. DOR, 328-330. 
2. DOR, 332 . 
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When they are taken together, they express the thought that 
human life in its highest cond i tions gives access to the inmost 
nature of the divine . Thus in Christ the divine presence was 
so complete as to guarantee the validity of his revelation of 
God. 1 This also would seem to be an example to the rest of 
mankind to seek the presence of God more fully so as to be 
able to manifest more and more completely the true nature of 
God. 
In summary, Knudson's view of the Trinity is that there 
are neither three distinct centers of self-consciousness in 
the Trinity nor a bare unity; God is one person who manifests 
himself in three modes (immanent in world, incarnate in Christ, 
and as the sanctifying Spirit in human redemption) so that his 
essential nature is indicated by the terms Father, Son and 
Holy Spirit. Hence the concept of the Trinity is a symbol of 
the richness of the idea of God and a way of expressing the 
Christlikeness of God. This vie\v is based to a great extent 
on his vievr of Jesus as human in spirit, soul, body and ego 
yet divine in that he was botq uniquely dependent upon and 
conscious of God. These views preserve the great religious 
values of the traditional conception of the Trinity and yet 
are free from the objections which are rightly due it in its 
traditional form. Knudson's arguments are clear and co gent. 
His view of God at this point would seem to be as empirically 
coherent as the given facts permit. 
1. DOR, 331-333. 
-- ·---- ----·- - . 
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CHAPTER VI 
CRITICISMS AND EVALUATIONS OF KNUDSON'S CONCEPTION 
It is almost impossible in the few pages that remain to 
investigate all of the many reviews of Knudson's books, the 
comments and criticisms of Knudson's conception, or the many 
criticisms applicable to his concept:ion. Henc.e only a ·· se len-
t ion of these is discussed in this chapter. This selection: 
j has been made to show the various types of comments and 
I 
criticisms that have been made so that the validity of each 
of the types can be discussed and ascertained. 
1 • . Comments Favoring Knudson's View 
I 
Of all the various types o f comments, perhaps those which 
I
. favor Knudson's view of God des·erva the most prominent place. 
Dean Knudson is a master in the anatomy of thought• 
1 He sees relations sharply and expresses them clearly. , I In a very noble andf Christian sensa he is a ration• 
I 
alist always going 1honestly on the road to which his logic carries him. Albert c. Knudson·· has taught'". 
j, widely and wisely and well • . College graduates who 
II knew him at Denver or Baker or Allegheny have been 
:· joined by ministerial students from his classes at:. 
'I Boston University School of The_ology i:n an informaa 
I Knudson Alumni Association, onmposed of men and women 
1 who have been blessed by the work of his mind •••• 
I 
But they in turn will be joined by thousands of those 
who have ·known Dr. Knudson from afar.? In his treat-
11 
ment of the goodness of God, he draws much from his 
large knowledge of the scriptures, controvertsthose 
II 
who think Jesus had no new idea or God, and returns 
to the attack upon those who hope to maintain the' 
1---
1. Hough, VC; 122. 
2;- C., B.C., Rev. ( 1950), 73• 
127 
1 
goodness of God by abandoning his omnipotence. The 
last chapter in the book /_Do§? deals with the Trinity • . 
It is exceedingly well done, being a careful analysis 
of the needs which were met by the formulation of the 
doctrine, the advantages of the doctrine, the diffiw 
culties inherent.2 
So run the praises of Dr. Knudson, his books, and his viewpoint 
In fact it is much easier to find comments which praise his 
3 
viewpoint than which are adverse to it.. His viewpoint is so 
Widely accepted today that most reviewers of his books have 
stressed their points of disagreement rather than their points 
of agreement. To state the reasons for the wide acaeptanoe o~ 
Knudson' a conception ot'.'God would be to restate the arguments~ 
of Knudson as set forth in this thesis. Moat of these are 
rational, consistent, coherent, empirical. and adequate. Henes: 
the main portion of this chapter is used to present and evalu-
ate the adverse criticisms of his view of God~ 
2. Comments on Points Basic to 
Knudson's Conception of God 
i. Idealistic Epistemology and Ontology.--Garnett. , in his 
review of BIOT, makes the following statement: 
A personalisti~ interpretation of God and the universe 
need not be made to depend on an idealistic epistemology 
and ontology. To do so is to link it with a lost, or at 
least a losing, cause. And it has no justifio:ation: now 
that physics has taught ul to interpret matter not as 
substance but as process~ . 
1~ .Evans, Rev. (1930), 1350. 
2. Woodburne, Rev. (1931), 118. 
3 • . For example see Marlatt, Rev. ( 1930); Cop:per, Rev. (1950); : 
Flewelling, Rev.(l932); \i'eeks, Rev.(l950); Anonymous, Rev. 
( 1931); Seiden spinner, Rev. ( 1950); Osborne, Rev. ( 1931); 
Krumbine, Rev.(l931); and Anonymous, Rev.(l932) • . 
4. Garnett, Rev. ( 1950), 923~ -
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A person can not help wondering how Garnett comes to this 
conclusion when one of the essential tenets of Knudson's 
idealistic ontology is that matter is process, activity, and 
volition, and not substance as substance is ordinarily unde~ 
stood. 
Reality in its essential nature is active. In other 
words, Oersonalis!!V interprets substance in terms of 
aausality • . It thus falls in l i ne with modern physical 
theory •••• Causality must ult~mately be intarpreted in 
terms of volition. • • • Matter is phenomenal. • • • the . 
whole material world. Li.!l the asaseleas product of the 
divine energizing • . 
For Knudson, mtter or substance has meaning only in terms of· 
volitional causality or process. Hence his view is entirely 
in line with the view or:· physics as stated by Garnett. Thus 
this criticism does not seem to be valid. 
iit Methodology and Crit.erion of Truth.-Atter making 
many comments ot praise in his review of DOG, Woodburne states 
that "we still need a work on the doctrine of God which will 
deal more adequately with the relevant material available from 
"2 the vast field of the history of .. religion. . This remark seems 
to imply that Knudson does not trace adequately the history o:f' 
the problems with which he is dealing. This is surely a mis-
conception. When one discusses Knudson's conception of God 
with him, Knudson invariabll· sets the problem in-, the context 
of ita historical background. A fairer criticis.m might be that 
Knudson , ia too historical in his methodology: it is hard at 
1. POP, 178. 
2. Woodburne, Rev.(l931), 118. 
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times to differentiate his own views from those of his pre-
decessors. But this point could be easily overstressed--he 
has done an excellent job of dealing with the relevant material 
a:vailable from the history of religion;t 
Woodburne also states that Knudson "hasoverstressed the 
first chapter of DOG is mainly an exposition justifying the 
above stated definition · of theology and distinguishing the 
realm of theology from that of religion. His reasoning and 
distinctions are cogent on the whole. And rather than being 
glad that he does not hold to this definition ' strictly, others; 
may well be sorry that he does not. Perhaps if Knudson were 
more strict in holding to this .definition throughout his 
writin.gs, there would be fewer inconsistencies in his total 
view • . It Knudson limited his discussion in accordance with 
mere logical consistency, there would seem to be reason for:· 
1. Woodburne, Rev.(l931), 117. 
2. Evans, Rev.(l930), 1351. 
130 
! / i 
F~udson is interested in taking into consideration each and 
every aspect of experience that vwu1d affect h is theories. 
1 
This is especially clee.r i n Chapter V of DOG. I n dis cus sing 
the sources of theology, he does consider the experience of 
the mystic as datum for theology on pages 1 85-1 86 of DOG. 
After considering the mystic's experience, he drm.,rs the con-
elusion that the mystic's experienc e has not added any new 
insight into the nature o f God . This is quite different than 
not considering h i s experience at all as Woodburne states . 
Waterhouse, in his review of POP, attacks the personal-
istic criterion of truth as Knudson d id in POP the pragmatic 
criterion of truth. He says that "Pragmatism has an intel-
ligible ansv.rer to the pro bl em . It does not appear that 
2 
Personalism has ." Without d iscussing this statement as it 
stands , it is sufficient to consider the adequacy o f Knudson 1 s 
criterion of truth. Knudson 1 s view is clearest i n BICT : 
There is no double standard of truth . Theology and 
philosophy are on the same footing i,vhen it comes to 
the question of the truth o f religion. Tney bo th base 
their case on a rational interp retation o f our t o tal 
human experience , both subjective and obj ective . 3 
An emphatic answei' was g iven in Chap ter I. v·le 
there decided unequivocally in favor of the rational 
conception of the standard of truth, us i ng the vrord 
"rational " i n its broader meaning as about equivalent 
to "reasonable. "4 
1. CF. a1 so to Osborne, Rev. (1931), 319. 
2. Waterhouse , Rev .(1928), 108 . 
3 . BICT, 44 • 
.L~ . BICT, 110. 
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This criterion of truth would seem to be more adequate than 
the pragmatic .or any other since it actually includes all 
others. Truth exists only for intelligenass, minds, or rea~s; 
hence truth must be rational in some sense of the word. And 
in the broadest sense of the term rational, . to which Knudson' 
holds, truth becomes the reas.onable interpretation and system-
, atic organization of all experience. Any criterion which 
includes only a part of the total would be inadequate, for 
experience is a totality, and any one that tried to include 
more than the total would be a contradiction of terms. Hence · 
it would appear that no more adequate criterion o~ truth can 
be found than is Knudson' s• . 
3. Comments on Various Aspects of 
Knudson's Conception of God 
1. The Personality of God and the Trinity.--Evans states 
that some . "may feel that LKnudsoriJ overstresses the idea of the 
1 
personality of God and so depreciates other types of religico~" 
In answer to Evans, it only seems right that impersonal reli• 
gions should be depreciated if there is more evidence that God 
is personal than impersonal•. Each person: should seek for &<.? 
truer view of God and not consider what views are being 
depreciated as a result of finding a truer view. 
It is interesting to note at this point that Joad (GE) 
arrives at the conclusion that God is personal from accepting:: 
the claim of the mystics, while Knudson : arrives at the same 
conclusion without . aco.epting their claim particularly. 
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Joad says: 
The claim of the mystics to make direct contact with 
••• reality may be allowed~ . The mystics' reports 
vary, soma .asserting the existence of a universal,> 
impersonal consciousness, , others of a personal God. 
On balance, the evidence seems in favour of the latter,~ 
since all the objections to the latter apply also to the 
former, and such positive reasons as are supplied by the 
promptings of our amoti~nal and passional natures point 
strongly to the latter• . 
Thus Joad arrives at the same conc.lusion as does Knudson-. as 
a result of accepting data which Knudson does not accept .. for 
this purpose • . Hence the authority of another source is added 
which substantiates Knudson's conclusions that God is a person• 
In turning to the concept of the Trinity, Pittenger states 
that Knudson 
parodies the doctrine of the Trinity in his attempt to . 
maintain a view of God which•-with all that can and must 
be said for his rie;ht emphasis on God as 11personal"~­
saams to be all too simpla.2 
If one can ~fsr from this statement that Pittane;er thinks 
Knudson's conception of the personality of God to be approxi-
mately correct, it seems inconsistent that he should criticize , 
his view of the Trinity in·· such a fashion. For the two terms 
are interrelated, and one can not change his conception of one 
without changing his conception of the other, if he wishes his 
conceptions to be consistent with each other. And since 
Knudson's conceptions or the personality of God and the Trinity 
do sa am to be consistent : with each other, , it appears that:. 
Pittene;er must mean something different by God ,.s be;l;n:g p ersoilal li 
1. Joad, GE, 358. 
2. Pittenger, Rev. (1950), , 42. 
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thSP Knudson does. If this is the case, then the critic is 
using a different realm of discourse than Knudson · and the ; 
criticism is inapplicable. Otherwise, Pittenger must make 
his meaning more explicit. 
Arbaugh gives a more difficult criticism of Knudson's 
conception of the Trinity: 
Personalism claims to solve many old problems. It 
protests against the tritheisti~ tendency of modern 
trinitarianism, and offers a personalistic . modalism 
in its place;• It avoids the paradoxical "two natures" 
of Christ by denying that they are:-:: "substances" and by 
interpreting them as factors of one ~personality • . But 
we might .. ask whether the duality of agency (Christ' a 
will and the Father's wyll) may not remain as great 
an unsolved difficulty. . 
Be;fore this criticism a.an be answered, it is nec.essary to 
determine what Arbaugh means by the duality of agency. If 
he means that Christ •s will and the Father 1 a will are two 
-
egos within .one body, then he has misunderstoo~Knudson's 
conception. For Knudson specifically states in DOR, 319, ~ 
that "oomplet.a humanity must be attributed to Jesus, not only 
~ 
in the sense that he had a human spirit as well as a human saul 
and body, but in the sensa that his personal center, his ego, , 
was human." If Arbaugh means that Christ' a will is not . 
identical with the Father's will but that they become one to 
the extent that Christ became extremely conscious or God's wil 
and dependent upon it (which seems to be Knudson's view),, then 
the difficulty appears to be erased. For than there are two 
l~ Arbaugh, Rev.(l950). 
-------,1 
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wills or salves united in one purpose, which is a state 
experienced frequently to a lesser degree by human beings 
who are united by soma common purpose. Of course there remains 
the problem as to how the . divine immanena:e was present·. inr 
Christ in such a supreme _ degree; or, to state the same thing 
in another manner, how Christ was so unusually God-conscious. 
But most parsons have experiences (e.g. during worship or 
meditation) when the presence of God is felt to an unusual 
extant. These experiences -_. would seam comparable to Christ's 
and render his more intelligible. This viewpoin~ seams much 
less difficult_ than the ttt.¥Ownature" !! theory • . 
ii. The Problem of Suffering and the Limitations of God~ . 
--It is quite interesting to see the transition in the thought . 
of Edwin l.Bwis • • In.- God and Ourselves (1931) he gave a plea:.' 
for the reality, adequacy, and availability of God. And God 
for him in this book is "Purposive Mind and Creative Will, 
~ 1 
infinite in Goodness, Wisdom, and Power. •• This 11 is the only 
2 
kind of God that really matters. 11 
Only as thoroughgoing theism will suffice. Nothing 
is to be gained by compromise in a life-and-de.ath 
struggle for religion~ .. The introduction of a con-
flict into the very bosom of -God such as Brightman 
proposes will hardly win our philosophical athaists.3 
There are, however, still those who have not bowed 
in the house of Rimmon~ Such living voices as those 
of Hocking ••• Knudson ••• . are stil.l to be hear4 in 
the land. The present writer acknowledges to them,, and: 
many others . like them, his own deep obligation~~ 
1. lswis, GO, 12. -
2. Lewis, GO, 12-13. 
3. lswis, . GO, . 13. 
4. Lewis, GO, . 15. 
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Thus Lewis essentially a greed with Knudson as to what is an 
adequate conception of God. Furthermore, his d i scussion of 
the problem o f Iiatural evil was very much the same throughout 
this book as in Knudson 's. But by 1948 his vievlS have 
admittedly changed quite a b i t . I n The Creator and the 
Adversary he openly states that he has "moved avmy from the 
attempt . • . •• to f i t the Christian faith into the type of 
1 
philosophical monistic idealism." This is due to a much 
more complete accep t a nce of both the c oncept and t h e fact of 
revelation as given in the Bible . In this revelation he finds 
a God of holy love who is conti nually opp o sed by an Adversa ry . 
This results in the evil, conflict and struggle that is present 
in the co smic order. 
The presence of good and evil, both in the "~Horld itself 
and in human life and experience, is too self-evident to 
be denied • • • The thinlcer vrho affi rms the absol ute 
sovereignty, omnipotence , and goodness of God still has 
the p 2oblem , and perhaps in it s most acute and perplexing 
form. 
This is obviously quite a change from his position i n GO. 
Vfuerea.s he felt in GO that only a God infinite in povrer vm s 
vrorth u pholding , in CA he feels that only a dua lism o f God 
and the Adversary is capabl e of exp laining the presence of 
good and evil . Thus there is somewhat of an analo gous 
situation bet-vreen Lewis a nd Brightman ina smuch as both once 
held to the concept of an omnipotent God and no,d both h old 
to a concep t of a finite God. Both a gree now that one who 
1. Lewis , CA, 7 . 
2 . Lewis , CA, 15 . 
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believes in an omnipotent God has a difficult task of axplainin ' 
I the reality of both good and evil in the universe. - Hence_ Lewis I 
is another witness against the Absolutistic view of Knudson. . . 
Yet it is quite doubtful if the given data warrants the dualism 
which Lswis asserts. Surely the universality of one system 
of causal law in the material world indicates a monism rather I 
I 
than a dualism. Knudson would seem to be more consistent with I 
I his present view than he would be if he changed to the dualist~~ 
view of Lswis~ I 
R. A. Tsanoff 1n The Nature of Evil emphasizes the reality 
of both good and evil • . Although he does not cr~t~cize directly 
Knudson's position as such, he does make statements which seem 
applicable to Knudson's view. Knudson speaks of evil as though 
it had finite existence only and not infinite. He also ~eaves 
the impression that evil is somewhat illusory•wthat what is 
normally called evil may take on a different color when seen 
in the light of eternity. Tsanoff ana~yzes this general type 
of viewpoint as follows: 
The affirmation of the illusoriness ot' the mare finitude 
of evil may be dictated by various motives and may 
reflect different and evan partly conflicting-· spiritual 
moods: : a r:i theologian' a jealousy for the spotless char--
acter of his one omnipotent God, a pantheist's mystical 
disdain of what eyes can see when open, an insistent 
absolutist or quasi-aesthetic.· demand for the harmonious 
and perfect finality of the cosmos, a complacent or a 
neurotic persistence in pronouncing reality fundamentally 
and ultimalely good and all alleged evil mere appearance 
and error~ _ 
Of course Knudson is not a pantheist, but the other three,, 
I 
I 
I 
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comments probably have some validity in reference to his 
motives for retaining his view of an absolutistic , omnipotent 
God. To a major extent these motives are probably unconscious, 
and they may be more influential than his more conscious ones. 
However, these comments can only be conjectures at best . There 
vwuld seem to be no v-ray to verify this conclusion v.rith any 
degree of certainty . 
Tsanoff finds in the universe a gradational system of 
values for p ersons. In this system evil is degradation--the 
surrender of the higher to the lower in the scale of being, 
the effective down-pulling incursion of the lovrer against the 
1 
higher. Whether or not this viewpoint is adequate is not 
of importance here . The i mporta,nt po int is that he finds a 
conception o f an omnipotent God to be untenable. 
In C~d is no stagnant plentitude but plenitude of ideal 
activity, no dull placidity but ever-heroic redemption 
of the vrorld from the hazard of settling back . 'Ivly 
Father ~r.rorketh hitherto, and I vrork .' Not less than my-
self but more is God thus resistant to the evil tug 2 
of the downpulling and the inert and the complacent. 
Thus Tsanoff concludes (as does Brightman) that God is not 
perfect but infinitely perfectibl e. He is strugsling to do 
the ideal just as the rest of mankind must to be able to do 
the ideal. Hence he is not omnipotent i n the way F-11udson 
uses the Hord. At least this vie1vpoint attempts to account 
for the evil of the world in a more thoroughgoing fashion than 
Knudson's does. 
1. Tsanoff, NOE, 390-395. 
2. Tsanoff, NOE, 399-400. Cf. Royce, SGE, where Royce makes 
suffering a necessary and eternal part of the divine life . 
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F. R. Tennant 1n his Philosophical Theology, . II, also 
makes .comments which seem applicable to Knudson's view: 
It is as incumbent upon empirically reached theism as 
upon theology of the a ~·priori kind to provide a :.' theodicy,, 
or to afford grounds for a belief equivalent to the 
rationalistically derived assertion that this is the 
best possible world. It is commonly held, however, that 
the problem of evil is the ~:of theism, and that though 
it does not exist for theism alone amongst theories as 
to the world-ground, this problem is graver for that 
than for any other world-view, in that theism regards the 
rationality of the world as including more than:· its intel-
ligibility to the analyti~understanding, to wit the 
ethical purposiveness of a creative will which is wholly 
good~ For materialism and mechanistic naturalism, . for 
spiritualistic pluralism and for singularism which con-
c:eives The Absolute as above, . or indifferent to, the 
distinction between good and evil, no such problem1 
exista.l 
Thus Tennant shows adequately that a theoretical solution mus~ 
be found if the data of experience is to be accounted for and 
made coherent in any type of plausible explanation. . Whenever 
the scientist in any fierJ.d finds data:,which are inconsistent 
with his pre~iously established theories, he is duty bound to 
reconsider the old theories until he can find some means of 
making the new data intelligible in terms of the old theories, 
or to establish new theories which will make all the given 
data intelligible, consistent and coherent. The theologian 
or philosopher is likewise duty bound to do his best to develop 
theories which will be coherent explanations of the data of 
his particular area of investigation. 2 
/ 
Nels Ferre, in his review of BICT, has this comment to 
make: 
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developing moral order in wh.ioh he stands a hand-breadth o-r-r· 
and allows his oreation to develop their lives aoaording to 
their own ohoioes. Also, 
/ . 
1. Fe·rre, Rev. (1951), 
2. Tennant, II, 188. 
view~ 
3. Tennant, II, 189. 
69. 
Of. McConnell, ~ IGL, 126-153 for similar 
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unalloyed fleasure is condemned by man himself as unworthy 
to be his life's crown•. No pain, or want, no effort; 
no effort, . no progress; . no progress, no attainment~ 
Neaessity is the mother of invention; experience is the 
11becom1ng expert by experiment" 1: mere happiness would 
entail stagnation • .. Thus· we a:a:r:mot have it both ways: 
the best world cannot be the most pleasurable; and it 
c:annot lack its crown in moral agents."~ 
Thus Tennant feels that pain is nec:essary to the attainment 
of the purpose of God--the development of moral agents. This 
I 
is also the probable •meaning of Ferre~ . That Knudson would 
agree also with this viewpoint should be evident from his 
statement that "the world with all its dark and forbidding 
2 
aspects [f.iJ. a training school of mankind. tt · In this manner 
Knudson makes suffering an organic part of this training school 
•-the world or nature. "It fits into the divine economy in 
3 
such a way that the devout soul offers no complaint~~· Hence 
it does seem that Knudson put a evil in the framework of God' s ~ 
eternal purpose and in its organic~ conneotion to nature. He 
shows ita connection to history by indicating that many people 
have been strengthened ra ligiously and morally as a result of 
suffering~ , Thus if the few words of FarrJ have been properly 
understood, it would seam that they have little basis • . That 
each of these attempts to justify the existence of suffering 
or natural evil is inadequate can be seen from the discussion 
in the chapter dealing with the problem of suffering. 
1. Tennant, II, 186-187 • . 
2. BICT, 106 • .. 
3. BICT, : 107. 
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Ross is one of the few persons to consider Knudson's 
view of the problem of evil in a specific manner. In PPE he 
points out many of the same inconsistencies that were mentioned 
in the chapter on the problem of suffering. Ross feels that 
Knudson's distinction between cosmic and human ethics under-
mines the cosmic validity of the ethical standpoint and thus 
it is weakening to his whole position. nKnudson takes his 
stand onc the ethical approach and then proceeds to pull the 
1 
foundation out from under himself. 11 He criticizes also the 
idea that evil may ba considered as a by-product of the cosmic-
order. "That this conflicts with personalism's idealistic 
interpretation of the system of nature is evident on a little 
2 
examination... But these points need not be further discussed 
here since they have been considered at soma length in the 
chapter mentioned above. Each of these would seem to be 
adequate criticisms of Knudson's view. 
MOntague's investigations in Belief Unbound would make him 
critical of Knudson's view: 
Of one thing \'te aan be certain, since the existing world 
contains evil, God's alleged attributes of infinite 
power and perfect goodness can be reconciled only by 
altering the one or the other of those attributes.3 
If our analysis of the Problem of Evil is valid, there 
can exist no omnipotent God. Possibly an omnipotent 
It, conceivably ~n omnipotent Demon, but not a.n omni• 
potent Goodness.~ 
1. Ross, PPE, 17. 
2. Ross, PPE, 17. 
3~ MOntague, BU, 70. 
4. MOntague, BU, 72 • . Garnett,s Rev.(l950), . 923 also agreese . 
142 
This cone lusion is also held by Joad in his book God and Evil: II 
So far as logical argument takes us, t .he balance of 
argument seems to be strongly against the view that the 
universe is the creation of an omnipotent, benevolent 
God • .L God did not create evil; nor is evil wholly due 
to man's misuse of his gift of free will~ The principle 
of evil in the universe is probably independent of God 
and ~xists in His despite. God, than, is not all-power• 
ful •. 
These many criticisms of Knudson's general position woulfr 
seem to laa.d to the dilemma which has bean - axpre ssed for a · 
thousand years. The amazing fact is that so many have felt 
that the only solution is a dualism in reality itself. But 
yet this is not so amazing when one is observant of both the 
good and evil of the universe~ , Hence it would seem that 
Knudson is losically forced to limit God's power in ones 
manner or another. As long as he refuses to do this, there 
would seem to be no way that he can develop a coherent view· 
of God that is basad on experienae~ 
General Criticisms of Theistic Absolutism 
i. Hartshorne 1s.--In Man's Vision of God Charles Hart,.. 
I 
I 
!I 
I 
I 
II 
r 
II shorne investigates the various possible doctrines of God from I 
a logical or formal viewpoint. He subjects the various theo-- I 
logical terms to rigorous examination, showing their ambi~ 
guities by showing _their many possible meanings. He portrays 
ably that when these terms are defined according to certain 
losical classifications that one, and· only one, of the 
following propositions must be true: 
1. Joad, GE, 358. 
2 • . Joad, GE, 359. 
I 
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I. There is a being in all respects absolutely perfe~t 
or unsurpasaable, in no way and in no respect surpassable 
or perfectible • . LKnudaon's viewpoin17 
II; There is no being in all respects absolutely perfect; 
but there is a being in .§.2l!! respect or reapeo:ts thus 
perfect, and in some respect or respects not so, in some 
respects surpa ssable, whether by self or others being 
left open. Thus it , is not excluded' that the being may 
be relatively perfect in all the respects in which it is 
not . absolutely perfect. , (Theism of the Second Type; 
~ch contempora:7. Protestant theology, _ doctrines of a '-: 
'finite•infinite •··or perfect-perfectible God.} 
III. There is no .. being in any respec.t absolutely perfect; 
all beings are in all respeo:ts surpassable by something 
conceivable, perhaps by others or perhaps by themselves 
in another state • . (Doctrines of a IDerely finite God, 
polytheism in some forma, atheism.)~ 
Hartshorne f'urthar analyzes these three into their various 
logical possibilities and studies each of these. He then 
points out the following about the one identified above as 
Knudson 'a: : 
lj 
I 
I 
i 
I 
II 
II 
II If there is a being corresponding to case one, than there:'; 1! 
is a being totally exempt from the possibility of decrease '/1 
or increase in value, hence of ohange :in any significant 
sense. In such a being time is not, or at least is I 
not time, ~ioh implies certain well known philosophical , 
paradoxes. , 
Complete perfection in all aspects would seem to lead logically 
to this conclusion. And anything less than complete perfection 
would leave room for improvement or growth-the second olasai• \ 
I 
fioation. Case one makes God no more superior than does case 
two in the attributes which are absolute in both oases, and 
it makes him leas perfect in those attributes which require 
! 
change or self-transcendence for their value. Hartshorne also 
1. Hartshorne, MVG, 11•12. 
2. Hartshorne, MVG, 15. 
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adequately shows that the attempt to treat these latter attri- 1 
butes under case one might destroy even the attributes to ~~· 
which absoluteness is appropriate. This results in the fact 
that the God of case one might really and consistently have 
1 
less perfection than the human race, according to Hartshorne •. 
His final conclusion concerning this view is as follows: 
The first view • • • being self-contradictory, is 
excluded by a negative ontological argument (chapter 
3). It also conflicts with absolute requirements of 
ethics and aesthetics (chapters 4 and 6). It fails, 
finally, to furnish an ultimate or cosmic subject of 
change, or to afford any help in the explanation2of time. Rather it denies time (chapters 7 and 8) • . 
These arguments do seem to be convincing. The logic appears 
to be flawless and the conclusions are consistent with the 
conclusions of this study from other viewpoints and consider-
ations. Hence this results in an added argument which tends 
to prove Knudson's conception inadequate. 
ii. Brightman's.--It was pointed out in the chapter on 
the problem of suffering that Professor Brightman feels that 
Dr. Knudson has made the best statement of objections to his 
3 
view in DOR, 204-212. Perhaps Knudson would make a similar 
statement concerning Brightman's critic isms in PORj. 307-313. 
At least he would seem to be justified in so doing. 
1 • . Hartshorne, MVG, 18. 
2. Hartshorne, MVG, 342. 
3. Birightman states this in POR, 324n. This footnote lists 
several criticisms that have made against his viewe 
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In the pages just cited Brightman first points out that li 
most philosophers and theologians since the time of Kant feel ( 
that it is not possible to demonstrate by arguments the . 
existence of God. Knudson clearly agrees with this viewpoint 
in DOG, 241. Hence the arguments for an infinite, omnipotent 
God cannot be regarded as syllogistically certain.. In _ order 
I 
I 
I 
I 
II 
II 
I 
to make this point clearer, , Brightman subjects the two argu- . 
menta that he feels to be the strongest for theistic absolutis1 
(the religious and the logical) to a critieal examination.. In II 
essence he states the following: (1) The assumption that I 
an absolute and omnipotent God is the natural implication 
and fulfillment ot religious t·aith ia not hvi:rtyoriaal ly II 
grounded: : many ordinary Christ i ans h ave a. ... finite view 
of God. (2) There is historical evidence that the supposed I 
religious demand for an absolutely infinite God results largel~~ 
from Ariatot91ml.influeno:e. (3) : Many religions have flourished J 
that · did not hold to an omnipotent God. (4) "Most - serious 
of all is the fact that metaphy.sioal conclusions cannot be 
grounded on the inspection of any limited area of experience, 
. 1 
even so important an area as the religious." The whole of 
experience must be taken into consideration. . (5) The ideal 
of an absolutely infinite theology or the rigid ideal of 
causa is no longer in complete acceptanc:e. Hence the first 
part of the logical .argument (based on an analogy between 
the two ideals) does not prove an omnipotent God. (6) The · 
i 1. Brightman, POR, 308. ~==*-•l' ,, 
I 
II 
'I 
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remainder of the logical argument (an appeal to coherence)) 
is the weakest aspect of it since coherence invol.vas the 
inclusion of all the facts of experience, the good and the 
evil, which is not conducive to the idea that reality is 
1 
perfect. . These observations do seem to be accurate on the :' 
whole. Hance there is not sufficient reason to .balieve that 
God is omnipotent from the arguments themselves. 
The five objections to theistic absolutism which 
Brightman gives are also very important • . These objections 
were written probably with Knudson's conception in mind; at . 
least they directly concern his view to the extent they are 
applicable. These objections are now discussed in the order 
of their occurrence in POR. 
(1) Its appeal to ignorance. The argument for 
theistic absolutism entails the admission that we 
cannot explain the surd evils--the wasta, the cruelty, 
the injustice of nature--and that we must admit our 
ignorance, while r etaining the faith that the fuller 
light of 2mmortality will make clear what we do not 
now know. . That we are ignorant requires no elaborate -
argument. Nona of our ultimate insights achieve 
certainty. But if the absolutist believes that we 
truly are ignorant, what right has he to assert at 
the same time that we have knowledge? If we do not 
know, how dare we infer that the surd evils are real 
goods? ••• In so far, then, as we are dealing with 
a· deus· -absconditus, it is the part of wisdom to admit 
that we do not know, rather than to infer God's 
absoluteness from our ignorance (as Royce in The 
Relisious Aspect of Philosophy).3 
1. Brightman, POR, 307-309. 
2. At this point Brightman puts a footnote referring to 
Knudson, DOG, 208-209. 
3. Brightman, POR, 309-310 • . 
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This first objection is cogent to the extent that it is 
applicable to Knudson's view. It has already been pointed 
out in this thesis that Knudson does not believe in the 
concept of surd evil as he thought Brightman defined it~ . 
Knudson would probably accept Brightman's concept of surd 
evil as it has been more adequately defined in a footnote 
in the chapter on the problem of suffering, but he would 
avoid the use of such a term. But whether or not he accepts 
this particular concept, he believes that evil is real to 
soma extant. And the fact that he does n£1 assert that all 
evil is instrumental to good (another point where the above · 
quotation is inappiioable) tends only to make his view less 
rather than more coherent. For if ha held that the world 
is the bast possible world, that all intrinsic evil is com-
pletely instrumental to intrinsic good, and that God is 
omnipotent, omniscient, and all-good, then his view would. 
be at least internally coherent regardless of whether or 
not it was consistent with the given facts of experience • . 
1 
But since his view is that the world is evil as well as good • . 
that all intrinsic evil may be instrumental to intrinsi~ good• 
and yet that God is omnipotent, omniscient, and all-good, it 
is hard to sea how he can consider these first two aspects- or 
his view consistent with the last one. . He asserts that it 
is at this point that his faith comes in--that these three 
1. DOR, 28 • . 
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aspects are consistent with each other even though they do 
not appear to be so. Here Knudson is too rationalistic in 
the traditional sense of the word. From his ideal concept 
of God he would rather deduce that evils are not quite what 
they appear to be to the mortal mind, rather than believing 
the testimony of mortal mind that evil as well as good are 
real in the world and that the nature of the Creator of these 
things should be inferred from these facts • . Here it is that 
Brightman's criticism would be applicable if it were changed' 
to fit this given situation • . Why appeal to ignorance concern-
ing that which you know best (the fact of evil) and assart 
knowledge concerning that which you know least (the nature 
of God)? Why should not this situation be reversed? This 
would seem to be the thought · that Brightman is trying to 
bring out and it does seem to be cogent. 
In a word, our ignorance must lead either to silence 
or to fUrther investigation; and further investiga-
tion will always have to be based on the evidence that 
is availa~le, not on data of which we are totally 
ignorant~ 
Brightman's second objection is as follows: : 
I-ts ascriptioD of surd _ evils to divine will.. Since 
the_istic absolutism includes the belief that the divine 
will is omnipotent and faces no conditions which it did: 
not create, an upholder of that view must find the 
ultimate source of all surd evils in the will of God. 2 
As the concept of surd evil is properly defined, this objection 
is applicable to Knudson's view. Knudson ad.Jilits this in 
1. Brightman, POR, 310. 
2. Brightman, POR, 310. 
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reference to his hypothetical solution which was discussed 
1 
in the chapter on the problem of suffering~ But here he 
dodges the full implication of his own admission by saying 
that evils "are not directly purposed and hence need not be 
regarded as immediate and complete expressions of the divine 
2 
character. 11 But why should an omnipotent God, whose nature 
is in complete harmony with his will, indirectly purpose 
evil? There would seem to be no adequate answer to this 
question, although there are many partially true answers ·~ 
such as God indirectly (or directly) purposes evil that good 
may result. But all such partial truths are nothing more 
than feeble attempts to avoid the inconsistenc.y of the basic 
premises • . Hence Brightman's objection does seem to be correct: 
ultimately for Knudson the world is just as God created it 
and desired that it should be, or else he would have changed 
it by his omnipotent power (which is even now omnipresent 
in a complete sense in every aspect and part of the universe). 
This would seem to be the neassaary conclusion of his view. 
(3) Its tendency to make p;ood and evil indistin-
guishable. · Since absolute theism entails the proposition 
that all apparent evil is real good, it is in danger of 
producing complete skepticism about values. It commands 
us to declare that an experience which, from every 
rational and empirica.l standpoint, seems an irreducible 
surd evil shall nevertheless be judged to be good. If 
what seems evil is really good, an inquiring mind .would 
naturally go on to inquire whether what seems good is 
not really evil.3 
1~ DOR, 217. 
2. DOR, 217. 
3. Brightman, POR, 311-312. 
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Knudson avoids the implications of this criticism by his 
view that all evil may be instrumental to good. Hence he 
avoids scepticism by asserting an inconsistent agnosticism. 
(4) Its cutting of the nerve of moral endeavor. 
From a theoretical standpoint, theistic absolutism, 
like other types of absolutism, removes all incentive 
for moral reform of the individual or of society, and 
that for two reasons. Firat, because the absolutistic 
view denies the reality of time; what happens in time 
is reduced to the level of phenomenon or even an 
illusion. Striving to make changes in the time order 
thus becomes unimportant and loses its militant cast. 
Secondly, absolutism holds to an optimism which implies 
that the world is already timelessly perfect. If it is 
perfect, why try to improve it? If avery evil is really 
a good, why try to eliminate evils? Fortunately, how-
ever, theistic absolutists have not been thaoretioally 
consistent.l 
This objection is only partially applicable for two reasons. 
First, although Knudson denied the reality of time in POP, 
235-237,376 in complete agreement with the above statement, 
heasaerted in a conversation that Professor Brightman has 
convinced him that time is real. Hence the first reason 
listed above is inapplicable. The second one is inapplicable 
likewise baoausa Knudson has asserted that he does not know 
whether or not this is a perfect world or what a perfect world 
would be. Yet there is a sense in which it is applicable. 
If God is perfect and omnipotent, why should poor, weak, and 
inferior man strive throughout thousands of years in order 
to transform that which God has freely created into something 
which is leas evil, especially when God has the power to 
1. Brightman, POR, 312. 
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change it all if and when he desires? Is it any wonder that 
Job's wife told Job to curse God and die? 
(5) Its unempirical character. The root of all 
objections to theistic absolutism is that it is a 
theory founded in an a priori faith, which in turn 
grows out of desires found in certain types of religious 
experience. Many thinkers regard it as improper to 
consider our desires at all; but after all, desi-res are : 
facts and they constitute part of the evidence about 
the kind of universe t h is is. Theistic absolutism ~ is~ 
therefore, not to be condemned for taking desires into 
consideration • . In so far as it does so, it is properly 
empirical. Ita defect lies in treating a favored set 
ot religious desires as ultimate intuitions--l'Thich are 
taken as absolute and a priori. Because of his pre .. 
dilection for a few experiences, the theistic absolutist·. 
sweeps to one side great masses of empirical fact with 
the a priori faith that so!a day they will be explained • . 
In this he is unempirical. · 
This statement is the one obJection that is completely 
applicable to Knudson's view. It points out his crucial 
error and why he arrives at that error. or course Knudson 
would deny that this critlctsm is applicab}.e to him. But 
from all the evidence in this thesis thus far, this woul~. 
seem to be the logical conclusion. That Dr. Knudson's 
conception of God is unempirical to the extent that Professor 
Brightman states above is the major conclusion of this 
thesis. 
5. Findings and Conclusions 
1 . God may justly be desc r ibed as absolute, omnipresent, 
ete r nal, personal, unitar y, i mmuta ble, omniscient, free, good 
(in the wi de sense), and a trinity in the specia l sense a nd way 
that Knudson us es each term. In these many a spects, Knudson's 
1. Brightman, POR, 313. 
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conception of God is reasonably coherent. 
2. Inasmuch as Knudson does not claim to have a theoreti-
cal solution for the problem of suffering, his view of God is 
incoherent at this point. 
3. Knudson's criticisms of Brightman's view are not cogent 
Hence Brightman's view should be reconsidered. 
4. Knudson's arguments for the omnipotence of God are not 
cogent in the light of the chapter on the problem of suffering 
and the criticisms of Chapter VI. Knudson should conceive of 
God under more limitations in order to make his conception more 
coherent. 
5. Knudson's conception of God is unempirical to the ex-
tent that Brightman states in his fifth objection in the pre-
ceding section. 
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.Al3STn ACT O:B, THESIS 
Inasmuch as the problem of the thesis is to determine 
whether A.C. Knudson's conception of God is empirically coher-
ent, the scope is limited to his view of God and to material 
pertinent to his view. Accordingly, the method used in the 
thesis is first that of depiction and then of evaluation of 
this view. 
For Knudson God is not absolute in the sense (1) of being 
unrelated or unknowable (Agnostic view), nor (2) of being 
inclusive of all existence (rantheistic view), but in the 
sense (3) of being the independent or self-existent ground 
or crea tor of the universe. It is this latter sense that both 
the religious quest after redemption and the intellectual quest 
after truth afi'irm. 
Next to the a ttribute of absoluteness, Knudson stresses the 
attribute of omnipotence which he feels is basic to each of the 
other attributes of God. By it he means that God can do all 
things that are possible but not the irrational, the self-con-
tradictory, or the impossible. He will not admit of any limita-
tion that denotes imperfection or diminution of reality; God's 
power expresses itself perfectly and completely in and through 
his nature. Truth and right are inherent laws of the Divine 
Being, having their ground in the divine :nature, but being made 
real through the activity of the divine will. Omnipresence for 
Knudson means that space constitutes no limitation to the divine 
' power, that God is the agent or agency which sustains every ac-
tivity of the universe. Eternity affirms that the divine power 
is not limited by time, that God in some manner spans all time. 
This time-transcendence is possible through the divine intelli-
gence which is conscious of its own identity in spite of all the 
multiplicity involved in its changing activit~ 
=--=- =-~-~~--=- -- -
God can be a person because personality does not necessaril 
imply either corporeality or dependent limitation. In its es-
sence it is selfhood, self-knowledge, and self-control--feeling, 
thinking, and willing. God (as all persons) by his very nature 
seeks comrrrunion with others in order to bring out his true self 
and intrinsic worth, and that of others. Absoluteness is not 
opposed to personality; the latter signifies that the Absolute 
or world-ground is intelligent and free. The religious values 
of fellowship with God and trust in his goodness both imply his 
personality, as does the consideration that man is like God. _ 
Also, personality is given in experience and contains in itself 
a solution of the fundamental problems of metaphysics as no im-
personal principle can. In the problems of unity and plurality, 
identity and change, God is self-conscious of his unity and un-
changingness throughout his changing and various activities. 
Being a person, God has complete knowledge of man's activities 
and difficulties, past, present, and future (to some extent). 
Because God is free to determine his activities, the world is 
not a necessary consequent of his nature but rather the free ex-
pression of his love. 
Knudson uses the concept goodness to describe the whole 
moral character of God. In the area of moral rectitude, God is 
the ground of moral distinctions and the perfect realization of 
the moral ideal. In the area of benevolence, God's love seeks 
the redemption of men and fellowship with them. His insistence 
upon righteousness is basic to his love for man; for love is the 
underlying motive whi ch seeks proper actions as a means to the 
happiness of the society of persons. Hence he hates sin and all 
things detrimental to this .society but expresses redemptive love 
toward the sinner. From a phil?sophical vi ewpoint , Knudso n uses 
the analogical, t he empirical and the aprioristic arguments as a 
basis for his belief that God is good. Then he concludes that 
there is no antinomy between his love and absoluteness since his 
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eternal creation has been free and actuated by love. His love 
is manifested both in his creation and in his attitude towards 
his creatures. 
In tracing the problem of suffering or natural evil, Knud-
son finds that the dominant Old Testament view was that evil was 
retributive, while the prevailing New Testament one is that it 
is pedagogical or disciplinary. For Augustine, evil is either 
sin or the punishment for sin. He developed the doctrine of 
original sin to account for suffering not traceable to sin. Yet 
evil does not really exist; it is only the diminution of the 
good and has no being apart from it. Bayle diu not feel that 
this conception was adequate ana argued that evil cannot be har-
monized with an almighty and all-merciful Creator. Leibniz an-
swered that imperfection is a rational necessity and that evil 
was a form of imperfection. Both Kant and Knudson agree that 
each of the preceding theodicies has been inadequate. They ac-
cept the primacy of the practical reason, the absolute worth of 
the moral personality and the instrumental nature of the natural 
world. Thus suffering has meaning as it contributes to the de-
velopment of moral character. This is for Knudson a practical 
solution to the problem, but he openly avows that the problem 
is theoretically insoluble. Yet he offer s several considerations 
which (though each is only partly valid) do help to ru&ke tne 
problem more intellig ible. He reJects all views limiting God 
externally. and what he describes as the monistic-dualistic view 
of Brightman. This latte r view is that God's will is limited by 
nonvoluntary aspec ts of his nature, called The Gi ven, so that he 
cannot create entirely as he would like. And even though he 
controls The Given, yet it is an i n evitable ingredient in all 
experience and is the source of t he suffering in the universe. 
But Knudson's criticisms of this theory are shown to be inad e-
quate. This leads to the conclusion that either Knuds on must 
present more adequate criticisms of this view or must limi t God's 
________ power __ ~ ~ siri!ilar man~er __ to ~hat _9f Brig_l:!_tman~.e_ _ view. __ Otherwise 
163 
164 
- ~ - ----- ~_....:~~~ ·-- ----- -------- ------- -- ------
his view remains incoherent and inconsistent. 
Due to the fact that there was a unique presence of God in 
Christ, theologians developed the concept of the Trinity to ac-
count for this presence. The last major stage in this develop-
ment was the Augustinian view which states that there are three 
Pers ons of complete equality in the Trinity. This has become 
the traditional Christian view of the Trinity which Knudson in 
part rejects due to certain stated objections. Yet he tries to 
retain its values. This he accomplishes to a ~ajar extent in 
his own view tha.t God is one person who manifests himself in 
three modes (immanent in world, incarnat e in Christ, and as sanc-
tifying Spirit in human redemption). Thus he views Jesus to be 
human in spirit, soul, body and ego, yet divine in his unique 
dependence upon God. 
In the last chapter, criticisms and evaluations are given 
of Knudson's view of God. Many critics favor Knudson's view; 
some are critical of the presuppositions of his view; and others 
find difficulty with his conceptions of the personality of God 
or of the Trinity. To a major extent these adverse criticisms 
are unwarranted. But the applicable comments of Lewis, Tsanoff, 
Tennant, Ross, .Montague, Joad, Hartshorne, and Brightman do seem 
to indicate that Knudson must view God under more limitations so 
as to be able to develop a theoretical solution to the problem 
of suffering and a more empirically coherent conception of God. 
On all other maj or aspects, his view does seem to be coherent. 
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